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Chapter 1 (Merlin Penny: Education and Work-Life Earnings) deals with the
lifetime perspective of education and earnings whereof little is known since a large part of
existing literature is concerned with estimating the returns to education. Therefore the
purpose of this chapter is to calculate and analyze how age-earnings proﬁles and work-
life earnings diﬀer for educational groups. Work-life earnings describe the accumulated
earnings from labor market entry to retirement. The main contributions are using
longitudinal data with precise educational information to calculate work-life earnings
and introducing a measure of work-life earnings that includes periods when individuals
have no earnings due to not being employed. Foregone earnings during education are
also calculated. A German dataset is used, i.e. survey data from the adult cohort of the
National Educational Panel Study (NEPS). The survey data is linked to social security
records (NEPS-SC6-ADIAB) to attain data on employment spells and earnings subject
to the social insurance contribution. This data covers individuals that are born between
1944 and 1989 while the administrative data ranges from 1975 to 2011. The empirical
proceeding is similar to related literature, i.e. wages are estimated that are censored due
to being above the social insurance contribution limit. The selectivity of non-consent to
record linkage is also investigated. Then the gross daily wages and days in employment
in a year are used to create age-earnings proﬁles and calculate the present value of
work-life earnings at age 18. The ﬁndings are that, on average, high skilled men earn
2.3 million EUR over the course of their working life. This is about 0.7 million EUR
more than a medium skilled individual earns (1.7 million EUR). Foregone earnings of
high skilled men during education as a fraction of work-life earnings are 3.9 percent.
High skilled women earn, on average, only 0.3 million EUR more than medium skilled
women. The results show that including periods where individuals are not employed
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makes a substantial diﬀerence in work-life earnings. At the same time foregone earnings
during education can also add up to a large fraction of work-life earnings.
Chapter 2 (Merlin Penny: Grades in Primary School and Educational
Opportunity - An Empirical Analysis for Germany) investigates whether school
reports should include grades or verbal assessments in the ﬁrst years of primary school.
A large part of existing pedagogical literature is concerned with this question. Very
little is known, however, about the eﬀects of actual reforms that led to later grading
on education opportunity. In theory several channels are possible through which verbal
reports could increase the likelihood of children with low parental education to transition
to upper secondary school. The feedback parents receive in a verbal assessment is more
extensive. Since cognitive costs of interpreting a school report are likely to diﬀer for
parents with diﬀerent educational background this could mean that verbal assessments
could also change educational opportunity. However, verbal reports could also be seen as
a less precise signal concerning the cognitive abilities of a child. Other possible channels
could be that teachers use verbal reports to strategically give distorted feedback to
boost the conﬁdence of students who are less conﬁdent due to their socio-economic
background. The research question for this project is therefore: what eﬀect does later
grading in primary school have on educational transitions and educational achievement
for students with diﬀerent parental background. A reform is analyzed for Germany
which meant federal states replaced grades in school reports by verbal assessments in the
ﬁrst classes of primary school starting in the 1970s. The data comes from the National
Educational Panel Study (NEPS) for Germany as well as law gazettes of federal states.
The NEPS includes 17,140 individuals born between 1944 and 1989 with information
about educational transitions and family background. Law gazettes oﬀer insight into
the exact time of introduction of verbal reports. A diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator is
employed for the empirical strategy. This allows using variation given by the diﬀerent
timing of the implementation of the reform in federal states to identify a causal eﬀect.
Although results show that the coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant the estimates provide
some evidence for an eﬀect of later grading on the transition to upper secondary school.
Findings are robust to the inclusion of institutional rules concerning the transition to
upper secondary school.
Chapter 3 (Katja Görlitz, Merlin Penny and Marcus Tamm: The Long-
term Eﬀect of Age at School Entry on Competencies in Adulthood) studies
xii
whether school starting age (SSA) diﬀerentials continue into adulthood or fade away
after leaving school. The previous literature has shown that children who enter school
at a more advanced age outperform their younger classmates on competency tests taken
between kindergarten and Grade 10. This chapter thereby contributes to this litera-
ture but also complements the literature investigating the long-run eﬀects of SSA on
individuals' wages and employment. The adult competencies are measured in compre-
hensive tests as part of a representative survey of individuals between 23 and 71. The
identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of SSA on competencies relies on an instrumental variable
strategy that exploits the state- and year-speciﬁc rules given by the cut-oﬀ dates. The
empirical model controls for a full set of month-of-birth dummies. The model can also
account for age-at-test eﬀects. This chapter contributes to the literature by addition-
ally disentangling relative from absolute age eﬀects, which is important from a policy
perspective. Relative age measures the age diﬀerence compared to the ages of the other
students within the cohort. Absolute age refers to the age (and, thus, maturity) when
starting school. Results show that the impact of SSA on math and text comprehension
measured in adulthood are considerably smaller than what the literature has shown for
children in school. Further, both estimates are statistically insigniﬁcant. In contrast,
the eﬀect of SSA on receptive vocabulary is sizable in adulthood, with a one-year-higher
SSA increasing competency by around a third of a standard deviation. These ﬁndings
survive several tests of robustness. When disentangling the eﬀect of SSA into an ab-
solute and a relative age eﬀect, we ﬁnd that receptive vocabulary is aﬀected solely by
absolute age. Policies that shift the cut-oﬀ to an earlier date, making some children
older by one year at school entry, should lead to an improvement in the average receptive
vocabulary competencies even in adulthood.
Chapter 4 (Patrick Nüß and Merlin Penny: Now You See Me! Ethnic
Discrimination in the Market for Apprenticeships) is about discrimination in
the labor market for apprenticeships. Since individuals without German citizenship
have only half the apprenticeship entry rate compared to those with German citizen-
ship it is important to understand what role discrimination plays. In this chapter a
correspondence experiment is used to study ethnic discrimination in the hiring mar-
ket for apprenticeships in Germany. We send ﬁctitious applications with German and
Arabic-sounding names to real vacancies, augmenting applications with a short motiva-
tional video. These video introductions by applicants serve as a simple way of extending
xiii
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employer insight into the personality and motivation of applicants and therefore solving
the problem of discrimination in the hiring market for apprenticeships. This is done
with the intention of decreasing potential statistical discrimination. Previous literature
provide evidence for statistical, taste-based and attention discrimination in German-
speaking labor markets. We ﬁnd that applications with German-sounding names are on
average twice as likely to receive an invitation for a job interview. Providing a video in
the application that gives employers more insight into the personality and motivation of
applicants increases invitations to job interviews for Arabic-sounding names. However,
since these conditional eﬀects are insigniﬁcant we interpret the results as weak evidence
of videos increasing invitations for Arabic-sounding names. Furthermore, despite the
fact that videos only have observable eﬀects on Arabic-sounding names, the videos of
German-sounding names are viewed 37% more often compared to the Arabic-sounding
names, which is in support of attention discrimination.
xiv
German Summary
Die vier Kapitel dieser Dissertation sind voneinander unabhängig und beschäftigen
sich mit verschiedenen Themen der ökonomischen Bildungsforschung. Das Vorwort
und die jeweiligen Einleitungen der einzelnen Kapitel motivieren die unterschiedlichen
Forschungsfragen und setzen sie in einen Zusammenhang mit der Literatur der Bil-
dungsforschung.
Kapitel 1 (Merlin Penny: Education and Work-Life Earnings) handelt
von der Lebensperspektive von Einkommen und Bildung worüber vergleichsweise wenig
bekannt ist da ein Großteil bestehender Literatur sich mit dem Schätzen von Bil-
dungsrenditen beschäftigt. Deshalb soll die Forschungsfrage beantwortet werden wie
Alters-Verdienst-Proﬁle und Lebenseinkommen sich nach Bildung unterscheiden. Leben-
seinkommen beschreiben dabei die akkumulierten Einkommen vom Arbeitsmarkteintritt
bis zum Renteneintritt. Der Beitrag des Kapitels liegt darin Längsschnitts Daten sowie
zuverlässige Bildungsdaten zu verwenden und Perioden ohne Erwerbstätigkeit bei der
Lebenseinkommensberechnung zu berücksichtigen. Neben der Berechnung von Leben-
seinkommen werden auch entgangenen Einnahmen während eines Studiums berechnet.
Als Datengrundlage dient die Erwachsenenkohorte des Nationalen Bildungspanels für
Deutschland (NEPS) verknüpft mit administrativen Daten über sozialversicherungspﬂichtige
Beschäftigungszeiten und deren Erwerbsbiographie (NEPS-SC6-ADIAB). Diese Daten
umfassen Individuen welche zwischen 1944 und 1989 geboren sind während die admin-
istrativen Daten von 1975 bis 2011 reichen. Die Methodische Vorgehensweise orien-
tiert sich an bestehender Literatur und beinhaltet das Schätzen von Löhnen welche
über der Beitragsbemessungsgrenze der Sozialversicherung liegen und das Überprüfen
einer möglichen Selektion bei der Zustimmung von Individuen zu der Verknüpfung der
Daten aus der Sozialversicherung mit den Befragungsdaten. Darauf folgend werden
xv
GERMAN SUMMARY
aus Bruttotageslöhnen und den Tagen in Beschäftigung in einem Altersjahr Alters-
Verdienst-Proﬁle erstellt und Barwerte von Lebenseinkommen zum Alter 18 berechnet.
Ergebnisse zeigen, dass ein männlicher Universitätsabsolvent im Durchschnitt mit 2,3
Mio. EUR über das Erwerbsleben 0,7 Mio. EUR mehr verdient als eine Person die
eine Lehre durchläuft (1,7 Mio. EUR). Die entgangenen Einnahmen von hochgebilde-
ten Männern während der Ausbildung betragen etwa 3,9 Prozent vom Lebenseinkom-
men. Hochgebildete Frauen verdienen im Leben im Durchschnitt nur 0,3 Mio. EUR
mehr als Mittelgebildete Frauen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass es einen wesentlichen
Unterschied macht welches Einkommenskonzept verwendet wird, das heißt ob lediglich
Vollzeit-Beschäftigungszeiten betrachtet werden oder ob auch Perioden wo Individuen
kein Einkommen haben hinzugefügt werden. Gleichzeitig können entgangene Einnah-
men während eines Studiums einen Großteil der Lebenseinkommen ausmachen.
Kapitel 2 (Merlin Penny: Grades in Primary School and Educational
Opportunity - An Empirical Analysis for Germany) beschäftigt sich mit der
Forschungsfrage ob Schulzeugnisse in den ersten Jahren der Grundschule Noten oder
Verbalbeurteilungen enthalten sollten. Dieser Frage widmet sich bereits ein Großteil
bestehender pädagogischer Literatur, jedoch ist so gut wie nichts bekannt über die Ef-
fekte einer Schulreform welche zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt der Notengebung führt
auf die Bildungschancen. In der Theorie sind mehrere Kanäle denkbar durch die Ver-
balbeurteilungen die Bildungschancen von Kindern mit niedriger elterlicher Bildung
erhöhen. Generell bekommen Eltern durch verbale Beurteilungen ein umfassenderes
Feedback über die kognitiven Fähigkeiten ihres Kindes. Wenn kognitive Kosten für El-
tern mit niedriger Bildung bei Noten höher sind können Verbalbeurteilungen helfen Bil-
dungschancen zu erhöhen. Auf der anderen Seite haben Lehrer durch Verbalbeurteilung
die Möglichkeit gezieltes verzerrtes Feedback an Schüler mit niedrigem sozioökonomis-
chem Hintergrund zu geben um das Selbstvertrauen zu stärken. Der Forschungsfrage
welche sich dieses Kapitel widmet ist damit welche Eﬀekte eine spätere Notengebung
in der Grundschule auf Bildungsübergänge und Bildungsabschlüsse für Schüler mit un-
terschiedlicher elterlicher Bildung hat. Dazu wird eine Reform untersucht welche in
Deutschland ab 1970 in den Bundesländern die Notengebung in Schulzeugnissen durch
Verbalbeurteilungen in der ersten und in manchen Bundesländern auch in der zweiten
Klasse ersetzt hat. Die Befragungsdaten kommen von der Erwachsenenkohorte des
Nationalen Bildungspanels für Deutschland (NEPS) und umfassen 17.140 Individuen
xvi
welche zwischen 1944 und 1989 geboren wurden. Umfassende Information über Bil-
dungsverläufe und Familienhintergrund sind darin vorhanden. Regelungen zu den Zeit-
punkten der Einführung von Notenzeugnissen kommen aus den Gesetz- und Verord-
nungsblättern der Bundesländer. Die empirische Methodik beinhaltet einen Diﬀerenz
von Diﬀerenzen Ansatz. Damit werden Variationen welche durch die unterschiedlichen
Zeitpunkte der Einführung der Reform in den Bundesländern gegeben sind genutzt
um kausale Eﬀekte zu schätzen. Obwohl die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Koeﬃzien-
ten nicht signiﬁkant sind liefern die Schätzungen Belege für einen Eﬀekt von einer
späterer Notengebung auf den Übergang zur Sekundarschule. Die Ergebnisse sind robust
wenn Informationen zu institutionellen Regelungen für den Übergang zur Sekundarstufe
hinzugefügt werden.
Kapitel 3 (Katja Görlitz, Merlin Penny and Marcus Tamm: The Long-
term Eﬀect of Age at School Entry on Competencies in Adulthood) unter-
sucht ob Unterschiede in Kompetenzen aufgrund des Alters bei der Einschulung bis
ins Erwachsenenalter bestehen oder nach dem Schulabschluss bereits verschwinden.
Frühere Literatur zeigt, dass Kinder, die bei der Einschulung älter sind als ihre Mitschüler,
da sie deutlich vor dem Einschulungsstichtag geboren sind, besser als ihre jüngeren
Mitschüler in Kompetenztests abschneiden, die erst kurz vor dem Einschulungsstichtag
geboren sind. Diese Erkenntnis der bisherigen Literatur wurde bisher jedoch nur für
Kompetenzen bis zur 10. Klassenstufe belegt. Die vorliegende Untersuchung betra-
chtet, ob sich der Einﬂuss des Alters bei der Einschulung auf Kompetenzen auch im
Erwachsenenalter fortsetzt. Dazu wird eine Befragung aus Deutschland genutzt, die
Kompetenztests in Mathematik und Deutsch umfasst. Die Kompetenztests werden in
umfangreichen Tests welche Teil einer repräsentativen Befragung für Individuen zwis-
chen 23 und 71 sind gemessen. Die Identiﬁkation der Eﬀekte greift auf Variation im
Einschulungsstichtag zwischen Bundesländern und über die Zeit hinweg zurück. Dafür
wird ein Instrumenten Variablen Schätzer angewandt während das Empirische Modell
auch für Indikatoren für die Geburtsmonate kontrolliert. Des weiteren berücksichtigt
das Modell auch Eﬀekte für das Alter zum Zeitpunkt eines Tests und separiert relative
von absoluten Alterseﬀekten. Letzteres ist relevant um Politikempfehlungen treﬀen zu
können. Das relative Alter misst die Unterschiede im Vergleich zu dem Alter der anderen
Schüler in der selben Kohorte. Im Gegensatz dazu bezieht sich das absolute Alter auf
das Einschulungsalter (und damit Reife) beim Schulstart. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass
xvii
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die Eﬀekte des Einschulungsalters auf Kompetenzen in Mathe und im Textverständnis
im Erwachsenenalter wesentlich geringer sind als jene welche die Literatur für Kinder
im Schulalter ﬁndet. Des weiteren sind beide Schätzungen statistisch insigniﬁkant.
Im Gegensatz dazu ist der Eﬀekt des Einschulungsalters auf rezeptiven Wortschatz
im Erwachsenenalter ausgeprägt. Ein um ein Jahr höheres Einschulungsalter erhöht
hier die Kompetenz um etwa ein Drittel einer Standardabweichung. Die Ergebnisse
bestehen mehrere Robustheitstests. Beim Entﬂechten von absoluten und relativen Al-
terseﬀekten zeigt sich, dass die Eﬀekte für den rezeptiven Wortschatz ausschließlich vom
absoluten Alter getrieben sind. Politikmaßnahmen welche den Einschulungsstichtag zu
einem früheren Datum verschieben und damit einige Kinder bei der Einschulung um
ein Jahr älter machen sollten daher zu einer Verbesserung in den durchschnittlichen
Kompetenzen für den rezeptiven Wortschatz im Erwachsenenalter führen.
Kapitel 4 (Patrick Nüß and Merlin Penny: Now You See Me! Ethnic
Discrimination in the Market for Apprenticeships) untersucht Diskriminierung
im Arbeitsmarkt für Lehrstellen. Da Individuen ohne deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit
nur etwa eine halb so große Ausbildungseintrittsrate haben verglichen zu denen mit
deutscher Staatsangehörigkeit ist es wichtig zu verstehen welche Rolle Diskriminierung
spielt. In diesem Kapitel wird ein so genanntes Correspondence Experiment verwen-
det um ethnische Diskriminierung im Bewerbermarkt für Lehrstellen in Deutschland
zu erforschen. Wir senden ﬁktive Bewerbungen mit Deutsch und Arabisch klingenden
Namen zu echten Vakanzen und fügen Bewerbungen kurze Motivationsvideos hinzu.
Diese Videovorstellungen der Bewerber dienen als ein einfacher Weg dem Arbeitgeber
einen tieferen Einblick in die Persönlichkeit und Motivation von Bewerbern zu geben
und somit zu der Lösung des Problems der Diskriminierung im Bewerbermarkt für
Lehrstellen beizutragen. Dies wird mit der Absicht getan potentielle statistische Diskri-
minierung zu verringern. Frühere Literatur ﬁndet für deutschsprachige Arbeitsmärkte
Belege für statistische Diskriminierung, Diskriminierung basierend auf einer persön-
lichen Präferenz eines Arbeitgebers (taste-based) sowie Diskriminierung beruhend auf
der Aufmerksamkeit mit welcher ein Arbeitgeber eine Bewerbung sichtet. Die Ergeb-
nisse zeigen, dass Bewerber mit Deutsch klingenden Namen im Durchschnitt eine dop-
pelt so hohe Wahrscheinlichkeit haben zum Vorstellungsgespräch eingeladen zu werden.
Das Beifügen eines Videos in der Bewerbung erhöht die Wahrscheinlichkeit für Indi-
viduen mit Arabisch klingenden Namen zum Vorstellungsgespräch eingeladen zu werden.
xviii
Da diese bedingten Eﬀekte jedoch insigniﬁkant sind interpretieren wir die Ergebnisse
als schwache Evidenz dafür, dass Videos Einladungen für Arabisch klingende Namen
erhöhen. Obwohl die Videos nur Eﬀekte auf Einladungen für Arabisch klingende Na-
men haben werden Videos von Personen mit Deutsch klingenden Namen trotzdem 37%
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Preface
This dissertation with the title Four Essays in the Economics of Education studies a
broad spectrum of research questions. The topics covered range from the documentation
of earnings over the working life to school grading, school starting age and discrimination
in the labor market for apprenticeships. Therefore the chapters can in some way be seen
as a reﬂection of the evolution in the economics of education where after many years
of research on the monetary returns to education more and more research is devoted
to cognitive and non-cognitive skills. At the same time behavioral and experimental
economics have also started playing a more important role in educational research.
The relevance of estimating the returns to education becomes apparent when regard-
ing the strong positive association of educational levels with labor market, health and
social outcomes (Heckman et al., 2011). The theoretical basis for the monetary returns
to education is laid by early work of Becker (1964), Schultz (1961) and Mincer (1958) on
human capital theory where investments into human capital increase productivity and
wages. The years of schooling are an essential part of this concept and have until now
been the most used measure for human capital acquired. I contribute to this literature
by documenting work-life earnings while also focusing on calculating foregone earnings
which are opportunity costs of education and therefore important indirect costs. While
the educational achievement has a strong association with earnings (Card, 1999) these
again are positively associated to other long-term outcomes, e.g. life satisfaction (Kah-
neman and Deaton, 2010) and longer lifetime (Chetty et al., 2016). At the same time
additional schooling causally increases the performance in intelligence tests in adulthood
(Carlsson et al., 2014). This is relevant since cognitive skills are known to also explain
labor market outcomes (Heckman et al., 2006) and suggests that lifetime earnings and
cognitive skills can be seen as equally important labor market outcomes. I study both
in separate chapters of this dissertation with diﬀerent research questions.
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PREFACE
The importance of studying family inputs in the economics of education becomes
clear when considering that there is ample evidence for a strong association between
parental background and educational paths in Germany (Bos et al., 2007; Dustmann,
2004). Even though some of this research indicates that early educational track choices
can be revised (Dustmann et al., 2017) complementing research does suggest that later
career choices remain highly selective with respect to parental background (Biewen and
Tapalaga, 2017). In fact, family inputs are one important component in the education
production where a student's achievement can be seen as a function of diﬀerent inputs
that also include school and peer inputs as well as individual abilities (Koch et al., 2015).
I study parental background in the context of determining the optimal time to start
grading in primary school and the eﬀect of later grading on educational opportunity.
However, family inputs also play a role in this dissertation for instance for the school
starting age where parents can delay the school entry of their child by a year if they
believe that this is an optimal decision.
The strong relationship between parental background and educational career paths
can be reinforced by expectations teachers tend to have for the performance of students
with diﬀerent parental background (Figlio, 2005). Lower grades given to pupils with for-
eign origin (Sprietsma, 2013) show discrimination in this area of research. The question
I study which type of feedback (grades or verbal reports) helps disadvantaged families
the most to improve the educational achievement of their children is therefore related
to this. Discrimination on the basis of ethnicity and socio-economic status is not only
found in form of grading and teacher recommendations but also in many other areas of
life. One of these is the labor market hiring process where for instance youths with a mi-
gration background applying for an apprenticeship are much less likely to be invited to a
job interview than those without migration background (Beicht, 2016). Avoiding initial
small failures in school and the apprenticeship labor market caused by discrimination
becomes even more important considering that these can lead to further academic or
even vocational failures through self-fulﬁlling prophecies (Glover et al., 2017). There-
fore, the last chapter of this dissertation studies whether video applications can reduce
discrimination in the apprenticeship labor market.
The data used in this work are from the National Educational Panel Study (NEPS)
for Germany as well as data collected in a ﬁeld experiment for Germany. Therefore the
2
German education system and its development over time is of special relevance. Edu-
cation in Germany is characterized by the educational autonomy of the federal states
which was granted for the West German states in 1949. In the following decades up
until now a multitude of educational reforms were introduced at diﬀerent points in time.
Some of the reforms during this time include grading reforms as well as cutoﬀ dates
that eﬀect the school starting age. These are addressed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.
Both evaluations rely methodologically on exploiting the variation of the time of im-
plementation of the reforms between states. The adult cohort of the NEPS includes
the educational biographies of individuals born as far back as 1944 and therefore of-
fers an optimal data set for the analysis and a basis for Chapter 1 where the work-life
education-earnings for far-ranging cohorts are calculated. By evaluating reforms that
took place in Germany I contribute to the human capital literature that does not use
US data. Since the education system in Germany diﬀers to that in other countries,
e.g. students do not have high direct costs resulting from education like in the US, it is
necessary to increase the number of studies that look at diﬀerent institutional settings.
The chapters in this dissertation diﬀer not only in the topics covered but also in
the empirical methods used depending on the research question, data availability and
structure. The empirical methods applied range from descriptive evidence (Chapter 1)
to the more causal diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (Chapter 2) and instrumental variable anal-
ysis (Chapter 3) and ﬁnally a correspondence experiment (Chapter 4). Table 1 gives
an overview of the research questions, data, methods and results of all four chapters.
Identifying causal treatment eﬀects in educational research is necessary to be able to
make policy recommendations. For instance, for policy makers to decide whether to
increase or decrease school starting age they can not simply rely on a simple estimation
of school starting age and years of education or other long-term outcomes. Since the
school starting age is endogenous and dependent on a cutoﬀ date it is necessary to
either rely on a instrumental variables or a regression discontinuity design. The reason
for this is that children who belong to the younger children of a cohort are not directly
comparable to their classmates who are up to one year older when starting school.
Researchers often use natural experiments to identify causal treatment eﬀects when
they are not able to perform randomized controlled trials. For many research questions
it is not possible to perform ﬁeld experiments due to the simple fact that a researcher
faces limited time and ﬁnancial resources. At the same time studying school starting
3
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age or grading in school reports would require randomly assigning individuals to treat-
ment and control groups and would therefore be ethically questionable. Studying ethic
discrimination in the hiring market for apprenticeships on the other hand allows the use
of a ﬁeld experiment which identiﬁes causal treatment eﬀects. Such a correspondence
experiment can also be conducted in a reasonable time frame since researchers are only
interested in whether the applicant is invited to a job interview or not and are not
estimating long-term eﬀects.
This dissertation commences by studying one of the most prominent research ques-
tions in the economics of education, i.e. the general relationship between education
and work-life earnings (Chapter 1). Documenting the lifetime perspective of education
and earnings has in the past rarely been done due to data availability. Most studies in
the past focus on using cross-sectional data and estimating the coeﬃcient of the years
of schooling in earnings functions. I present results of age-earnings proﬁles, work-life
earnings and foregone earnings and make a distinction by using diﬀerent samples for
individuals who are employed throughout their career and those who are not.
The following Chapter 2 studies school grading and educational opportunity, topics
which have during recent years become more and more important in educational re-
search. I contribute to a growing amount of research in this ﬁeld by analyzing the eﬀect
of abolishing grades in primary school reports on educational opportunity as measured
by secondary school track choice for students with diﬀerent parental education. The
results are especially interesting for countries with early tracking systems and countries
where educational achievement is highly dependent on parental background.
In Chapter 3 the causal eﬀect of school starting age on adult competencies is studied.
While there exists ample research on the eﬀects of school starting age on in-school out-
comes little is known about the long-term eﬀects of age at school entry on competencies
in adulthood. This chapter therefore contributes to a growing amount of educational
research on cognitive skills and complements existing studies that analyze the eﬀect
of school starting age on earnings. While previous literature suggests that the eﬀects
of age at school entry get smaller as children grow older little is still known whether
these eﬀects remain important during adulthood. The competencies focused on are
mathematical literacy, text comprehension and receptive vocabulary. At the same time




Finally, Chapter 4 consists of a correspondence experiment that aims to ﬁnd out
whether video applications can diminish ethnic discrimination in the labor market for
apprenticeships. In Germany, individuals without German citizenship have only half the
apprenticeship entry rate compared to those with German citizenship (BMBF, 2018).
This is explained with diﬀerences in occupational preferences, regional labor markets,
limited proﬁciency in the German language and participation rate in internships. The
chapter aims at ﬁnding out what role discrimination plays. Given the importance of the
school-to-work transition for future labor market prospects, it is important to under-
stand the relevance of discrimination and to search for solutions in the school-to-work
transition. Therefore a ﬁeld experiment is conducted by sending applications to va-
cancies for apprenticeship positions. The applications diﬀer in the applicants ethnicity
and the inclusion of a short motivational video. This allows employers to gain insight
into the personality of applicants and therefore oﬀers a solution to discrimination in the
hiring market for apprenticeships. Previous experiments have found both statistical dis-
crimination (Kaas and Manger, 2012) and taste-basted discrimination (Weichselbaumer,
2016a) in German-speaking labor markets. By including videos in applications it can
be tested whether potential statistical discrimination can be decreased.
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Chapter 1
Education and Work-Life Earnings
1.1 Introduction
Empirically, higher levels of education are generally associated with higher labor mar-
ket, health and social outcomes (Heckman et al., 2011). The most prominent associa-
tion, however, is that of the relationship between education and earnings (Card, 1999).
Higher earnings have not only been found to improve individual evaluation of life (Kah-
neman and Deaton, 2010), but to lead to greater longevity (Chetty et al., 2016) while
higher relative earnings increase well-being (Luttmer, 2005). High work-life earnings
also have a positive impact on retirement beneﬁts from social security contributions
(Tamborini et al., 2009). Hence, the calculation of work-life earnings, which are deﬁned
as the cumulative yearly earnings from labor market entry until retirement, is of special
interest since individuals desire to maximize their utility of lifetime earnings by choos-
ing a certain level of education. The theory of investment in human capital which was
introduced by Becker (1964) lays the theoretical basis for the calculation of work-life
earnings. In his model, investment in education and training increases productivity and
wages. At the same time this model and also the school-work model by Ben-Porath
(1967) emphasize the importance of foregone earnings during training.
In the present study I document diﬀerences in age-earnings proﬁles and work-life
earnings for educational groups. Data from the National Educational Panel Study
(NEPS) are linked to longitudinal administrative social security records for West Ger-
many. In this way reliable educational information from survey data and employment
variables from administrative data can be used. The paper aims at contributing to the
7
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literature on work-life earnings in respect to education in the following ways:
Firstly, the aim of this paper is to ﬁnd out how work-life earnings and age-earnings
proﬁles diﬀer for educational groups. The calculation of work-life earnings includes ﬁnd-
ing out how large a fraction of work-life earnings is made up of the opportunity costs
of education, i.e. foregone earnings of students. Many studies have come to the conclu-
sion that special attention should be paid to earnings that university students forgo by
not working (Ben-Porath, 1967; Becker, 1964; Schultz, 1960). However, foregone earn-
ings have in the past mostly not been calculated separately because they are implicitly
included in returns to education estimates (Heckman et al., 2006; Card, 1999).
Secondly, data limitations hinder the analysis of work-life earnings to a large extent.
This study contributes to the literature through the use of panel data which allows
the calculation of work-life earnings of several generations for men and women. In
the past studies calculating work-life earnings have, for the most part, relied on cross-
sectional pooled data due to far-ranging longitudinal data being unavailable (Schmillen
and Stüber, 2014; Julian and Kominski, 2011; Carnevale et al., 2011; Day and New-
burger, 2002). These studies assume that earnings of older and younger cohorts are
similar when calculating work-life earnings. Other studies that calculate work-life earn-
ings with panel data either analyze diﬀerent countries, e.g. Tamborini et al. (2015) for
the US, or focus on measures of inequality instead of educational levels (Bönke et al.,
2015).
Thirdly, a contribution is made by introducing a holistic measure of earnings that
is not restricted to certain subgroups of working individuals, e.g. full-time or full-
year employed, and can therefore yield work-life earnings that are representative for the
entire population. The measurement of earnings has been discussed by Card (1999) who
illustrates that the return to schooling is almost always higher for weekly and annual
earnings than it is for hourly wages because individuals with higher levels of schooling
work more. He notes that about two-thirds of the returns to education calculated by
using annual earnings data is due to the eﬀect of education on hourly wage while the rest
is due to hours per week and weeks per year. While research diﬀers in the working time
restrictions made for calculating work-life earnings, in most studies average earnings
of full-time workers are examined (Schmillen and Stüber, 2014; Day and Newburger,
2002). This restriction neglects the fact that labor supply of individuals changes to a
large extent during their working career for reasons such as unemployment, motherhood,
8
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early retirement and other circumstances. Hence, these are normally higher than average
work-life earnings for all workers, including part-time individuals and individuals that
work only part of the year (Day and Newburger, 2002). Therefore, diﬀerent sample
restrictions are used here: The ﬁrst sample is restricted to spells where individuals
are in an employment. The second sample includes periods where individuals have no
earnings due to voluntary or involuntary reasons. The distinction made here can answer
questions regarding the impact of accounting for periods where individuals have zero
earnings.
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 1.2 provides an overview of the relevant
literature. Section 1.3 describes the data and methodology. Section 1.4 examines age-
earnings proﬁles and work-life earnings. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Relevant literature
1.2.1 Human capital theory
The human capital theory literature starts devoting more relevance to work-life earnings
in the 1960s. Theoretical models developed by Becker (1964, 1962) also start to distin-
guish between direct costs and foregone earnings in human capital investment models
for workers receiving on-the-job training. In his model individuals invest in their hu-
man capital by choosing an educational level in order to increase future productivity
and wages. After comparing expected work-life earnings of these career decisions and
also considering the direct and indirect costs during education an educational level is
chosen.1 Human capital theory also predicts that earnings increase with experience
and additional investments in human capital are worth less at the end of the career
(Mincer, 1974). Ben-Porath (1967) develops a schooling choice model where the human
capital accumulation is modeled as an optimal path of investment in human capital
over an individual's life cycle. The human capital production function thereby explains
the growth of earnings with age. This model implies that late investments yield smaller
beneﬁts because of the shorter time span in which any gains of these investments can
be reaped. This explains why a rational decision of allocating time to investments in
education means investing at a young age (Ben-Porath, 1967).
1Taking into account preferences for leisure.
9
1. EDUCATION AND WORK-LIFE EARNINGS
1.2.2 Work-life earnings and other measures
The empirical literature calculating work-life earnings by educational groups mostly
uses cross-sectional data. While studies for the US ﬁnd individuals with a bachelor
degree earn on average between 2-3m USD during their career, a recent study for Ger-
many ﬁnds work-life earnings of 2.3m EUR for individuals with a university degree
(Schmillen and Stüber, 2014). Day and Newburger (2002) use data from the Current
Population Survey and ﬁnd that average earnings for individuals who work full-time
and year-round are higher than average earnings of all workers including people who
work part-time or for a part of the year. They also ﬁnd a substantial gap between
work-life earnings of men and women where women completing a bachelor degree earn
about 1m USD less than men with the same level of education. Julian and Komin-
ski (2011) use the American Community Survey to ﬁnd similar results for more recent
years (2006-08). The authors document the rise of the level of education in America in
the last 70 years and strong diﬀerences in the earnings ratios for gender and ethnicity.
Carnevale et al. (2011) conﬁrm these results in an extensive study of work-life earnings
by educational attainment. While these calculations are for full-time and full-year work-
ers, the authors note that many workers, especially women2, do not meet this criteria.
Other studies from the US use lifecycle earnings models to estimate work-life earnings:
Webber (2016) calculates expected work-life earnings for a median male person for col-
lege majors including explicit and implicit costs of education and ﬁnds that a four-year
STEM (science, technology, engineering or math) degree with average college expenses
has a value of about 2.1 million US Dollars. Examining data from the federal pension
insurance register for Germany, Bönke et al. (2015) oﬀer some insight into age-earnings
proﬁles for educational groups and pooled cohorts for the years 1935-49 and ﬁnd higher
earnings growth for higher educated individuals throughout their career. However, the
study does not present any estimates of work-life earnings. Tamborini et al. (2015) use
data for the US that span over 26 years. They also include individuals without positive
earnings and ﬁnd large diﬀerences in work-life earnings especially for women. However,
the interpretation of most of the mentioned studies using pooled cross-sectional proﬁles
is very diﬀerent to that of longitudinal proﬁles. The estimates from Table 1.1 give work-
life earnings for educational groups and answer the question as to how much individuals




Table 1.1: Reports of lifetime earnings
Study Lifetime earnings Age Range Data Years
Day and Newburger (2002) 2.3m USDa 25-64 CPS 1997-1999
Julian and Kominski (2011) 2.6/2.8m USDb 25-64 ACS 2006-2008
Carnevale et al. (2011) 2.2m USDc 25-64 ACS 2007-2009
Schmillen and Stüber (2014) 2.3m EURd 25-64 SIAB 2008-2010
Tamborini et al. (2015) 2.4m USDe 20-69 SIPP-IRS 1982-2008
Notes: The lifetime earnings are those for holding a bachelor degree (a, b, c) or other university
degree (d). a) Averages b) Medians for white males; lower value represents all workers, higher value
represents full-time year round workers. c) Median full-time year round workers d) Averages of full-
time workers. e) Median lifetime gross earnings for men Data: CPS: Current Population Survey;
ACS: American Community Survey; SIAB: Stichprobe der Integrierten Arbeitsmarktbiograﬁen
(i.e. administrative data for Germany); SIPP-IRS: Survey of Income and Program Participation
linked to Detailed Earnings Record.
with the same educational level are expected to earn in a hypothetical career. Thereby
assuming that cross-sectional earnings are representative for future earnings. This does
not depict changes in work-life earnings of birth cohorts. Interpreting these ﬁndings as
representative for a population would require the assumption that work-life earnings do
not diﬀer between cohorts.3 Another assumption is that there is no increase in produc-
tivity in the economy. Finally, it is assumed that individuals participate in the labor
force without interruption and work full-time and full-year. The present study, similar
to Tamborini et al. (2015), uses a less restrictive sample and includes individuals who
are not as attached to the labor market.
Apart from calculating work-life or lifetime earnings there are other measures used in
the literature. Since the Mincerian earnings function was introduced (Mincer, 1974), a
very strong focus has been placed on estimating the coeﬃcient of the years of schooling
by using this method. While this method also implicitly accounts for foregone earnings4
there have been diﬀerent methods in the literature to calculate returns. Various types
of returns and treatment eﬀects of higher education have been estimated, which vary,
3For instance, a person who has annual earnings in the year 2010 at age 30 is assumed to have the
same work-life earnings in 2030 as a person aged 50 in the year 2010.
4Schultz (1960) is one of the ﬁrst to estimate foregone earnings of students in high school, college
and university. He ﬁnds that foregone earnings are 43% of total costs in 1956 and are therefore as
important as direct costs.
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depending on which treatment eﬀects one is interested in (Dickson and Harmon, 2011;
Heckman et al., 2006). However, the Mincerian earnings function has been criticized
for a number of reasons. Heckman et al. (2006) argued that, in recent decades, the
assumption that log-earnings experience proﬁles are parallel across schooling levels has
failed.5 The function has also been criticized by Murphy and Welch (1990) who show
that earnings growth changes to a larger extent early in a career than later in a career
and therefore does not decline linearly and is not constant. The advantage of the
method is that causal estimates can be achieved if a source of exogenous variation is
found to identify wage returns.6 While this has become the preferred empirical method
when estimating the coeﬃcient of the years of schooling in an earnings function, the
full-discounting or elaborate method which was mainly used in the sixties is not in
wide use anymore. It compares lifetime earnings streams of diﬀerent educational levels
by using individual age-earnings proﬁles (Psacharopoulos, 2014; Becker, 1964) and has
the advantage that less assumptions are required. Since it is possible to construct these
proﬁles here this method will also be used in the present study. However, the focus of
this study remains providing descriptive evidence of age-earnings proﬁles and work-life
earnings.
1.3 Data and Methodology
1.3.1 Data
The data originate from the adult cohort of the German National Educational Panel
Study (NEPS), as described in Blossfeld et al. (2011) that are linked to social security
records by the German Institute for Employment Research (IAB).7 NEPS-SC6-ADIAB
is unique, as educational survey data is combined with retrospective administrative
information on earnings and employment over the working lives of individuals. The
NEPS Adult Starting Cohort was started in 2007 and covers 17,140 individuals born
5Even though the predictions that log-earnings age proﬁles diverge with age across schooling levels
and the variance of earnings over the life cycle has a U-shaped pattern do hold for recent data (Heckman
et al., 2006).
6Some examples for natural experiments include month of birth in combination with compulsory
schooling laws (Angrist and Krueger, 1991) or twins (Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994; Leigh and Ryan,
2008). However, as Card and Lemieux (2001) note, true randomization can almost never be achieved
completely and one should therefore interpret parameter estimates with caution.
7The structure of the administrative data in NEPS-SC6-ADIAB is described in Antoni et al. (2018).
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between 1944 and 1989. Up to the year 2013 ﬁve NEPS waves are available which oﬀer
detailed information on educational biographies, family background and employment.
From this data set the highest educational degrees are used for the analysis. The
retrospective collection of individuals' educational information in the NEPS can be
seen as reliable since there is a data revision module.8
The administrative data consists of social security records for the years 1975 to
2011. The data includes individuals who have one of the following statuses: employment
subject to social security contributions (recorded from 1975 onwards), marginal part-
time employment (recorded from 1999 onwards), receipt of beneﬁts (recorded from 1975
onwards) or registered as a job seeker at the Federal Employment Agency (recorded
from 2000 onwards). The administrative data does not include civil servants and self-
employed workers. The dataset is largely comprised by the original data without having
undergone anonymization processes.
A probabilistic record linkage is performed by the IAB, which also provides the
ﬁnal dataset. While the willingness of individuals to agree to be linked with the IAB
data is at 88.77 percent in the NEPS, the IAB reports that 91.35 percent of these
willing individuals were able to be matched by an exact, probabilistic or manual match
with social security records. These are all workers and employees. Compared to other
surveys, e.g. Sakshaug and Kreuter (2012), there is a high consent rate. Still, selectivity
of non-consent to record linkage can be a source of bias if education and earnings diﬀer
for the groups that agree or disagree to linkage. Here, Table 1.A.2 shows the diﬀerences
in means of characteristics. Applying a t-test reveals that both groups are similar
in terms of birth year, gender, years of education and years of education of parents.
However, the share of individuals who are married is slightly higher for individuals that
agreed to the linkage. This group is also less often self-employed. Another way to test
non-consent selectivity in a regression framework is to ﬁnd an exclusion restriction and
test for selection bias as suggested by Fertig and Görlitz (2013). The idea they propose
is to ﬁnd a measure that identiﬁes selection and apply a Heckman selection model. The
exclusion restriction applied here is the standard deviation of the interviewer speciﬁc
months which can be used as a measure of interviewer engagement in the survey. The
consideration behind this is that a low standard deviation is evidence of an interviewer
8After each interview a data revision is done and inconsistencies in the sequence of episodes are
identiﬁed. The respondent is then asked to add missing events and dates (Skopek, 2013).
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Table 1.2: Data restrictions
Observations
Employee history (Employment spells) 363,781
Without interns and student assistants in ﬁrms (since 1997) 360,421
Without individuals below the SCC ceiling (since 1999) 318,142
Without part time older workers (since 2000) 315,183
Only employees subject to SCC and those in vocational training 313,776
Without year 2012 (missing establishment data) 302,414
Spells split on monthly level 2,484,249
Notes: Dataset NEPS-SC6-ADIAB. SCC: social security contribution.
knowing speciﬁc issues of the questionnaire better. Table 1.A.1 show the results. The
coeﬃcient of the exclusion restriction is statistically signiﬁcant in the selection equation
while a higher standard deviation of months conducting the interviews is negatively
related to the individual's likelihood to give consent. Furthermore, ρ is insigniﬁcant
indicating no statistically signiﬁcant correlation between the unobservables of the wage
and the selection equation.
Other data quality issues are censored wages in the social security data as well as
some inconsistencies over time. The censoring is solved by imputing top coded wages.
Similarly to the literature (Reichelt, 2015; Dustmann et al., 2009; Gartner, 2005) this
is done by conducting a regression, predicting the right censored wages and adding an
error term. A detailed explanation of this can be found in Section 1.A.1.
In 1984 one-time payments became subject to social security tax and are therefore
only included in the administrative data starting from 1984. Steiner and Wagner (1998)
note that that ignoring this can increase earnings inequality. However, in the dataset
the structural break does not aﬀect many individuals as is argued in Section 1.A.2.
The following data restrictions are done as depicted in Table 1.2: From the adminis-
trative data for the years 1975-2011, employees subject to social security contributions
and those in vocational training are retained. The data is used only up to the year 2011
because establishment data which is indispensable in the regressions imputing censored
wages is missing for 2012. The following groups are dropped from the sample because
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Table 1.3: Samples
Men Women Total
Individuals 5,156 5,101 10,266
Panel Panel structure
1. Employed (EMPL) Unbalanced 104,111 86,957 191,068
2. Employed plus (EMPL+) Balanced 143,596 141,988 285,584
Notes: West German men and women; Dataset NEPS-SC6-ADIAB. Panel-years refer
to yearly earnings for years 1975-2011 and ages 18-64.
they are not available from 1975 onwards: individuals below the social security contri-
bution ceiling (added in 1999), interns and student assistants in ﬁrms (since 1997) and
part time older workers (since 2000). Only taking into account employees subject to
social security contributions and those in vocational training up to the year 2011 (since
establishment data is only available until 2011) leaves 302,414 employment spells which
relate to 2,484,249 employments on a monthly level. This sample consists of 10,266
individuals from West Germany, since administrative data on East Germany (1,809 in-
dividuals) is only available starting in 1990 and therefore not used. The sample consists
of about as many women as men for the birth years 1944 to 1989 (Table 1.3). The ﬁnal
samples used are described in the following section.
It is important to note that, although for some cohorts almost the entire working
life is observed, how far earnings trajectories can be observed depends on the birth year
of an individual. Since life-cycle employment patterns are not derived for future periods
individuals can only be observed up until the age with existent data. Thus, it should be
noted that for younger age cohorts lifecycle earnings are incomplete and should not
be compared to those of older cohorts.
1.3.2 Empirical proceeding
Table 1.3 shows two diﬀerent samples. Both are created by constructing yearly earnings
for every individual and ages 18 to 64 that fall into the years 1975 to 2011. The
ﬁrst sample (EMPL) solely relies on information from employment spells. This means
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that earnings are mostly positive.9 While the ﬁrst sample is restricted to spells where
individuals are in an employment (EMPL), the second sample includes periods where
individuals have no earnings in addition to this (EMPL+). The latter are panels where
ages without social security records are included with earnings of zero for every person-
age between 18 and 64. Neither of the samples is restricted to full-time or full-year
employments. The relevance of EMPL+ trajectories is higher for groups where labor
supply changes to a large extent over the course of life. Including periods for individuals
who are not in the labor force is seldom done in the literature, one study where these
are included in the calculation of work-life earnings is Tamborini et al. (2015).
Constructing age-earnings proﬁles is as follows: Using gross daily wages10, imputed
wages are used to calculate yearly earnings. This is done by summing up the days
in employment in a year and multiplying these with the corresponding daily wages.
Yearly earnings are deﬂated with a 2010 base year Consumer Price Index and weights
are generated and applied in order to attain representative results.11 The age-earnings
proﬁles are constructed by calculating the unweighted arithmetic means and medians of
annual earnings by age, separately according to educational levels. Work-life earnings
are the sum of yearly earnings during working ages. The present value (PV) of work-life
earnings is calculated by applying a 2 percent discount factor and calculating the sum
of annual discounted earnings to the year a person turns 18. The same discount factor
is also applied to annual earnings for the construction of age-earnings proﬁles.12
9Zero wages are only included if these are employment interruption notiﬁcations (e.g. maternity
leave, longer periods of sickness).
10These also cover the social security insurance components pension, health, unemployment, nursing
care and accident insurance.
11Weights are generated by using gender, region, education and birth cohort from the NEPS survey
adjusted to the marginal distribution of the Mikrozensus 2010 by the German Federal Statistical Oﬃce.
12As an alternative, the inﬂation adjusted 10-year government bond yield is also used. While the
2 percent discount factor is assumed to be the same for all individuals irrespective of their age and
the year they turn 18, the government bond yield implies diﬀering discount factors for individuals
(government bond yield the year a person turns 18). However, for both methods it is assumed that
the discount factor is constant over the course of life of an individual. The consideration behind these
assumptions is that using government bonds to calculate present values of work-life earnings is a more
accurate model of the investment decision of an individual at age 18. Between 1975-1995 the nominal
government bond yield is very high and on average 7.4 percent which results in very low work-life
earnings and less informative patterns of age-earnings proﬁles than without discounting. The results
are not displayed here but are available from the author upon request.
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Education is classiﬁed into low, medium and high skilled (see Section 1.A.3) to
best reﬂect the German education system, where apprenticeships traditionally play an
important role in the vocational training system. Low skilled are deﬁned as not having
completed an apprenticeship or any other post-secondary education and as not having
completed a high school degree. Medium skilled have an apprenticeship or a high school
degree, while high skilled have a university or university of applied science degree. In the
data, the actual average starting age of employment for men is 18.6 for low skilled (only
individuals under the age of 25 considered), 19.6 for medium skilled (only individuals
under the age of 30 considered) and 24.6 for high skilled (all individuals considered).
For the age-earnings proﬁles the ages of starting an employment are therefore set to
ages 18 for low skilled, 20 for medium skilled and 25 for high skilled and earnings are
assumed to be zero before that.
1.4 Analysis
1.4.1 Patterns of age-earnings proﬁles
Figure 1.A.1 documents diﬀerent age-earnings proﬁles for educational levels calculated
by annual mean earnings for both samples. Sample EMPL for men in (a) and EMPL
women in (b). Discounted with a 2 percent discount factor for EMPL men in (c) and
EMPL women in (d). The EMPL+ sample include periods with zero earnings for men
undiscounted in (e) and discounted in (g). For EMPL+ women these are in (f) and in
(h).
1.4.1.1 Employed (EMPL) sample
In the EMPL sample the tradeoﬀ of the human capital investment decision can be seen
in Figure 1.A.1a for men. The age-earnings proﬁle of a high skilled male worker is
much steeper than the proﬁle of the medium skilled worker and the high skilled worker
sacriﬁces earnings early in the career to receive higher earnings in the future. High
skilled men earn up to 72,408 EUR annually at the age of 48 and have an average
annual earnings growth of 9 percent between the ages 25 and 40. While proﬁles for
high skilled men follow an inverse u-shape this can not generally be said for proﬁles
of medium and low skilled. The ﬂat patterns for age-earnings proﬁles of medium and
low skilled are evidence for lower growth rates throughout the course of working life.
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As human capital theory predicts the yearly earnings increase with experience but at
a diminishing rate. For men average annual earnings growth between ages 20-35 is 7.9
percent for medium skilled and 5.3 percent for low skilled. While the earnings growth is
especially large for medium and low skilled men before the age of 30 and for high skilled
men before the age of 40 it steadily diminishes thereafter. The increase in earnings of
employed high skilled men (Figure 1.A.1a) for ages over 60 years could be explained by
the drop in yearly average earnings for individuals in their mid-ﬁfties. Individuals with
very high earnings seem to continue working after the age of 60, while lower earning
peers work less. This causes the remaining sample of the employed to be more selective.
Risk plays an important role when calculating work-life earnings due to uncertain
career paths and possible shocks. Dillon (2018) reports that a worker is willing to give
up at least 9 percent of her lifetime earnings to move from the most uncertain to the
safest occupation at the start of her career. Diﬀerent educational levels also lead to
career paths with varying unemployment, wage and other risk. Higher education in
most cases oﬀers higher work-life earnings and therefore also a better protection against
unemployment spells as can be seen in Figure 1.A.1a. However, risk-averse individuals
who choose this career path also face foregone earnings for a longer period of time.
These foregone earnings are calculated in subsequent sections.
The proﬁles of women in Figure 1.A.1b do not depict the inverse u-shape pattern
seen for high skilled men since annual earnings in all skill groups stay on a similar
level between ages 30 and 60. The highest annual earnings are reported for high skilled
women at age 52 with 39,154 EUR. The medium skilled group has the highest number
of observations and therefore oﬀers the most reliable results. The group shows a low
annual earnings growth. Earnings increase only at a decreasing rate already early in the
career for reasons such as maternity. For this reason the more extensive second sample
(EMPL+) used below is more informative for age-earnings proﬁles of women.
Discounted age-earnings proﬁles for men (Figure 1.A.1c) clearly show that earnings
at older ages are less valuable and that starting to work at younger ages with lower levels
of skill becomes more of an advantage with increasing interest rates. The highest present
value of an annual earning is then at a lower age. For high skilled men the highest annual
earnings are now at age 43 and are 43,582 EUR. For women the discounted proﬁles in
Figure 1.A.1d are at low levels in all education groups with 24,639 EUR being the
highest annual earnings for high skilled women at an early age of 31 years.
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Comparing these results to other studies using German data, Bönke et al. (2015) ﬁnd
similar patterns for pooled birth cohorts 1935-49, as does the report by Schmillen and
Stüber (2014) using earnings data from 2008-2010. However, these studies do not show
proﬁles separately for men and women. They also rely on educational information from
social security records known to be less accurate (Kruppe and Unger, 2014; Fitzenberger
et al., 2005). Literature for the US, i.e. Tamborini et al. (2015), ﬁnd similar diﬀerences
between education proﬁles of men and women and patterns over the course of life.
Since the proﬁles constructed by annual mean earnings rely on the imputation strat-
egy for top coded earnings, as a robustness check the proﬁles with annual median earn-
ings are constructed. These are depicted for men in the EMPL sample in Figure 1.A.2a
and suggest similar patterns of proﬁles.
1.4.1.2 Employed plus (EMPL+) sample
The EMPL+ proﬁles (Figure 1.A.1e, f, g and h), which refer to the sample that in-
clude periods with and without employment and zero earnings, are more compressed
compared to the EMPL proﬁles. The average diﬀerence in annual earnings between
the EMPL and the EMPL+ proﬁles are the lowest between age 45 and 50 in all skill
groups for men. The highest annual earnings of high skilled men is 57,369 EUR at age
45 (Figure 1.A.1e). There is a steep drop in average annual earnings in the EMPL+
sample proﬁles for individuals in their mid-ﬁfties indicating a lower participation in the
labor force. Therefore, comparing the EMPL+ with the EMPL sample reveals that
employment probabilities for men and women and actual labor supply diﬀer to a cer-
tain extent. This is especially pronounced at the start and end of the career and could
be due to various reasons. These include investing in education, early retirement as
well as unemployment. EMPL and EMPL+ proﬁles for women both include periods of
maternity leave which explains the similar pattern of proﬁles in Figure 1.A.1b, and f
of medium skilled women. The proﬁles for women are much lower compared to those
of men, however, relative diﬀerences between skill groups are quite similar to those of
men.
Medium and high skilled proﬁles intersect in all graphs of Figure 1.A.1 and allow
inference about the time needed to recover foregone earnings during education. Re-
gardless of gender, discounting (0 percent, 2 percent) and sample restrictions (EMPL,
EMPL+), high skilled individuals always manage to catch up in annual earnings with
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low and medium skilled by the age of 30. High skilled and employed men are the
most advantaged because they already have approximately twice the annual earnings
in comparison to the low skilled at the age of 30.
As above with the EMPL sample, proﬁles with median annual earnings are con-
structed for men in the EMPL+ sample in Figure 1.A.2b. These show that in the high
skilled group many individuals have very low or zero annual earnings in their twenties
and towards the end of their ﬁfties.
Bönke et al. (2015) and Schmillen and Stüber (2014) do not report age-earnings pro-
ﬁles of individuals that are not continuously employed and also do not report the proﬁles
of women. Therefore our results complement both studies in adding zero earnings and
suggest that average work-life earnings in the population are lower than previously
suggested due to varying labor supply especially at the beginning and end of the career.
1.4.2 Cumulative earnings
The cumulative earnings give information on the age of a higher skill group intersecting
with a lower skill group in cumulative work-life earnings. These intersection ages are
interesting and help to verify the theory of human capital investment. For instance,
they can answer several questions: How long does it take a high skilled person to make
up for foregone earnings of education? What do these intersection points say about risk
preferences?
Figure 1.A.2c and d are cumulative age-earnings proﬁles for men. While for the
EMPL sample for men the graphs are almost linear for ages above 30, for the EMPL+
sample for men proﬁles seem nonlinear and show the very low earnings growth at the
beginning and end of working life in all education groups.
Table 1.A.3 oﬀers an overview of work-life earnings up to certain ages, i.e. 40, 50
and 60 years. These are also discounted with a 0 and 2 percent discount factor. The
calculations show that for men and women earnings growth between 40 to 50 and 50
to 60 is similar in all skill groups. For men in both samples, higher skilled men always
have higher cumulative earnings than lower skilled men. In the EMPL women sample
this is also the case. However, it is not the case in the EMPL+ sample for women with
a 2 percent discount factor. Here, high skilled women have earned less than medium
skilled women at age 40 and age 50. In this case the human capital investment pays oﬀ
very late, at age 56.
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The intersection ages of cumulative earnings are depicted in Table 1.A.4. For high
skilled employed men it takes until the age of 36 to catch up in cumulative earnings
with the medium skilled. Taking into account periods without an employment increases
this age to 39. For women, the EMPL+ sample provides a more realistic calculation of
work-life earnings since the inclusion of zero earnings seems to be even more important
than for men. This leads to an intersection age for women of 48 years and indicates
that it takes a considerable amount of time to make up for foregone earnings. Using the
2 percent discount factor further increases these ages and reveals that the right human
capital investment decision is not necessarily always higher education when periods
without earnings are included and individuals retire early. In addition to this, direct
costs of education, which are not included in this analysis, might make investment
in education even less attractive. Late intersection points between some skill groups
generally make investment in education riskier. The reason for this is that negative
earnings shocks are more likely to impact work-life earnings before this intersection
point. This is more likely to happen for women than for men since high compared to
medium skilled women have relatively high intersection ages.
1.4.3 Work-Life earnings
The work-life earnings estimates are given in Table 1.A.5. These are calculated as a
sum of annual average or median earnings for samples EMPL and EMPL+, men and
women and educational groups. Median work-life earnings are calculated in addition
to averages so as to have a robust estimation of work-life earnings that does not rely
on the imputation strategy for top coded earnings. Results conﬁrm the large impact
of including zero earnings as was illustrated in age-earnings proﬁles. The work-life
earnings calculated by means and medians and pooled for men and women do not diﬀer
immensely for the EMPL sample. However, the diﬀerence is far larger for EMPL+
since the median work-life earnings reveal the large number of individuals with low or
no earnings at the start and end of working life. For the EMPL sample the earnings of
high skilled men over the course of working life are 2.3 million EUR. For the EMPL+
sample, work-life earnings for high skilled men are 1.63 million EUR. This is 70 percent
of EMPL work-life earnings and suggests that men with multiple periods of employment
are outdistanced in terms of lifetime earnings from men who are employed throughout
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their working life. Indeed, Johnson and Feng (2013) ﬁnd that in the US 6 months after a
job loss about half of long-term unemployed workers still have 40 percent lower incomes.
An important ﬁnding in Table 1.A.5 is that the sample restrictions make a consider-
able diﬀerence in work-life earnings which is especially pronounced for women. Work-life
earnings of employed women (undiscounted) are 1.29 million EUR in the EMPL women
sample and 0.7 million EUR for high skilled EMPL+ women sample. Considering the
previously found strong relationship between labor force participation and earnings, the
EMPL+ sample yields work-life earnings that are closer to the actual earnings in the
population and should therefore be the preferred sample. In the EMPL+ sample for
women, low skilled have work-life earnings of 0.43 million EUR and medium skilled
have 0.62 million EUR. This means that, for low skilled women, work-life earnings in
the EMPL sample are double that of the EMPL+. Discounting has a strong impact
on the calculations with work-life earnings dropping from 1.63 to 0.96 million EUR for
men and from 0.70 to 0.42 million EUR for women. This is similar in the other skill
groups.
1.4.4 Foregone earnings of education
Measuring the implicit cost of education in form of foregone earnings requires a calcula-
tion of earnings of the next-best alternative. Here the next-best alternative for a person
with a university degree (high skilled) is assumed to be the earnings of a person with
an apprenticeship or high school qualiﬁcation (medium skilled). In addition, one has
to distinguish between two types of foregone earnings. First of all, there are foregone
earnings that occur during education. Secondly, there are foregone earnings a person
has after labor market entry. These are due to lower earnings which result from having
less labor market experience than a person in a lower skill group.
The results are depicted in Table 1.A.6. Focusing on the EMPL+ sample, for high
skilled men, foregone earnings during education are 64,880 EUR. These are the annual
earnings medium skilled men receive up to the age of 25. This absolute value roughly
corresponds to the annual earnings of high skilled men at age 40. To know how high
these absolute values are as a fraction of work-life earnings is interesting because they
can indicate whether human capital investment is proﬁtable or not. This corresponds to
about 4 percent of total work-life earnings for high skilled men. Taking into account the
foregone earnings after labor market entry, i.e. up to the age at which high skilled earn
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more than medium skilled for the ﬁrst time, increases foregone earnings for this group
to 109,556 EUR or 6.74 percent of work-life earnings. These are the sum of earnings of
medium skilled up to age 25 plus the amount medium skilled earn more annually in the
following 2 years.
For high skilled women in the EMPL+ sample foregone earnings are 65,638 EUR
or 9.34 percent of work-life earnings. Including foregone earnings after starting to work
increases these to 88,397 EUR or 12.58 percent. This is almost double the percentage
of that in the EMPL sample indicating that foregone earnings are underestimated when
not applying the correct sample restrictions. Foregone earnings of medium skilled are
very low because in the data they only have two more years of education than low skilled.
At the same time foregone earnings after starting to work are almost nonexistent, due
to the fact that the medium skilled almost immediately have higher earnings than the
low skilled.
1.4.5 At what interest rate is less education favored?
The interest rate is calculated for which present values of average work-life earnings of
high and medium skilled men are equal. To ﬁnd this rate the present value of work-life
earnings of high skilled as a function of the interest rate r is equated with the present
value of work-life earnings of medium skilled and the equation is solved for r. The
less restricted sample of EMPL+ men is used here. Results are that for interest rates
higher than 7.7 percent, the medium skill education (vocational training) is preferable
to the high skill education (university). As a comparison, Hanushek et al. (2016) ﬁnd a
discount rate of 9.6 percent when comparing vocational and general education.13 The
importance of foregone earnings in the human capital investment decision also increases
with higher interest rates. These results are interesting because the EMPL+ sample
restrictions show relatively low capital market interest rates necessary to make less
education preferable.
13Usinge the EMPL sample for men gives an interest rate of 10.1 percent and for women 6.68 percent.
In the EMPL+ sample for women the rate is 2.95 percent. The rate for men from the EMPL sample
is therefore similar to the 9.6 percent reported by Hanushek et al. (2016).
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1.4.6 Earnings gain from an extra year of education
How large is the gain g in earnings from an extra year of education? This can be
calculated by using the elaborate method originally proposed by Becker (1964). This
method compares work-life earnings streams of high (LEhigh) and medium (LEmedium)







Foregone earnings and direct costs are included, however, direct costs are assumed to
be a public subsidy and set to zero. It is further assumed that both skill groups have
the same retirement age and that high skilled invest 5 years more in their education
than medium skilled and have zero earnings while studying. Table 1.A.7 displays the
results. For men the gain is 6.7 percent (EMPL+) and 8.0 percent (EMPL) while for
women it is much lower at 2.6 percent (EMPL+) and 5.4 percent (EMPL). Naturally,
with increasing interest rates g decreases. It is important to note that these results can
not be interpreted as the causal eﬀect of education. Nevertheless, the results found for
men fall into the range of estimates of lower and upper bounds of 4.8 and 11.7 percent
of the return to an additional year of education found by Ichino and Winter-Ebmer
(1999).
1.4.7 Sample restrictions
Concluding, as has become evident, employment probabilities seem to diﬀer from labor
supply which makes it important to include individuals that have unsteady employment
biographies as was done in the EMPL+ sample where zero earnings are included. Since
education also has a powerful eﬀect on the risk of unemployment using this sample
seems especially important when interested in the lifetime perspective of education and
earnings. The only other study that uses similar sample restrictions is Tamborini et al.
(2015) for the US. Interestingly, there, results between EMPL and EMPL+ are much
more similar than in our study for Germany where results diﬀer to a large extent. This
may be due to a vast number of diﬀerences, e.g. social security systems and labor
markets, between the countries. In the German context sample restrictions similar to




In the data, earnings trajectories can be observed for the age range from
max {18, 1975− year of birth} to min {64, 2011− year of birth} .14
Concerns in the analysis are therefore that real earnings between cohorts might diﬀer to
such a large extent that it is inappropriate to represent proﬁles in one graph. Further-
more, age and period could generally confound and fewer administrative records being
available for older cohorts could bias the results.
In order to have a suﬃcient number of cases, birth cohort groups are deﬁned by ﬁve
or more adjacent birth years and are pooled for men and women. Table 1.A.8 reveals
that the cumulative earnings up to the age of 40 do not diﬀer substantially for individuals
born before and after 1960. For the EMPL sample and high skilled the diﬀerence is
1.19 percent, for medium skilled 0.77 percent and for low skilled 4.26 percent. For the
EMPL+ sample average work-life earnings of medium and high skilled born after 1960
are higher than of those born before 1960, for the low skilled the opposite is the case.15
Figure 1.A.3 gives an overview of age-earnings trajectories for nine birth cohorts of
the EMPL sample. Skill groups are not considered in this graph as to have a suﬃcient
number of cases for each cohort. While these proﬁles do diﬀer especially for the ages
between 25 and 40 there are no systematic cohort patterns. The same can be said in
the EMPL+ sample in Figure 1.A.4.
Splitting ages into eight groups also permits a comparison of birth cohorts for skill
groups at the mean of every age group. These graphs in Figure 1.A.5 show similar
patterns but diﬀer in years with a very low number of observations. It is not possible to
calculate complete work-life earnings for all birth cohorts, due to the simple fact that
future earnings for the young birth cohorts are unknown. However, the analysis of birth
cohorts provides evidence that for the analyzed years work-life earnings of birth cohorts
are similar.
14For example, individuals born in 1944 can be observed for ages 31-64 while the age range is 18-41
for the birth year 1970 and 18-25 for the birth year 1986.
15Among others, one explanation for the latter could be skill-biased technological change, a demand
shift triggered by new technologies that increased the demand for higher skilled workers in relation to
lower skilled workers. In this scenario there are more low skilled that are unable to ﬁnd a job as they are
not suﬃciently qualiﬁed which explains the lower earnings of low skilled after 1960 compared to before
1960. The patterns of age-earnings proﬁles for these cohorts support this theory. These age-earnings
proﬁles are not depicted here but are available from the author upon request.
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1.5 Conclusion
This study draws attention to the lifetime perspective of education and earnings. The
calculation of work-life earnings is performed by using an innovative dataset, namely
survey data linked to administrative social security records. Thereby this study avoids
the data limitations of similar studies which use cross-sectional data and less reliable
educational information when calculating work-life earnings.
The study contributes to the literature, ﬁrstly, by describing patterns of age-earnings
proﬁles for educational groups and calculating work-life earnings and foregone earnings
during education which are opportunity costs of education. Secondly, it uses far-ranging
longitudinal earnings data. Thirdly, it introduces a less restrictive sample that includes
periods of individuals without employment as zero earnings.
Work-life earnings for high skilled men are on average 2.3 million EUR and for
women 1.29 million EUR if they are employed continuously throughout their career.
Using the less restrictive sample which includes periods without employment as zero
earnings, results in work-life earnings of 1.6 million EUR for men and for 0.7 million
EUR for women. Results also suggest that foregone earnings are important implicit
costs in the human capital investment decision of individuals. How large foregone
earnings are as a fraction of lifetime earnings, however, depends on the kind of degree,
gender and whether a person is employed throughout his or her career. These results
have a high policy relevance since expected work-life earnings and forgone earnings
strongly inﬂuence the human capital investment decision as well as the decision to
use student loan programs. Regarding the sample restrictions, results have provided
evidence that work-life earnings are much lower when including periods of individuals
without employment. This has rarely been done before and seems important since the
assumption that individuals are employed throughout their career is unrealistic. Future
research should therefore generally include subgroups of the population with unsteady




1.A.1 Imputation of censored wages
Censored wages in the administrative data are imputed for employees subject to social
security contributions for the years 1975-2011. Marginally employed, which have only
been recorded since 1999, are dropped. Furthermore, spells are split to a monthly level.
Upper ceiling limits are calculated by deriving daily limits from the pension insurance
yearly limits given in the appendix of the Sozialgesetzbuch VI. The limits vary for years,
region (East/West Germany) and type of pension insurance (workers/employees vs.
miners). Our imputation strategy is similar to that of related literature (Gartner, 2005;
Dustmann et al., 2009; Reichelt, 2015) and involves estimating a truncated regression
and predicting the right censored wages and adding an error term. This strategy rests
on the assumption that log wages follow a normal distribution. The regression is then
repeated for each year. The variables in the prediction include education, sex, age,
number of employees of the establishment, German nationality, indicator for workplace
in East Germany, occupational status and occupation with all information taken from
the social security records. Our main methods are:
 Method 1: Replacing all values larger than and equal to the censoring limit with
imputed values (In total 6.67 percent of monthly spells are censored).
 Method 2: Replacing all values 0.985 times larger than the censoring limit with
imputed values (in total 8.65 percent of all monthly spells are censored).
The following histograms for the year 2009 show, that the imputation works best for
the 10,266 individuals from West Germany using imputation method 2. This is why
method 2 is used as the main method for the calculation of age-earnings proﬁles and
work-life earnings. Using method 2 gives a wage distribution that is censored each
year between 1-5 percent for the years 1975-1984, 5-10 percent for the years 1985-1994
and 8-13 percent for the years 1995-2011. Comparing this to the IABS, a 2 percent
random sample of social security records for the years 1975-2004, Dustmann et al.
(2009) report that each year 9.4% and 14.2% of the male wage distribution there is
censored. The 1,809 person sample for East Germany suﬀers from a small sample size
and is not used for the analysis. Using imputation method 2, years and regions are
pooled and histograms for diﬀerent age and education groups are compared. N denotes
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the number of Observations, i.e. number of spells on monthly level. Due to the data
protection legislation of the Institute for Employment Research it is not permitted
to export histogram bins with less than 20 observations. The Education groups are:
No Abitur without completed vocational training (NOVOC); No Abitur with completed
vocational training (VOC); Abitur without completed vocational training (ABI); Abitur
with completed vocational training (ABIVOC); Completion of a university of applied
sciences (UAS); College/university degree (UNI).
Figure 1.A.6 show the distribution of the logarithm of daily wages before and after
the imputation for the year 2009. Figure 1.A.7 and Figure 1.A.8 show the distribution
for age groups and pooled for all years, while Figure 1.A.9 and Figure 1.A.10 show the
same for the education groups.
1.A.2 Structual break in 1984 for one-time payments
One-time payments are only included starting from 1984 in the administrative data
since commencing in the year 1984 these payments became subject to social security
tax. Ignoring this can increase earnings inequality (Steiner and Wagner, 1998). One
possible method of correction is to assume that quantiles above the median are most
aﬀected by the structural break. Regressions of the wage ratios between the years
before and after the break on the percentiles can then be estimated and a correction
factor can be calculated (Dustmann et al., 2009; Fitzenberger, 1999). However, the
NEPS is somewhat diﬀerent to the datasets used in the literature mentioned above.
The oldest individuals in the NEPS are 40 years old in 1984. These individuals are
aged 31 in the year 1975 when social security records start. This age eﬀect is one
possible explanation why there are almost no one-time payments that are larger than
zero observed in the years directly after the structural break (in 1984, 1985 and 1986) but
more starting in the 1990s. This stands in contrast to other studies, e.g. Fitzenberger
(1999), who use the 1 percent random sample from German Social Security Accounts
(IAB-Beschäftigtenstichprobe) with a diﬀerent age composition of individuals. In our
dataset, of the above mentioned 2.4 million monthly spells only 2859 have one-time
payments that are larger than zero. That is only 0.1 percent. Since there are almost no
one-time payments observed directly after the structural break in 1984, for this analysis
no correction factor is applied.
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1.A.3 Deﬁnition of the education variable
Label CASMIN classiﬁcation Description
Low skilled 1a/1b/2b No apprenticeship
Medium skilled 1c/2a/2c_gen/2c_voc Apprenticeship or high school degree
High skilled 3a/3b University (of applied science) degree





























Table 1.A.1: Sample selection
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Heckman selection model
OLS Full Sample OLS Selected Sample Maximum likelihood Two-step model
Selection equation
Std.dev. of interviewer months for waves -0.2277*** -0.2277***
(0.0301) (0.0301)
Covariates from wage equation Yes Yes
ρ 0.0202 0.2145
(0.0777)
Wald test (p-value) 0.81
Wage equation
Female -0.0558*** -0.0559*** -0.0556*** -0.0552***
(0.0082) (0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0084)
Married 0.4998*** 0.4938*** 0.4944*** 0.4970***
(0.0089) (0.0091) (0.0092) (0.0100)
Years of education 0.0779*** 0.0760*** 0.0761*** 0.0767***
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0020)
Age -0.0039*** -0.0040*** -0.0040*** -0.0039***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Observations 16450 15460 16861 16861











Table 1.A.2: Means and t-test of individuals agreeing and disagreeing to linkage
No consent for record linkage Given consent for record linkage
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Diﬀerence t-statistics
Birth year 1,919 1963.55 11.49 15,205 1963.75 11.27 -0.203 (-0.74)
Female (==1) 1,925 0.5 0.50 15,215 0.51 0.50 -0.011 (-0.88)
Married (==1) 1,925 0.63 0.48 15,215 0.66 0.47 -0.037 ** (-3.26)
Years of education 1,880 13.92 2.39 15,006 13.95 2.33 -0.030 (-0.53)
Currently employed (==1) 1,925 0.77 0.42 15,215 0.78 0.41 -0.018 (-1.77)
Occupational status
Employee (==1) 1,925 0.43 0.50 15,215 0.46 0.50 -0.026 * (-2.15)
Worker (==1) 1,925 0.12 0.33 15,215 0.14 0.34 -0.014 (-1.70)
Self-Employed (==1) 1,925 0.12 0.33 15,215 0.10 0.29 0.027 *** (3.69)
Household size 1,910 2.60 1.20 15,205 2.66 1.36 -0.066 * (-2.02)
Mother: years of education 1,660 11.75 2.39 13,881 11.80 2.34 -0.054 (-0.88)
Father: years of education 1,674 12.85 2.45 13,999 12.87 2.40 -0.025 (-0.40)
Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table 1.A.3: Work-life earnings up to age 40, 50 and 60
Panel A Panel B Panel C
EMPL+ EMPL EMPL+ EMPL EMPL+ EMPL
Men
r = 0.00
Low skilled 0.384 0.533 0.593 0.822 0.765 1.139
Medium skilled 0.521 0.655 0.888 1.096 1.176 1.519
High skilled 0.542 0.759 1.101 1.464 1.539 2.106
r = 0.02
Low skilled 0.297 0.418 0.419 0.585 0.502 0.737
Medium skilled 0.398 0.503 0.611 0.759 0.751 0.962
High skilled 0.392 0.556 0.716 0.965 0.928 1.272
Women
r = 0.00
Low skilled 0.188 0.372 0.313 0.578 0.419 0.788
Medium skilled 0.280 0.440 0.454 0.690 0.603 0.935
High skilled 0.246 0.461 0.467 0.825 0.660 1.175
r = 0.02
Low skilled 0.150 0.294 0.222 0.414 0.273 0.514
Medium skilled 0.223 0.346 0.323 0.490 0.395 0.608
High skilled 0.182 0.343 0.310 0.554 0.403 0.721
Notes: Work-life earnings in million EUR. Notes from Table 1.A.5 apply here
also. All calculations based on means. Panel A: Lifetime earnings up to age
40; Panel B: up to age 50; Panel C: up to age 60.
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Table 1.A.4: Ages of intersection of cumulative work-life earnings
High / Low High / Medium Medium / Low
EMPL+ EMPL EMPL+ EMPL EMPL+ EMPL
r = 0.00
Pooled (means) 33 33 38 36 23 26
Pooled (medians) 28 26 30 28 20 22
Men (means) 34 33 39 36 24 27
Women (means) 33 34 48 38 22 25
r = 0.02
Pooled (means) 33 34 40 37 23 26
Pooled (medians) 28 26 30 28 20 22
Men (means) 35 34 41 37 24 27
Women (means) 34 35 56 41 22 25
Notes: Notes from Table 1.A.5 apply here. High, medium and low refer to skill
level. All calculations based on lifetime earnings with discount factor r. Reported
are ages at which cumulative earnings of a higher skill group overtakes a lower
skill group.
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Table 1.A.5: Work-life earnings
Low skilled Medium skilled High skilled
EMPL+ EMPL EMPL+ EMPL EMPL+ EMPL
r = 0.00
Pooled (means) 0.56 1.03 0.92 1.39 1.34 2.08
Pooled (medians) 0.35 1.02 0.83 1.34 1.13 1.98
Men (means) 0.79 1.26 1.22 1.67 1.63 2.34
Women (means) 0.43 0.87 0.62 1.02 0.70 1.29
r = 0.02
Pooled (means) 0.37 0.65 0.59 0.86 0.79 1.22
Pooled (medians) 0.22 0.65 0.54 0.84 0.68 1.17
Men (means) 0.51 0.79 0.77 1.03 0.96 1.37
Women (means) 0.28 0.55 0.40 0.64 0.42 0.77
Notes: Work-life earnings in million EUR for ages 18-64. Discount factor r. EMPL: Employments. EMPL+: Employ-
ments plus periods with zero earnings. Yearly earnings are set to zero for ages 18 and 19 for medium skilled and to zero
for ages 18-24 for high skilled to account for diﬀerent labor market entry ages. If yearly earnings are unavailable due to
a low number of observations and the data protection legislation of the German Institute for Employment Research, the
missing earnings are substituted by the last known annual earnings: For pooled (means and medians) the low skilled
EMPL earnings for ages 61-64 are not available and are therefore set to the earnings at age 60. For the EMPL+ the
earnings of low skilled men aged 63-64 are unavailable and set to that at age 62. For the EMPL low skilled men this is
the case for ages 59-64. For EMPL high skilled men earnings at age 64 are missing and replaced by earnings at age 63.
For EMPL low skilled women the same method applies for ages 61-64 and for EMPL high skilled women for ages 63-64.
Table 1.A.6: Foregone earnings
Up to labor market entry Incl. earnings after labor market entry
High skilled Medium skilled High skilled Medium skilled
EUR Percent EUR Percent EUR Percent EUR Percent
Men
EMPL 91,458 3.90% 19,611 1.17% 102,303 4.37% 21,568 1.29%
EMPL+ 64,880 3.99% 10,909 0.90% 109,556 6.74% 10,909 0.90%
Women
EMPL 85,720 6.64% 17,089 1.68% 93,157 7.21% 17,089 1.68%
EMPL+ 65,638 9.34% 10,262 1.65% 88,397 12.58% 10,262 1.65%
Notes: Earnings of high skilled compared to those of medium skilled. Medium skilled com-
pared to low skilled. Percentages are given as a fraction of work-life earnings. In addition,
Notes from Table 1.A.5 also apply here.
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Table 1.A.7: Earnings gain for an additional year of education
EMPL+ EMPL
r = 0.00
Pooled (means) 9.0% 9.9%
Pooled (medians) 7.5% 9.5%
Men (means) 6.7% 8.0%
Women (means) 2.6% 5.4%
r = 0.02
Pooled (means) 7.0% 8.3%
Pooled (medians) 5.1% 7.7%
Men (means) 5.1% 6.7%
Women (means) 0.9% 4.0%
Notes: Results refer to g from Equa-
tion 1.1.
Table 1.A.8: Cumulative earnings up to age 40
Low skilled Medium skilled High skilled
EMPL+ EMPL EMPL+ EMPL EMPL+ EMPL
Born before 1960 280,235 468,142 382,860 565,909 417,961 683,148
Born after 1960 265,373 448,999 409,036 561,606 455,343 675,105
Notes: Earnings in EUR.
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Figure 1.A.3: Age-earnings proﬁles for the EMPL sample for birth cohorts (pooled)
Figure 1.A.4: Age-earnings proﬁles for the EMPL+ sample for birth cohorts (pooled)
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Figure 1.A.5: Age-earnings proﬁles for birth cohorts and skill groups (EMPL sample,
pooled)
Figure 1.A.6: Distribution of logarithm of daily wage before and after the imputation
(West Germany, year 2009)
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Figure 1.A.7: Distribution of logarithm of daily wage for age groups before the imputation
Figure 1.A.8: Distribution of logarithm of daily wage for age groups after the imputation
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Figure 1.A.9: Distribution of logarithm of daily wage for education groups before the
imputation




Grades in Primary School and
Educational Opportunity - An
Empirical Analysis for Germany
2.1 Introduction
Should primary school reports include grades? While a large part of existing pedagogical
literature is concerned with this question and focuses on soft skills such as the joy of
studying, anxieties and self-concepts (Zeinz and Köller, 2006; Wagner and Valtin, 2003;
van Aken et al., 1997), very little is known about the eﬀects grading has on educational
opportunity as measured by educational transitions and achievement for individuals
with diﬀerent parental background. This is interesting since there exists ample evidence
for a strong relationship between parental background and secondary school track choice
(PISA, 2007; Bos et al., 2007; Dustmann, 2004) as well as early tracking into diﬀering-
ability schools increasing this eﬀect (Hanushek and Wößmann, 2006; Lange and von
Werder, 2014; Brunello and Checchi, 2007)1.
The aim of this empirical study is to contribute to the aforementioned literature
by investigating, ﬁrstly, the eﬀect of grading in the ﬁrst classes of primary school on
educational transitions and achievement and, secondly, on educational opportunity in
an early tracking system. Hence, the results of this study are interesting for countries
1Even though recent evidence suggests that tracking does not have long-term eﬀects since early
track choices can be revised (Dustmann et al., 2017), these later career choices remain highly selective
with respect to parental background (Biewen and Tapalaga, 2017).
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that have early tracking systems (e.g. Germany and Austria) and/or countries where
educational achievement is highly dependent on parental background (e.g. UK and US).
For countries where grading does not start before class 6 (e.g. Sweden and Norway)
and tracking is also done later, it is of interest to ﬁnd out if later grading leads to a
mismatch because school reports without grades are a less precise signal for students
and parents. In Germany the question as to whether or not to include grades in school
reports in primary schools has been heavily discussed since the 1970s when most federal
states replaced grades in classes 1 and 2 by verbal assessments. Using these reforms this
study will ﬁnd out if children with low socio-economic status proﬁt from later grading
in terms of educational transitions and achievement. To do this, variation across West
German federal states and across time is exploited and the fact that in the 1970s some
federal states moved the time of grading in school reports to the third class while
others still used grades before the third class. Using a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DD)
strategy the outcomes of these groups are compared. The data used in the analysis
is survey data from the National Educational Panel Study (NEPS) for Germany and
contains information about the educational biography of individuals and their socio-
economic status. Findings show no eﬀect of later grading on the likelihood of moving
to upper secondary school for groups with diﬀerent parental education. However, the
reform increases later up- and downward transitions between secondary school tracks.
This is evidence that verbal assessments might lead to a mismatching of individuals to
secondary school tracks.
In theory there exist numerous ways in which later grading can, in interaction with
school resources, peer eﬀects, family resources and the belief a student has about his
or her individual skills, have an eﬀect on educational opportunity. One possible in-
stance of this is that verbal reports are used by teachers to give distorted feedback
to students with low self-conﬁdence which could have a motivational eﬀect. Bénabou
and Tirole (2002) show in a theoretical model that one way of achieving a higher de-
gree of self-conﬁdence is to selectively process information about ability. Since there is
a strong correlation between self-conﬁdence and socio-economic background (Filippin
and Paccagnella, 2012; Chowdry et al., 2011; Gregg and Washbrook, 2011; Chevalier
et al., 2009) and initially small diﬀerences in self-conﬁdence can lead to diverging pat-
terns of human capital accumulation (Filippin and Paccagnella, 2012), using verbal
reports to give distorted feedback could narrow this gap. Closely related to this is the
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big-ﬁsh-little pond eﬀect (Marsh and Parker, 1984)2 which is increased by grading be-
cause social comparisons increase (Zeinz and Köller, 2006). The literature on rank ﬁnds
that absolute grading motivates better than relative grading if students' abilities are
independent (Dubey and Geanakoplos, 2010). At the same time high primary school
(perceived) rank has positive eﬀects on secondary school test scores (Murphy and Wein-
hardt, 2016). However, considering this, it is surprising that Wagner and Valtin (2003)
do not ﬁnd diﬀerences for the self-perception of abilities and performance motivation
when comparing children with grades and verbal assessments but ﬁnd that the joy of
studying decreases for children with grades.
Teachers tend to have lower expectations for students with low socio-economic status
(Figlio, 2005) and give lower grades to pupils with foreign origin (Sprietsma, 2013). This
means that early grading could also lead to low achieving pupils being negatively labeled
which in time could lead to further academic failure through self-fulﬁlling prophecies.3
This raises the question as to whether an educational system with later grading can
decrease the eﬀects related to socio-economic status. As regards the family, it is likely
that parents with diﬀerent socio-economic status react diﬀerently to information from
school reports. This is because cognitive costs, in general, are an essential part of
decision making costs (Hastings and Tejeda-Ashton, 2008) and simpliﬁed information
helps disadvantaged families to improve the educational achievement of their children
(Hastings and Tejeda-Ashton, 2008). But Filippin and Paccagnella (2012) ﬁnd that
feedback has to be precise to help disadvantaged families. While grades are usually a
precise signal for students and parents, a potential concern is that, were this not to
be the case, mismatching to secondary school could occur. However, for any of the
aforementioned ways educational opportunity is impacted it is required that, ﬁrstly, it
makes a diﬀerence whether performance is judged by grades or verbal reports. Secondly,
diﬀerences induced by not grading in classes 1 and 2 have to persist until the end of
primary school.
The contributions of this paper are: First, providing causal evidence of the eﬀect
of having grades in school reports on educational transitions and achievement. This
study is, to the best of my knowledge, the ﬁrst to analyze the grading reform in the
2The eﬀect that equally capable individuals have higher self-concepts when in a less capable group
than in a more capable group.
3This is also known as the Pygmalion eﬀect which was found by Rosenthal and Jacobson (1968)
when conducting an experiment on self-fulﬁlling prophecy.
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1970s for all West German states by combining retrospective educational biographies
with rules on grading from law gazettes. Secondly, this study adds to the literature
on ways to increase educational opportunity in educational systems where students are
tracked into diﬀering-ability schools at an early age and track choice is strongly related
to socio-economic status.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 2.2 presents an overview of the
German education system, the primary school grading reform and the tracking system.
The data is described in Section 2.3, the identiﬁcation strategy is explained in Section 2.4
while Section 2.5 shows the results. Robustness checks of the results are provided in
Section 2.6 and Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Institutional setting
2.2.1 Overview of the German school system
For the cohorts born between 1944 and 1987, which are the cohorts analyzed in the
empirical section of this paper, compulsory schooling starts when children have reached
the age of 6 and are enrolled into primary school (Grundschule). Primary school lasts
4 years in all West German states and at around the age of ten pupils are assigned
to diﬀerent types of secondary schools. The lowest secondary school track takes ﬁve
years (Hauptschule), the middle track lasts 6 years (Realschule) and the highest track
lasts for nine years (Gymnasium)4. Individuals who have attended the medium and low
track usually proceed to a vocational education such as an apprenticeship in blue-collar
or white-collar occupations. Individuals who have attained the ﬁnal degree of upper
secondary school (Abitur) usually proceed to university.
2.2.2 Primary school grading reform
For quite some time, but at least since the reformation ﬁve hundred years ago, grading
is school has been a selectivity mechanism in meritocratic societes. In West Germany
after 1950 school reports include grades already in the ﬁrst classes of primary school.5
4These three school tracks are in the following referred to as lower (LS), middle (MS) and upper
(US) school.
5However, most federal states evaluated the performance in the 1st class with one overall grade or











State BW BY HB HH HE NI NW RP SL SH
Class 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
Year
1949/1950 G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G
... G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G
1970/1971 G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G
1971/1972 G G G G G G V V G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G
1972/1973 G G G G G G V V G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G
1973/1974 G G G G G G V V G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G V,Gb Gb G G G G
1974/1975 G G G G G G V V G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G V,Gb Gb G G G G
1975/1976 G G G G G G V V G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G V,Gb Gb G G G G
1976/1977 G G G G G G V V G G G G G G G G G G Va Va G G G G V,Gb Gb G G G G
1977/1978 V V,Ge G Vc G G V V G G G G G G G V Vc G Va Va G G G G V,Gb Gb G G G G
1978/1979 V V,Ge G Vc G G V V G G G G G G G V Vc G Va Va G V V,G G V,Gb Gb G V,G G G
1979/1980 V V,Ge G Vc G G V V,Gd G V V G V V,G G V Vc G V V G V V,G G V,G G G V,G G G
1980/1981 V V,Ge G Vc G G V V,Gd G V V G V V,G G V Vc G V V G V V,G G V,G G G V,G G G
1981/1982 V V,Ge G Vc G G V V,Gd G V V G V V G V Vc G V V G V V,G G V,G G G V,G G G
1982/1983 V V,Ge G Vc G G V V,Gd G V V G V V G V Vc G V V G V V,G G V,G G G V,G G G
1983/1984 V V,Ge G Vc G G V V,Gd G V V G V V G V Vc G V V G V V,G G V,G G G V,G G G
1984/1985 V V,Ge G Vc G G V V,Gd G V V G V V G V Vc G V V G V V,G G V,G G G V,G G G
1985/1986 V V,Ge G Vc G G V V,Gd G V V G V V G V Vc G V V G V V,G G V,G G G V,G G G
1986/1987 V V,Ge G Vc G G V V,Gd G V V G V V G V Vc G V V G V V,G G V,G G G V,G G G
1987/1988 V V,Ge G Vc G G V V,Gd G V V G V V G V Vc G V V G V V,G G V,G G G V,G G G
1988/1989 V V,Ge G Vc G G V V,Gd G V V G V V G V Vc G V V G V V G V,G G G V,G G G
1990/1991 V V,Ge G Vc G G V V,Gd G V V G V V G V Vc G V V G V V G V,G G G V,G G G
1991/1992 V V,Ge G Vc G G V V,Gd G V V G V V G V Vc G V V G V V G V,G G G V V G
1992/1993 V V,Ge G Vc G G V V,Gd G V V G V V G V Vc G V V G V V G V,G G G V V G
1993/1994 V V,Ge G Vc G G V V,Gd G V V G V V G V Vc G V V G V V G V,G G G V V G
1994/1995 V V,Ge G Vc G G V V,Gd G V V G V V G V Vc G V V G V V G V V G V V G
1995/1996 V V,Ge G Vc G G V V,Gd G V V G V V G V Vc G V V G V V G V V G V V G
Notes: : after reform with grading starting before 3rd class : after reform with grading starting in 3rd class. V: verbal report. G: report with grades. Va: While the
order is from the year 1979 it was already applied in 1976. Vb Order from 1979 but already applied in 1973. Vc: Two verbal reports. Gd: grades in wording for reading, writing
and Maths. Ge: annual grading report only in maths and German. V,G: after ﬁrst half of school year V and after second half of school year G. References: Law gazettes.
Table 2.1: Primary school grading reform
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The 6-point grading scale ranges from 1 (excellent) to 6 (insuﬃcient) and report cards
at the end of a school year only allow for integer grades. In the 1970s a change in
educational policy meant that recommendations were made for primary schools not to
grade in classes 1 and 2 (KMK, 1970). Instead of grading in these classes a general
verbal assessment of children was to be given. This should include an assessment of
the social and work habits, indications of interests, special skills and weaknesses. In
the following years most federal states started to follow these recommendations while
others followed the recommendations only for the ﬁrst class or up until the mid term
report of the second class. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the year and extent of
implementation of the primary school reform in states. While all states had semiannual
grading reports at the latest in the third class, the states BW, BY, RP, SL and SH start
grading before class three at least until the late 1980s. Table 2.1 also oﬀers a yearly
overview of the introduction of the reform in federal states with the diﬀerentiation
stipulating whether grading started before or after the third class. The light grey area
are states and years with grading before the third class after implementation of the
reform. The dark grey area are states and years where grading was started in third
class after reform implementation.
Verbal reports Reviewing the law gazettes of the federal states on the wording
of the laws gives an idea of how comparable these actually were. In fact the word-
ing in the law gazettes about the content of the verbal reports is very similar between
states and follows the KMK ruling closely. Most of the time there are three main do-
mains of assessment: Learning, working and behavior. Learning includes the learning
progress, the capability of expression and speech comprehension. Working consists of
working in class, in a group and alone. Behavior is assessed in respect to teachers,
classmates and matters. Some states oﬀer aid on formulating verbal reports by oﬀering
pre-built sentences where teachers only have to insert adjectives (Hartenstein and Rud-
dies, 1978). In addition to the orders of the federal states there exists a vast amount of
literature on verbal reports oﬀering aid as well as examples (Bartnitzky and Christiani,
1977; Hartenstein and Ruddies, 1978; Ullrich and Wöbcke, 1981; Heller and Bartnitzky,
1984). At the same time this literature also oﬀers guidelines for teacher conferences
and information on how to inform parents about the new reports. It is important to
note that the substitution of reports with grades for verbal reports alone can not be
seen as an improvement in performance assessment. If verbal reports are simply an
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implementation of grades in words the traditional performance assessment will stay the
same. Jachmann (2003) notes that for the reform to be successful there has to be a
change in the culture of teaching and teachers as well as parents have to accept verbal
assessments.
2.2.3 Tracking
Federal states have diﬀerent rules when it comes to the assignment of children to sec-
ondary schools. While some states used to have entry exams as one criteria of transition
to the higher secondary school track, the most important criteria is the grade point av-
erage as well as the teacher recommendation. The teacher recommendation is binding
in most states in the 1950s, after which time this states gradually start to change this.
This means that the inﬂuence of parents regarding the ﬁnal decision of which secondary
school to choose varies between states.
The educational transition to upper secondary school is still highly dependent on
parental background (Dustmann, 2004). Tracking choices can, however, be revoked since
it is possible to switch tracks at any given point during secondary school. Nonetheless,
switching tracks before completion of a track seldom occurs (Dustmann et al., 2017).
More frequently individuals change tracks after completing a track. The most common
way for individuals in the low track to switch to the medium track is after grade 9 and for
students of the medium track to switch to the high track after grade 10. Dustmann et al.
(2017) ﬁnd that by doing this earlier track choices are often revised, thereby avoiding
any long-term consequences of track allocation. However, Biewen and Tapalaga (2017)
show that most individuals that switch tracks have a high parental background.
In the following, an overview of the criteria for the transition from primary to sec-
ondary school is provided. Regarding grades and the teacher recommendation it is of
particular interest to see whether these were binding or not. The rules are later used
as control variables in the empirical analysis.
Teacher recommendation For the transition to secondary school the most impor-
tant criteria is the recommendation of primary school teachers. While parent preferences
and trial periods in higher secondary schools have also played a role in recent years,
the teacher recommendation has for a long time dominated the transition process. Ta-
ble 2.A.1 (Appendix) gives an overview of these rules. While Berlin was the only state
49
2. GRADES IN PRIMARY SCHOOL AND EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY - AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS FOR GERMANY
where the recommendation was not binding in the 1950s, most states started to enforce
a system of non-binding recommendations in the 1970s and 80s. The southern states of
BW and BY kept the binding recommendation as did NW. Jähnen and Helbig (2015)
ﬁnd evidence that the abolishment of binding recommendations led to an increase in
the participation in higher education in Germany. This makes the rules all the more
important to consider in an empirical analysis.
Grades Since 1950 some states have used grades given in the last class of primary
school as a binding criteria to receive a recommendation for the highest secondary school
track. This meant pupils had to receive certain grades or they would miss out on the
chance of moving on to the highest secondary school type. Whether grades were binding
or not can be seen in Table 2.A.2. While most states had non-binding grades up until
the 1970s, some states such as BW, BY, HH, RP and SH chose to implement a system
with binding grades from there on.
Formal tests From 1960 onwards, some states still used entrance examinations while
others had already abolished these (KMK, 1960). The last state to have formal tests
was Baden-Württemberg (BW) which had formal tests as the only criteria of transition
to secondary school up until the school year 1966/67 and formal tests as one criteria
amongst others up until 1978/79. These rules can be seen in Table 2.A.3.
2.3 Data and descriptive statistics
The analysis uses life-cycle data from the National Educational Panel Study (NEPS,
starting cohort adults, SC6) as described in Blossfeld et al. (2011). The NEPS survey
adult starting cohort was started in 2007 and covers 17,140 individuals born between
1944 and 1989. Up to the year 2015, seven NEPS waves are available which oﬀer de-
tailed information on educational biographies, family background and employment. The
educational information consists of sequences of episodes of educational decisions. The
retrospective collection of individuals' life courses in the NEPS can be seen as reliable
since there is a data revision module.6 In the analysis individuals are included that give
6After each interview a data revision is done and inconsistencies in the sequence of episodes are
identiﬁed. The respondent is then asked to add missing events and dates (Skopek, 2013).
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information about their primary school enrollment in West Germany (excluding West
Berlin). Individuals are excluded that have a school starting age which is not between
4 and 9 years. Rudolf Steiner schools as well as other special schools are excluded,
however, these represent relatively few cases. The main outcomes and characteristics
Table 2.2: Summary statistics of sample
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Reform indicators
D1 (after reform: grading before 3rd class) 0.153 0.36 0 1 8444
D2 (after reform: grading in 3rd class) 0.172 0.377 0 1 8444
Outcomes
Transition from primary to upper sec. school (US) 0.417 0.493 0 1 8444
Years of schooling 11.338 1.742 7 13 8444
Track switch: Middle school (MS) → Upper sec. school (US) 0.064 0.245 0 1 8444
Track switch: Upper sec. school (US)→ Middle/Lower school (MS/LS) 0.05 0.218 0 1 8444
Grade retention in 1-4 class 0.045 0.208 0 1 8444
Background variables
Female 0.518 0.5 0 1 8444
Birth year 1966.31 10.216 1944 1987 8444
Age of primary school enrollment 6.504 0.511 4 9 8444
Age when starting sec. school 10.767 0.876 8 15 8444
Rules for transition to upper secondary school
Binding recommendation 0.858 0.349 0 1 8192
Binding grades 0.294 0.456 0 1 8162
Entrance examinations exist 0.179 0.383 0 1 8168
Maximal education of parents
Lower than vocational training (ED1) 0.082 0.275 0 1 8316
Vocational training, no upper secondary degree (ED2) 0.658 0.474 0 1 8316
Upper secondary degree (and possibly vocational training) (ED3) 0.079 0.27 0 1 8316
Tertiary education degree (ED4) 0.18 0.384 0 1 8316
Maximal occupational status of parents
Low (OCC 1) 0.149 0.356 0 1 7666
Medium (OCC 2) 0.377 0.485 0 1 7666
High (OCC 3) 0.474 0.499 0 1 7666
Notes: Descriptives are unweighted. Occupational status: High: higher/lower managerial and professional workers, small
self-employed with employees. Medium: routine clerical work, routine service and sales work, small self-employed without
employees, manual supervisors, skilled manual workers. Low: semi- and unskilled manual workers, agricultural labor,
self-employed farmers.
are listed in Table 2.2. The reform indicators are equal to one for states and peri-
ods that still started grading before 3rd class after the reform (D1) or started grading
in 3rd class after the reform (D2). These indicators are constructed on the basis of
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Table 2.3: Observations for federal states in the sample
Federal state Freq. Percent Cum.
Schleswig-Holstein (SH) 312 3.69 3.69
Hamburg (HH) 183 2.17 5.86
Niedersachsen (NI) 1,136 13.45 19.32
Bremen (HB) 75 0.89 20.20
Nordrhein-Westfalen (NW) 2,540 30.08 50.28
Hessen (HE) 583 6.90 57.19
Rheinland-Pfalz (RP) 584 6.92 64.10
Baden-Württemberg (BW) 1,376 16.30 80.40
Bayern (BY) 1,488 17.62 98.02
Saarland (SL) 167 1.98 100.00
Total 8,444 100.00
the school entry year of individuals and information on the grading reform from law
gazettes. The key outcome variable is whether an individual transitioned to upper sec-
ondary school after having ﬁnished primary school. Other key dependent variables are
the years of schooling7, whether individuals switched school tracks and the probability
of grade retention8. The ﬁnal grade is only available for about half the sample with 1
being the best available grade and 5 the worst. The maximal education of parents is
classiﬁed into four categories and occupations are classiﬁed into three categories. The
parental education can also be grouped into two categories, i.e. with/without upper
secondary degree (ED1/ED2 and ED3/ED4). Other variables are gender, birth year
and the age of primary school and secondary school enrollment (decimal). While the
fraction transitioning from primary to upper secondary school could be seen as rather
high at 41.7 percent, one has to note that these statistics are unweighted.9 The indi-
7The years of schooling are equivalent to the degrees which are 7 (no degree) , 9 (Hauptschule), 10
(Realschule) or 13 (Abitur). The total years of education is a function of the CASMIN classiﬁcation.
Using the educational attainment in years of schooling allows an easy to interpret continuous depen-
dent variable to be constructed. However, when also looking at tertiary education it would be more
appropriate to use a categorical variable instead of a continuous one since diﬀerent educational paths
can amount to equal years of education.
8This means repeating a grade.
9Applying weights reduces this value to 35.4 and is closer to the estimate found by Biewen and
Tapalaga (2017) who use the same dataset but a much smaller sample. Weights are generated by using
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cators for transition rules, as described in Section 2.2.3, are equal to one when at the
time of transition to upper secondary school the teacher recommendation was binding,
grades were binding or entrance examinations existed.
For the analysis observations from 10 West German federal states are used.
The identiﬁcation strategy of the analysis rests on ﬁnding the correct state an in-
dividual went to school in. The NEPS oﬀer variables on the federal state at birth as
well as the state in which a person was enrolled into primary school. At the same time
the dataset includes the residence history. To ﬁnd the federal state at school start an
imputation is done in the following order. First, the variable of the federal state of
the primary school is used. Second, if this information is not available, the place of
residence at the time of enrollment into primary school is substituted. Third, if the
federal state is still missing the federal state at birth is applied. Table 2.3 shows that
77.45 percent of observations are from four states, these are NI, NW, BW and BY.
2.4 Identiﬁcation strategy
Causal eﬀects of the reform on educational outcomes are estimated by using a diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerences framework. Two indicator variables are used to measure the eﬀect of
grading. Variable D1 is equal to one for states where the primary school reform was
introduced but where states still started grading before third class (e.g. in second class
compared to grading in ﬁrst class previously). Variable D2 indicates grading in third
class. Both indicators are equal to one for states and years eﬀected by the reform.10
The main speciﬁcation is
Yist = γs + λt + β1D1,st + β2D2,st +Xistδ +Rstµ+ φst + εist (2.1)
where Yist is one of the educational outcome variables for individual i in state s
and time t. If the dependent variable is a binary variable such as an indicator for
gender, region, education and birth cohort from the NEPS survey adjusted to the marginal distribution
of the Mikrozensus 2010 by the German Federal Statistical Oﬃce.
10Even though both indicators are included in the model, measuring the eﬀect for D2 is more inter-
esting. The results are also easier to interpret since the entire control group was exposed to grading
before third class while D1 uses as a control group grading at the start of primary school before the
reform as well as grading in third class after the reform. This way D2 can measure the absolute eﬀect
of later grading.
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the transition to upper secondary school, switching tracks or grade retention, a linear
probability model (LPM) is used. γs and λt are time-invariant state and year eﬀects,
D1,st and D2,st are Dummy variables for the reform as deﬁned above and Xist are
individual level covariates such as gender and the age when secondary school started. Rst
are state and year speciﬁc rules for transition to upper secondary school (as discussed in
Section 2.2.3), these are three Dummy variables which are one if grades are binding, the
teacher recommendation is binding or entrance examinations exist and zero otherwise.
φst adds state-speciﬁc trends before the reforms. εist is an error term. Equation 2.2
includes indicators for the parental education of individuals. These are groups ED2,
ED3 and ED4 and are equal to one if the maximal education of an individual's parent
falls into one of the categories. ED4 is the highest parental education. ED1 serves as a
reference category for the parental education. The reform variables are then interacted
with parental education groups:
Yist = γs + λt + β1D1,st + β2D2,st + α1ED2ist + α2ED3ist + α3ED4ist
+ δ1D1,st ∗ ED2ist + δ2D1,st ∗ ED3ist + δ3D1,st ∗ ED4ist
+ δ4D2,st ∗ ED2ist + δ5D2,st ∗ ED3ist + δ6D2,st ∗ ED4ist
+Xistδ +Rstµ+ φst + εist
(2.2)
The hypotheses are:
 H1: The eﬀect of later grading on educational outcomes is larger when grading
starts in 3rd class compared to when grading starts before 3rd class after the
reform (β2 > β1 in Equation 2.1).
 H2: Later grading (in 3rd class) leads to more equal opportunity in educational
career paths (β2 + δ4 > β2 + δ5 > β2 + δ6 in Equation 2.2).
The common trends assumption is a key identifying assumption which states that
in the absence of the reform, changes in outcomes between birth cohorts living in states
that adopted the reform would have been the same as in states where there was no
reform. While pre-treatment can be used to show that trends are the same before and
after the reform, it is still diﬃcult to verify. This is because, even with the same pre-
trends, other policies can change at the same time. For example, states could also have
changed teaching methods before the reform was introduced. However, the literature
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suggests that teaching methods did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly in classes with grading and
classes with verbal reports (Wagner and Valtin, 2003). The common trends assumption
is further addressed in Section 2.6.
2.5 Empirical results
Results are from estimating Equation 2.1.11 Table 2.4 reports the eﬀects of transitioning
from primary to upper secondary school on the primary school reform. The estimates
include state and year eﬀects, state-speciﬁc time trends for the time before the reform12,
other controls such as the school entry age and gender as well as the rules for transition to
upper secondary school. These are indicators that equal one if school recommendations
are binding, grades are binding and an entrance examination exists. Column (1) refers
to Equation 2.1 while column (2) refers to the model from Equation 2.2. The coeﬃcients
are larger in size for D2 than for D1 which conﬁrms H1, i.e. it is more likely that eﬀects
of verbal reports can be found for the individuals in the classes that started grading in
3rd class. The results in column (1) are that starting grading in 3rd class (D2) increases
the likelihood of attending upper secondary school by 4 percentage points. For grading
before 3rd class after the reform (D1) it is about -1 percentage point. Although the
coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant which is likely to be due to the large standard errors of
estimated coeﬃcients in the medium-sized sample these estimates provide some evidence
for an eﬀect of later grading on the transition to upper secondary school.13
Unsurprisingly, the parental education variables added in (2) have a strong inﬂuence
on secondary school track choice. This has been found in many previous studies related
to educational opportunity and tracking (e.g., Dustmann, 2004). The interaction terms
in (2) reveal how the later grading eﬀect changes with increasing parental education
level. Results for the more interesting case of D2 are that the grading gap does not
seem to change with parental education (H2). For individuals with parental education
ED2 it is 0.078 (= 0.0609 + 0.0171), for ED3 it is −0.009 (= 0.0609 − 0.0699) and for
11Since the standard errors often understate the standard deviation of the estimators (Bertrand et al.,
2004) they are clustered at the state × year of birth level.
12This allows treatment and control states to follow diﬀerent trends before the reform and can
therefore also be seen as a check of the identiﬁcation strategy.
13While this model is a Linear Probability Model (LPM), marginal eﬀects of a probit model conﬁrm
these results with average marginal eﬀects of −0.0016 for D1 and 0.0537 for D2.
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Table 2.4: DD estimates, visiting upper secondary track on grading reform
(1) (2)
Grading reform:
D1 (after reform: grading before 3rd class) -0.0107 -0.0063
(0.0813) (0.0875)
D2 (after reform: grading in 3rd class) 0.0407 0.0609
(0.0873) (0.0956)
Parental Education (Reference: ED1 (Lower than vocational training)):
ED2 (Vocational training, no upper secondary degree) 0.1277***
(0.0219)
ED3 (Upper secondary degree (and possibly vocational training)) 0.4295***
(0.0311)
ED4 (Tertiary education degree) 0.5910***
(0.0236)
Interaction of D1 with ED1− ED4 (Reference: D1 ∗ ED1):
D1 × ED2 0.0522
(0.0443)
D1 × ED3 -0.1191*
(0.0681)
D1 × ED4 0.0653
(0.0447)
Interaction of D2 with ED1− ED4 (Reference: D2 ∗ ED1):
D2 × ED2 0.0171
(0.0534)
D2 × ED3 -0.0699
(0.0794)
D2 × ED4 0.0183
(0.0531)
State eﬀects X X
Year eﬀects X X
State-speciﬁc trends X X
School entry age X X
Female X X
State and year speciﬁc rules for transition to upper secondary school:
Binding recommendation X X
Binding grades X X
Entrance examinations exist X X
Observations 8169 8045
Notes: OLS regression. Signiﬁcance levels * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, the robust standard
errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clusters at the state × year of birth level. Transition rules are
implemented as Dummies (see Table 2.2).
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ED4 it is 0.0792 (= 0.0609+0.0183). However, none of the interaction terms for D2 are
signiﬁcant. The F-test of joint signiﬁcance with the null hypothesis H0: β2, δ4, δ5, δ6 = 0
reports an F-statistic of 1.00 with a p-value of 0.406 and can not be rejected.14 Separate
tests with any of the interactions of D2 and a given educational category all report an
F-statistic of below 1.00 and therefore also cannot be rejected.
Nevertheless, the interaction terms do also indicate that there is some evidence of
later grading having an eﬀect on educational opportunity.
Table 2.5 give estimates for diﬀerent educational outcomes. None of the coeﬃcients
for the years of schooling (2) are signiﬁcant at the 10-percent level. While the coeﬃcient
for D1 has a negative sign, the coeﬃcient for D2 is positive but very small (-0.0011).
The likelihood of individuals switching tracks up or down at a later point are almost
identical for D2 and signiﬁcant at the 10-percent level (columns (2) and (3)). There
is no signiﬁcant eﬀect of later grading on the grade retention in class 1-4. However
the coeﬃcient for D2 shows a negative sign indicating that later grading leads to a
lower grade retention of 2.9 percentage points (4). This is mainly due to the fact that
the grading reform also meant that generally there was no grade retention in classes
that had reports that solely included verbal assessments. For the parental education of
individuals, again, it becomes evident that both the years of schooling (1) and mobility
between tracks (3) increase with parental education.15 At the same time the likelihood
of grade retention decreases (4). Regarding the interaction terms of the more interesting
case of D2, the coeﬃcients indicate that the group with ED1 are likely to have proﬁted
the least from later grading. ED2 and ED3 are groups that had proﬁted the most,
however, the eﬀects are not signiﬁcant. None of the coeﬃcients of the other outcomes are
very large or signiﬁcant in the case of D2 interacted with parental education. Separately
testing interactions of D2 with education categories results in most tests not being
rejected. However, for the downward school switch (3) all tests show F-statistics above
3 and p-values below 0.05. This suggests that while later grading might have caused
some mismatch, this may also be connected to selectivity regarding parental background.
The mismatch could be caused by reports without grades being a less precise signal,
making sorting more diﬃcult. This results in track choices being revised at a later
14The F-test of joint signiﬁcance for the less interesting null hypothesis H0: β1, δ1, δ2, δ3 = 0 reports
an F-statistic of 2.17 and a p-value of 0.0720.









































































Table 2.5: DD estimates, educational outcomes on grading reform
Years of schooling MS → US US → MS/LS Grade ret. 1-4 class
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Grading reform:
D1 -0.3748 0.0394 0.1091** 0.0498
(0.4275) (0.0514) (0.0464) (0.0574)
D2 -0.0011 0.1168* 0.1212** -0.0293
(0.4393) (0.0607) (0.0489) (0.0566)
Parental Education (Reference: ED1):
ED2 0.7485*** 0.0110 0.0155* -0.0643***
(0.0845) (0.0110) (0.0084) (0.0145)
ED3 1.6658*** 0.0110 0.0333** -0.0589***
(0.1162) (0.0170) (0.0145) (0.0184)
ED4 2.1268*** -0.0007 0.0435*** -0.0702***
(0.0863) (0.0141) (0.0133) (0.0136)
Interaction of D1 with ED1− ED4 (Reference: D1 ∗ ED1):
D1 × ED2 0.0954 0.0440* 0.0341* -0.0449
(0.1854) (0.0224) (0.0199) (0.0383)
D1 × ED3 -0.2264 0.0989** 0.0647* -0.0781*
(0.2592) (0.0418) (0.0370) (0.0405)
D1 × ED4 0.1951 0.0350 0.0242 -0.0616*
(0.1926) (0.0238) (0.0269) (0.0352)
Interaction of D2 with ED1− ED4 (Reference: D2 ∗ ED1):
D2 × ED2 0.1314 -0.0102 0.0017 0.0018
(0.1936) (0.0269) (0.0205) (0.0420)
D2 × ED3 0.0611 -0.0219 -0.0076 -0.0383
(0.2317) (0.0402) (0.0310) (0.0422)
D2 × ED4 0.0408 -0.0180 -0.0266 -0.0514
(0.2047) (0.0317) (0.0230) (0.0394)
Observations 8045 8045 8045 8045
Notes: OLS regression. Signiﬁcance levels * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, the robust standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clusters at the state × year of birth
level. All models include state and year eﬀects and state speciﬁc trends, a dummy for female, school starting age and state and year speciﬁc rules for the transition to upper
secondary school (recommendation, binding grades, entrance examinations).
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point. Many of these individuals that are in the high school track decide to switch
tracks because they do not want to go to university but start an apprenticeship training
instead. Indeed, Biewen and Tapalaga (2017) show that, after completion of upper
secondary school, the share of individuals starting an apprenticeship training is as large
as the share of students that start to study.
Even though the binary variables of rules for the transition to upper secondary school
(binding recommendations, binding grades, entrance examinations) were included as
controls in the regressions, it is worth further investigating these. Results could indicate
that verbal assessments in combination with certain transition rules have a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the educational career path in groups with diﬀerent parental education. In-
teraction terms of the reform with these rules are included in Table 2.6. Column (1) is
the original sample, column (2) is a sample that only includes parents without upper
secondary degree. The interaction of the reform with entrance examination rules is
omitted because of collinearity. The main dependent variable remains the likelihood to
proceed to upper secondary school. None of the interaction coeﬃcients show signiﬁcance
at the 10 percent level. Also, none of the F-tests with interactions of D2 with a given
transition rule are signiﬁcant at the 10-percent level. There is also no clear pattern that
would suggest that the reform in interaction with transition rules beneﬁted individuals
with low parental education.
2.6 Robustness
The identiﬁcation assumption Since there are multiple treatment and control
states and periods it is diﬃcult to provide visual evidence of identical counterfactual
trends in treatment and control states. A formal test is to interact the treatment
variable with time dummies (Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Autor, 2003). 16 This results in
q leads (anticipatory eﬀects: α+1, α+2, ..., α+q) and m lags (post treatment eﬀects:
α−1, α−2, ..., α−m). α0 refers to the year of adoption. While α corresponds to D1
(grading before 3rd class), β does the same analog for D2 (grading in 3rd class). The
16Alternatively, Mora and Reggio (2015) oﬀer a new command framework which allows the evaluation
of treatment eﬀects under alternative assumptions.
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Table 2.6: DD estimates, transition to upper secondary school on Reform interacted with
binding secondary school recommendation and binding grades
Parents with ED1, ED2







Rules for transition to upper secondary school:
DBinding recommendation 0.0298 -0.0362
(0.0745) (0.0699)
DBinding grades 0.0248 0.0966
(0.1229) (0.1003)
DEntrance examinations exist 0.2471** 0.1790**
(0.1017) (0.0855)
Interactions:
D1 × DBinding recommendation -0.0366 -0.0068
(0.1175) (0.1073)
D1 × DBinding grades 0.0705 -0.2165
(0.1663) (0.1434)
D2 × DBinding recommendation -0.1444 0.0632
(0.1079) (0.1457)
D2 × DBinding grades 0.0473 -0.1441
(0.1802) (0.1679)
Observations 8169 5975
Notes: OLS regression. Signiﬁcance levels * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, the robust
standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clusters at the state × year of birth level. All
models include state and year eﬀects and state speciﬁc trends, a dummy for female, school starting

















β+τD2,s,t+τ +Xistδ +Rstµ+ φst + εist (2.3)
The outcome variable Yist is the likelihood to transition to upper secondary school, other
variables are as deﬁned in Equation 2.1. The DD assumption is tested as to whether
coeﬃcients on all leads of the treatment are zero. At the same time the pattern of the
lagged eﬀects is of interest in order to ﬁnd out if the causal eﬀect gets larger or smaller.
D1 and D2 are estimated in one model as shown in Equation 2.3. The estimated leads
and lags coeﬃcients are plotted in Figure 2.A.1 and Figure 2.A.2 and run from ﬁve years
ahead to ﬁve years behind. In Figure 2.A.1 for coeﬃcients of D1 the estimates before the
reform show a clear pattern only starting in the year before the adoption. In Figure 2.A.2
for the coeﬃcients of D2 the pattern is consistent with a causal interpretation. That
is, there are no large anticipatory eﬀects on the likelihood of transitioning to upper
secondary school. In the third year after the reform these eﬀects strongly increase. To
investigate the robustness of the results and whether the DD estimates are actually the
eﬀect of the later grading reform and not just state or year trends, a similar placebo
test is performed with more years. A placebo reform indicator is constructed where the
reform is shifted to earlier years. Table 2.7 gives the results of these estimations.
The likelihood of attending upper secondary school for the entire sample on the D2
placebo is small and insigniﬁcant. This shows that Placebo eﬀects are weak. However,
as before, the placebo does not work for every variable and year. The coeﬃcients for
D2 are small and insigniﬁcant for the leads t− 7 to t− 10. Some of the coeﬃcients are,
however, larger and signiﬁcant. Since year eﬀects are included, the explanation that
older cohorts have less education than younger cohorts does not hold.
In Columns (3)-(4) many of the coeﬃcients are smaller than in Table 2.5 and mostly
insigniﬁcant. The relatively large eﬀect found previously of the reform on mobility
between tracks cannot be found here. This speaks in favor of the robustness of the
estimation. The coeﬃcients for grade retention, on the other hand, are often higher in
the placebo estimation for the D1 placebo. This was due to the fact that it became less









































































Table 2.7: DD estimates, placebo test
Transition to upp. sec. Years of schooling MS → US US → MS/LS Grade ret. 1-4 class
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
D1 Placebo (t-6) 0.0735 0.3162 -0.0522 -0.0057 -0.0727**
(0.0735) (0.3080) (0.0332) (0.0307) (0.0349)
D1 Placebo (t-7) -0.0560 0.1303 0.0099 -0.0734** -0.0272
(0.0767) (0.2282) (0.0306) (0.0347) (0.0308)
D1 Placebo (t-8) 0.0119 0.0768 0.0103 -0.0496 -0.0893***
(0.0943) (0.2469) (0.0508) (0.0344) (0.0327)
D1 Placebo (t-9) -0.0432 -0.0373 -0.0324 -0.0233 -0.0049
(0.0705) (0.1887) (0.0333) (0.0258) (0.0379)
D1 Placebo (t-10) -0.0027 0.1210 -0.0289 -0.0333 -0.0748***
(0.0855) (0.2030) (0.0295) (0.0305) (0.0209)
D2 Placebo (t-6) 0.1282 0.4583* -0.0172 -0.0305 -0.0520
(0.1022) (0.2758) (0.0425) (0.0288) (0.0433)
D2 Placebo (t-7) 0.0068 0.7605*** 0.0827** -0.0466* -0.0202
(0.0832) (0.1825) (0.0359) (0.0261) (0.0373)
D2 Placebo (t-8) -0.0031 -0.2553 -0.0398 0.0114 0.0018
(0.0730) (0.2077) (0.0274) (0.0295) (0.0353)
D2 Placebo (t-9) -0.0269 0.2823 0.0243 -0.0224 -0.0191
(0.0649) (0.2142) (0.0255) (0.0294) (0.0322)
D2 Placebo (t-10) -0.0511 -0.4066** -0.0141 -0.0095 0.0221
(0.0590) (0.2008) (0.0347) (0.0340) (0.0335)
Observations 8169 8169 8169 8169 8169
Notes: OLS regression. Signiﬁcance levels * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, the robust standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clusters at
the state × year of birth level. All models include state and year eﬀects and state speciﬁc trends, a dummy for female, school starting age and state and
year speciﬁc rules for the transition to upper secondary school (recommendation, binding grades, entrance examinations). The regression also includes
leads from 0 to 5 and lags from 1 to 5.
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which henceforward prohibited grade retention in the ﬁrst years of school. In this case a
placebo reform estimation would yield higher coeﬃcients than estimates from the true
reform.
Another threat to the identifying assumption might arise if federal states suddenly
change quotas for upper secondary schools and increase the number of individuals tran-
sitioning to a higher track. This is possible, however, it is not relevant for the research
question of interest which is ﬁnding out whether later grading in combination with
socio-economic status has an eﬀect on educational achievement. Also, there is a steady
increase over the years of individuals moving to upper secondary school. The relatively
small coeﬃcient found for D1 compared to the one for D2 is also more in line with a
causal interpretation of an eﬀect of later grading since sudden changes in quotas should
show a larger coeﬃcient for D1 as well as coeﬃcients for D1 and D2 being more similar
in size.
Socio-economic status As an alternative measure of socio-economic status the max-
imal parental occupational status is used. Three groups are constructed: high (OCC3:
Managers and professional workers, small self-employed with employees), medium (OCC2:
routine clerical work, routine service and sales work, small self-employed without em-
ployees, manual supervisors, skilled manual workers) and low (OCC1: semi- and un-
skilled manual workers, agricultural labor). The results can be seen in Table 2.8.
For the transition to upper secondary school and the years of schooling none of the
interaction coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 10-percent level. This is in line with results
for parental education. The same is true for the other outcome variables. Again, there
is no clear pattern concerning the direction of the eﬀects for parental occupation and
there are mostly no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between occupation groups.
2.7 Conclusion
In light of the literature of recent years that ﬁnds strong evidence of the eﬀects of social
origin on educational transitions, this study aims at ﬁnding out if replacing grades by
verbal assessments in primary school can increase educational opportunity for children
with low parental education. The reform analyzed meant that West German federal









































































Table 2.8: DD estimates, educational outcomes on grading reform for parental occupation
Transition to upp. sec. Years of schooling MS → US US → MS/LS Grade ret. 1-4 class
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Grading reform:
D1 -0.0117 -0.4931 0.0751 0.1030** -0.0347
(0.1042) (0.3947) (0.0546) (0.0418) (0.0516)
D2 0.0193 -0.1719 0.0815 0.1083** -0.0192
(0.1048) (0.3942) (0.0590) (0.0447) (0.0514)
Parental Occupation (Reference: OCC1):
OCC2 0.0976*** 0.3577*** -0.0024 0.0098 -0.0375***
(0.0171) (0.0626) (0.0097) (0.0072) (0.0099)
OCC3 0.3837*** 1.3010*** 0.0052 0.0312*** -0.0536***
(0.0171) (0.0673) (0.0110) (0.0079) (0.0104)
Interaction of D1 with OCC1−OCC3 (Reference: D1 ∗OCC1):
D1 ×OCC2 0.0097 0.0976 0.0427* 0.0221 0.0455**
(0.0491) (0.2386) (0.0234) (0.0220) (0.0225)
D1 ×OCC3 0.0119 0.0227 0.0199 0.0177 0.0251
(0.0442) (0.2052) (0.0215) (0.0212) (0.0201)
Interaction of D2 with OCC1−OCC3 (Reference: D2 ∗OCC1):
D2 ×OCC2 -0.0009 0.2647 0.0484** -0.0014 -0.0052
(0.0422) (0.1774) (0.0224) (0.0182) (0.0247)
D2 ×OCC3 0.0590 0.1818 0.0269 -0.0127 -0.0374
(0.0367) (0.1666) (0.0193) (0.0177) (0.0241)
Observations 7415 7415 7415 7415 7415
Notes: OLS regression. Signiﬁcance levels * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, the robust standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clusters at the state ×
year of birth level. All models include state and year eﬀects and state speciﬁc trends, a dummy for female, school starting age and state and year speciﬁc rules for the
transition to upper secondary school (recommendation, binding grades, entrance examinations).
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in the 1970s. A diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimator is employed. This allows the use of
variation given by the diﬀerent timing of the implementation of the reform in federal
states to identify a causal eﬀect. The data comes from the National Educational Panel
Study (NEPS) for Germany as well as law gazettes of federal states.
Results provide little evidence that the later grading reform had an eﬀect on the
likelihood of transitioning to upper secondary school as well as educational attainment.
This means there is no evidence that not grading in the ﬁrst two classes has an impact
on track choice after class four. Furthermore, there is no evidence that students with
diﬀerent levels of parental education beneﬁt diﬀerently from later grading which means
educational opportunity seems to be unaﬀected by the reform. The reform does however
increase transitions between secondary school tracks. This indicates an educational
mismatch after primary school possibly caused by school reports without grades being
a less precise signal of individual ability. There is, however, no selectivity regarding
parental background for these transitions. The ﬁndings are robust to the inclusion of
institutional rules concerning the transition to upper secondary school, other controls
and using parental occupation as an indicator for socio-economic status.
In summary, the results suggest that it does not make a diﬀerence whether perfor-
mance is judged by grades or verbal reports with regard to the subsequent track choice.
Pekrun (1996) notes that other characteristics may be more important for the mea-
surement of performance. These are characteristics such as the quality of the judgment,
objectivity, to what extent judgments are displayed to individuals and the consequences
of selection. While this study investigates the impact of not grading in the ﬁrst two
classes of primary school, future work may focus on ﬁnding out how a four year expo-
sure to school reports without grades impacts educational opportunity. Also interesting
would be to ﬁnd out how other outcomes, for instance soft skills, are aﬀected by not
grading in primary school.
2.A Appendix
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BW BY BE HB HH HE NI NW RP SL SH
1954/1955 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y L Y / Y
1955/1956 Y Y N Y Y Y Y L Y / Y
1956/1957 Y Y N Y Y Y Y L Y / Y
1957/1958 Y Y N Y Y Y Y L Y / Y
1958/1959 Y Y N Y Y Y Y L Y / Y
1959/1960 Y Y N Y Y Y Y L Y / Y
1960/1961 Y Y N Y Y Y Y L Y / Y
1961/1962 Y Y N Y Y Y Y L Y / Y
1962/1963 Y Y N Y Y Y Y L Y / Y
1963/1964 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y / Y
1964/1965 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y / Y
1965/1966 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y / Y
1966/1967 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y / Y
1967/1968 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y / Y
1968/1969 Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y / Y
1969/1970 Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y / Y
1970/1971 Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y / Y
1971/1972 Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y / N
1972/1973 Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y / N
1973/1974 Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y / N
1974/1975 Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y / N
1975/1976 Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y N
1976/1977 Y Y N Y N Y Y Y Y Y N
1977/1978 Y Y N N N Y Y Y Y Y N
1978/1979 Y Y N N N Y N Y Y Y N
1979/1980 Y Y N N N Y N Y Y Y N
1980/1981 Y Y N N N Y N Y Y Y N
1981/1982 Y Y N N N Y N Y Y Y N
1982/1983 Y Y N N N Y N Y Y Y N
1983/1984 Y Y N N N Y N Y Y Y N
1984/1985 Y Y N N N Y N Y N Y N
1985/1986 Y Y N N N Y N Y N Y N
1986/1987 Y Y N N N Y N Y N Y N
1987/1988 Y Y N N N Y N Y N Y N
1988/1989 Y Y N N N Y N Y N N N
1990/1991 Y Y N N N Y N Y N N N
1991/1992 Y Y N N N Y N Y N N N
1992/1993 Y Y N N N Y N Y N N N
1993/1994 Y Y N N N N N Y N N N
1994/1995 Y Y N N N N N Y N N N
1995/1996 Y Y N N N N N Y N N N
1996/1997 Y Y N N N N N Y N N N
Notes: Secondary school recommendation is Y: binding, N: not binding. L: rules
diﬀer for local education authorities, /: rules missing. Adapted from Helbig and
Nikolai (2015).
Table 2.A.1: Secondary school recommendation
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BW BY BE HB HH HE NI NW RP SL SH
1954/1955 N N N N N N / L N / N
1955/1956 N N N N N N N L N / N
1956/1957 N N N N N N N L N / N
1957/1958 N N N Y N N N L N / N
1958/1959 N N N Y N N N L N / N
1959/1960 N N N N N N N L N / N
1960/1961 N N N N N N N L N / N
1961/1962 N N N N N N N L N / N
1962/1963 N N N N N N N L N / N
1963/1964 N N N N N N N N N / N
1964/1965 N N N N N N N N N / N
1965/1966 N N N N N N N N N / N
1966/1967 N N N N N N N N Y / N
1967/1968 N N N Y N N N N Y / N
1968/1969 N N N Y N N N N Y / N
1969/1970 N N N Y N N N N Y / N
1970/1971 N N N Y N N N N Y / N
1971/1972 N Y N Y N N N N Y / N
1972/1973 N Y N Y N N N N Y / N
1973/1974 N Y N Y N N N N Y / N
1974/1975 N Y N Y N N N N Y / N
1975/1976 N Y N Y N N N N Y / N
1976/1977 N Y N Y N N N N Y / N
1977/1978 N Y N N N N N N Y / N
1978/1979 N Y N N N N N N Y N N
1979/1980 Y Y N N / N N N Y N N
1980/1981 Y Y N N Y N N N Y N Y
1981/1982 Y Y N N Y N N N Y N Y
1982/1983 Y Y N N Y N N N Y N Y
1983/1984 Y Y N N Y N N N Y N Y
1984/1985 Y Y N N Y N N N Y N Y
1985/1986 Y Y N N Y N N N Y N Y
1986/1987 Y Y N N Y N N N Y N Y
1987/1988 Y Y N N Y N N N Y N Y
1988/1989 Y Y N N Y N N N Y N Y
1990/1991 Y Y N N Y N N N Y N Y
1991/1992 Y Y N N Y N N N Y N N
1992/1993 Y Y N N Y N N N Y N N
1993/1994 Y Y N N Y N N N Y N N
1994/1995 Y Y N N Y N N N Y N N
1995/1996 Y Y N N Y N N N Y N N
1996/1997 Y Y N N Y N N N Y N N
Notes: Grades are binding or not binding for the transition to upper secondary
school. Y: binding, N: not binding, L: rules diﬀer for local education authorities, /:
rules missing. Adapted from Helbig and Nikolai (2015).
Table 2.A.2: Criteria of transition: binding vs. non-binding grades
67
2. GRADES IN PRIMARY SCHOOL AND EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY - AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS FOR GERMANY
BW BY BE HB HH HE NI NW RP SL SH
1949/1950 / Y S Y / Y / L / / Y
1950/1951 / Y S Y / Y / L / / Y
1951/1952 / Y S Y / Y / L Y / Y
1952/1953 / Y N Y / Y / L Y / Y
1953/1954 / Y N Y / Y / L Y / Y
1954/1955 Y Y N Y Y Y / L Y / Y
1955/1956 Y Y N Y Y Y Y L Y / Y
1956/1957 Y Y N Y Y Y Y L Y / Y
1957/1958 Y Y N Y Y Y Y L Y / Y
1958/1959 Y Y N Y Y Y Y L Y / Y
1959/1960 Y Y N Y Y Y Y L Y / Y
1960/1961 Y Y N Y Y N Y L N / Y
1961/1962 Y Y N Y Y N Y L N / Y
1962/1963 Y Y N Y Y N Y L N / Y
1963/1964 Y Y N Y Y N Y Y N / Y
1964/1965 Y Y N Y Y N N N N / Y
1965/1966 Y Y N Y Y N N N N / Y
1966/1967 Y Y N Y Y N N N N / Y
1967/1968 Y Y N N Y N N N N / Y
1968/1969 Y Y N N N N N N N / Y
1969/1970 Y Y N N N N N N N / Y
1970/1971 Y Y N N N N N N N / Y
1971/1972 Y N N N N N N N N / N
1972/1973 Y N N N N N N N N / N
1973/1974 Y N N N N N N N N / N
1974/1975 Y N N N N N N N N / N
1975/1976 Y N N N N N N N N / N
1976/1977 Y N N N N N N N N / N
1977/1978 Y N N N N N N N N / N
1978/1979 Y N N N N N N N N N N
1979/1980 N N N N N N N N N N N
1980/1981 N N N N N N N N N N N
1981/1982 N N N N N N N N N N N
1982/1983 N N N N N N N N N N N
1983/1984 N N N N N N N N N N N
1984/1985 N N N N N N N N N N N
1985/1986 N N N N N N N N N N N
1986/1987 N N N N N N N N N N N
1987/1988 N N N N N N N N N N N
1988/1989 N N N N N N N N N N N
1990/1991 N N N N N N N N N N N
1991/1992 N N N N N N N N N N N
1992/1993 N N N N N N N N N N N
1993/1994 N N N N N N N N N N N
1994/1995 N N N N N N N N N N N
1995/1996 N N N N N N N N N N N
1996/1997 N N N N N N N N N N N
Notes: Entrance examination for the transition to upper secondary school. Y:
entrance examination is exclusive criteria or one of many criteria, N: no entrance
examination, S: single school type, L: rules diﬀer for local education authorities, /:
rules missing. Adapted from Helbig and Nikolai (2015).
Table 2.A.3: Criteria of transition: entrance examination
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Figure 2.A.1: Estimates for D1 from Equation 2.3 (α+5, α+4, ..., α−4, α−5), vertical lines
mark 90% conﬁdence interval
Figure 2.A.2: Estimates for D2 from Equation 2.3 (β+5, β+4, ..., β−4, β−5), vertical lines
mark 90% conﬁdence interval
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Chapter 3
The Long-term Eﬀect of Age at
School Entry on Competencies in
Adulthood*
3.1 Introduction
Many countries determine the age at which children may legally start school by deﬁning
cut-oﬀ dates for enrollment. All children born before the cut-oﬀ are supposed to enter
school in a given year, while those born after the cut-oﬀ are expected to wait until the
start of the next school year. This leads to considerable between-child variation in the
school starting age (SSA) within a class. A vast empirical literature shows that SSA
has important eﬀects on children's school performances. Children that are enrolled
at a higher SSA outperform their younger classmates in mathematics, reading, and
writing (see, e.g., Bedard and Dhuey, 2006; Elder and Lubotsky, 2009; Smith, 2009).
Most countries also give parents legal options to enroll their children with a one-year
delay. These options usually allow parents of children, who would have had a low SSA
*This chapter is based on joint work with Katja Görlitz (FU Berlin, DIW, RWI and IZA) and Marcus
Tamm (RWI and IZA). This chapter uses data from the National Educational Panel Study (NEPS):
Starting Cohort Adults, doi:10.5157/NEPS:SC6:8.0.0. From 2008 to 2013, NEPS data was collected
as part of the Framework Program for the Promotion of Empirical Educational Research funded by
the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF). As of 2014, NEPS is carried out by
the Leibniz Institute for Educational Trajectories (LIfBi) at the University of Bamberg in cooperation
with a nationwide network. Katja Görlitz and Marcus Tamm acknowledge ﬁnancial support from the
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (GO 2168/1-2 and TA 829/2-2).
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if they were enrolled regularly, to delay school entry by one year, making the child a
high SSA student. This practice, which is often called red-shirting in the academic
literature, has become increasingly common in recent years in the US and Germany
(Deming and Dynarski, 2008; Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017, 2018). Parents might
consider red-shirting to be an optimal decision if enrolling their children with a lower
SSA is accompanied by lifetime disadvantages for their children. However, previous
literature, which documents the negative SSA eﬀects, focuses mostly on the test score
diﬀerentials of schoolchildren. Only a handful of papers go beyond Grade 10 and show
that SSA eﬀects become much smaller when looking at IQ and SAT scores at around
the age of 18 (see, e.g., Black et al., 2011; Hurwitz et al., 2015).
This paper is the ﬁrst to investigate whether SSA test score diﬀerentials continue
into adulthood or fade away after leaving school. It evaluates SSA eﬀects on adult com-
petencies, as measured in comprehensive tests administered as part of a representative
survey of individuals between 23 and 71 years old. Analyzing the persistence of SSA
eﬀects provides important information for parents. It also contributes to the literature
investigating the long-run eﬀects of SSA on individuals' wages and employment (e.g.,
Black et al., 2011; Fredriksson and Öckert, 2014; Larsen and Solli, 2017). Individuals
with a lower SSA have higher wages and better employment perspectives shortly after
entering the labor market. This result is due to a lower SSA being accompanied by
longer tenure and actual experience when holding the age constant. However, Fredriks-
son and Öckert (2014) and Larsen and Solli (2017) conclude that SSA has no eﬀects
on cumulative earnings over an individual's life using data for Sweden and Norway,
respectively. Since one of the potential channels for long-run eﬀects on wages and em-
ployment is SSA-induced diﬀerences in adult competencies, our study should be viewed
as complementary to this stream of literature.1
Our study also contributes to the literature showing that SSA test score diﬀerentials
decrease as children progress through school (see, e.g., Bedard and Dhuey, 2006; Elder
and Lubotsky, 2009). Even though many studies support this view, there is still some
disagreement about whether the eﬀects are attenuated by middle school (Cook and
1Other papers on the long-run eﬀects of SSA are only slightly connected to our research question.
These papers involve studies investigating the eﬀects of SSA on crime (e.g., Cook and Kang, 2016;
Landersø et al., 2017), fertility (e.g., McCrary and Royer, 2011; Skirbekk et al., 2004), and marriage
outcomes (e.g., Lefgren and McIntyre, 2006).
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Kang, 2018, p. 2). Apart from our main analysis, which sheds further light on the
potential attenuation by presenting the long-term eﬀects of SSA, our literature section
makes an additional contribution. It graphically analyzes how the estimates of SSA on
students' test scores presented in the previous literature diﬀer by grade level.
The identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of SSA on competencies relies on an instrumental
variable strategy that exploits the state- and year-speciﬁc rules given by the cut-oﬀ
dates. The empirical model controls for a full set of month-of-birth dummies. This is
important because Buckles and Hungerman (2013) point out that the distribution of
family background diﬀers by children's months of birth and diﬀerences in SSA might
capture some of these eﬀects. This capture is possible in our study because the school-
entry regulations were subject to several changes at the state and year levels, allowing
separate identiﬁcation of the month-of-birth eﬀects. In addition, our model can account
for age-at-test eﬀects. Such an accounting is not possible in most of the previous
studies that analyze SSA eﬀects on test scores for school-aged children. If all children
take the test at the same point in time, being older at school entry means automatically
taking each test at an older age. Black et al. (2011) show that SSA eﬀects become
much smaller after controlling for the age at the time of testing. We are able to account
for the age at the time of testing because the competency tests were not taken at a
particular date for all individuals, but the time interval for the interviews stretched out
over several months and the test-taking date was unrelated to the date of birth and the
state where individuals went to school.
This paper contributes to the literature by additionally disentangling relative from
absolute age eﬀects, which is important from a policy perspective. Relative age measures
the age diﬀerence compared to the ages of the other students within the cohort. Absolute
age refers to the age (and, thus, maturity) when starting school. The previous literature
is generally not able to separate these two potential channels when analyzing SSA
diﬀerences. This inability to separate comes about due to the fact that the relative age
at school entry is linearly related to the absolute age. One exception is the work of
Cascio and Schanzenbach (2016), which separates absolute from relative SSA eﬀects.
They show that absolute age signiﬁcantly increases a combined math and reading test
score in Grade 8, while relative age has a statistically negative impact on the test score.
Our analysis provides estimates for relative and absolute SSA eﬀects by exploiting the
fact that several states experienced changes in cut-oﬀ dates over time. However, to
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compare our results to the previous literature, our baseline results provide SSA eﬀects
without separating the two eﬀects.
Our analysis shows that the impact of SSA on math and text comprehension mea-
sured in adulthood are considerably smaller than what the literature has shown for
children in school. Further, both estimates are statistically insigniﬁcant. In contrast,
the eﬀect of SSA on receptive vocabulary is sizable in adulthood, with a one-year-higher
SSA increasing competency by around a third of a standard deviation. These ﬁndings
survive several tests of robustness. When disentangling the eﬀect of SSA into an ab-
solute and a relative age eﬀect, we ﬁnd that receptive vocabulary is aﬀected solely by
absolute age.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 gives an overview of
the previous literature on SSA eﬀects on test scores and illustrates how the estimated
eﬀects diﬀer by grade level. Section 3.3 describes the data and the school entry regula-
tions, and Section 3.4 presents the estimation strategy. The ﬁfth section presents and
discusses the results, and the ﬁnal section oﬀers a conclusion.
3.2 Previous literature
There exists a vast empirical literature that estimates the causal eﬀects of SSA on test
scores. The majority of papers rely on instrumental variable strategies for identiﬁcation.
The instruments exploit the variation in individuals' dates of birth and cut-oﬀ rules.
Both determine at which age a student should legally start school. Alternatively, some
studies use the information on date of birth and the cut-oﬀ rules for implementing
a regression discontinuity design. The previous literature uses test scores measured at
diﬀerent grade levels as outcomes. The earliest test score diﬀerences are measured during
kindergarten, where the variation derives from kindergarten entry cut-oﬀ dates. Several
studies show that the oldest kindergarten children score signiﬁcantly better in reading
and math tests compared to the youngest children within the class (Datar, 2006; Elder
and Lubotsky, 2009; Lubotsky and Kaestner, 2016; Cascio and Schanzenbach, 2016).
Being one year older within a kindergarten class increases math and reading/writing
test scores by 0.43 to 0.87 and 0.42 to 0.58 of a standard deviation, respectively.
These early advantages of being the oldest when entering school continue into higher
classes (Bedard and Dhuey, 2006; Fredriksson and Öckert, 2006; Puhani and Weber,
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2007; McEwan and Shapiro, 2008; Ponzo and Scoppa, 2014; Cook and Kang, 2016;
Dhuey et al., 2017; Attar and Cohen-Zada, 2018; Koppensteiner, 2018). However, when
comparing the magnitude of the relationship, this advantage seems to decrease when
children progress through school. In Grades 9 and 10, the test score diﬀerential from
being one year older at school entry is 0.10 to 0.20 of a standard deviation in math and
0.15 to 0.24 in reading/writing (Smith, 2009; Black et al., 2011; Peña, 2017).
We provide further evidence on how SSA test score diﬀerential evolves by graphically
illustrating how SSA estimates presented in the literature diﬀer by grade level. The
studies considered for the graphs come from an extensive literature search performed
using EconLit.2 Figure 3.1 shows the relationship for math and reading/writing scores
in Panels A and B, respectively. It illustrates that the test score advantage conferred on
the oldest students decreases with grade level. It is largest in kindergarten  even more
so for math compared to reading/writing. The dashed lines indicate the best ﬁt for
the functional relationship between SSA test score diﬀerentials and grade levels.3 The
lines suggest a declining but non-linear relationship. Based on the graphs, extrapolation
beyond Grade 10 suggests that the math test score diﬀerentials will continue to decline,
while there is no clear conclusion for reading/writing.
There are only a handful of papers that go beyond Grade 10. However, most of
these studies analyze competencies at around the age of 18 and do not extend to higher
ages. Further, they sometimes use tests that do not represent competencies but, rather,
2The search on EconLit was done on November 20th, 2018. It included the following keywords:
school entry age, kindergarten entry age, school entrance age, kindergarten entrance age, school
starting age, kindergarten starting age, age at school entry, age at kindergarten entry, age at
school start, age at kindergarten start, enrollment cutoﬀ, age eﬀect school, relative age school,
and relative age performance. From the studies found in this manner, we kept only those in which
the identiﬁcation strategy exploits cut-oﬀ rules and the dependent variable is a test score (rather than
grades given by the teacher). To be able to consider all estimates from these studies in one ﬁgure for
math and in one ﬁgure for reading/writing, the estimates additionally had to fulﬁl the following criteria:
i) they are provided separately for math and reading/writing tests; ii) they are provided separately by
grade level; iii) they can be interpreted in terms of standard deviations of the test score's distribution
(i.e., summary statistics that at least allowed a corresponding interpretation had to be provided); and
iv) the estimates are provided for the entire population of students rather than just separately for
subgroups, such as boys and girls. Table 3.A.1 in the appendix contains the full list of studies that are
used for the ﬁgures.
3To decide on the functional form of the relationship, we have run linear, quadratic, cubic, and
exponential regressions. According to the AIC criteria, a cubic speciﬁcation best ﬁts the relationship
for math scores, and a quadratic model works best for reading/writing.
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abilities, or they present their results for a selective sample of students. Therefore, we
could not include these results in Figure 3.1. The following paragraph will summarize
these ﬁndings.
Using cut-oﬀ dates for identiﬁcation, Black et al. (2011) provide evidence of the
impact of SSA on men's IQ scores measured at 18 years of age. They ﬁnd relatively
small negative eﬀects, i.e., those who are older within class have slightly lower IQ scores.
When using IQ scores as an outcome, one caveat is that it is unclear to what extent
IQ represents competencies acquired at school and to what extent it represents innate
abilities. Cascio and Lewis (2006) provide reduced form estimates of the eﬀect of SSA on
AFQT scores of individuals aged 15 to 19. While the eﬀects are not signiﬁcant for whites,
they are slightly negative for blacks. Fletcher and Kim (2016) estimate the reduced form
eﬀects of the kindergarten entry cut-oﬀs that diﬀer by state on state-speciﬁc averages
of the test scores in math and reading. They ﬁnd no eﬀect of kindergarten entry age
on test scores in Grade 12. Nam (2014) exploits cut-oﬀ rules using Korean data. The
results indicate that SSA has positive eﬀects on math and reading/writing test scores in
Grades 6 to 8 but that these diﬀerences do not persist when students graduate from high
school. Implementing a regression discontinuity design based on cut-oﬀ dates, Hurwitz
et al. (2015) show that SSA has no signiﬁcant impact on the SAT scores of college-
bound students. However, both Nam (2014) and Hurwitz et al. (2015) analyze test
scores of students who voluntarily participated in the test, thus representing a selective
sample of students who intend to enroll in college after high school graduation. The
same is true for Pellizzari and Billari (2012), who look at the performance of university
students. They ﬁnd that younger students outperform their older fellow students, which
they explain via fewer social activities and, thus, more learning time for the younger
students. In conclusion, it is an open question whether and how the eﬀects of SSA on
competencies linger into adulthood.
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3.3 Data and school enrollment regulations
3.3.1 Data
The analysis is based on the adult cohort of the National Educational Panel Study
(NEPS-SC6). The NEPS-SC6 includes information on the educational, occupational,
and family formation processes for individuals born between 1944 and 1986. It covers
detailed information from birth through adult life (Blossfeld et al., 2011), including
information on state and date of school entry. This last information allows us to deter-
mine accurately the date when children should have entered school according to oﬃcial
regulations and when they have actually done so.
The data also contain information on competencies measured in adulthood. For
our analysis, we use one test for mathematical competencies and two tests for language
competencies, i.e., for text comprehension and receptive vocabulary. The diﬀerent com-
petency tests were collected in the NEPS-SC6 data in diﬀerent waves. The tests were
part of the interviews in wave 2010/2011, in which individuals were randomly selected
to take the math or the text comprehension test or both, and 2012/2013, in which
text comprehension tests were administered to individuals who did not take the test in
2010/2011. In 2014/2015, tests for receptive vocabulary were part of the interview for
all respondents. These competency tests capture basic competencies in everyday life
situations (Weinert et al., 2011). The math competency tests were designed to describe
respondents' abilities to use and apply mathematics ﬂexibly in realistic situations. They
cover four content areas: data and probability, quantities, shape and space, and change
and relationship (Schnittjer and Durchhardt, 2015). To provide one example from the
area data and probability, respondents are asked whether they understand the statistics
on side eﬀects from the package inserts of a pharmaceutical product. The test for text
comprehension uses diﬀerent types of text from which respondents must ﬁnd informa-
tion in the text, draw text-related conclusions, and reﬂect and assess (Gehrer et al.,
2012). The receptive vocabulary test is similar to the Peabody Picture Vocabulary
Test. Respondents have to assign pictures to a single word given by the interviewer by
choosing from four possibilities. The correlation between the three test scores is high,
with correlation coeﬃcients varying between 0.47 and 0.55, but there is substantial inde-
pendent variation in each of these outcomes, i.e., we are guaranteed that the three tests
scores measure diﬀerent dimensions of competencies. In order to ease interpretation of
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Figure 3.1: Eﬀects of school starting age on test scores by grade level
Panel A: Math test scores
Panel B: Reading/writing test scores
Notes: Grade 0 refers to kindergarten. The dots represent statistically signiﬁcant estimates
and the crosses statistically insigniﬁcant estimates. The dashed blue line presents the best
ﬁt of a model, where grade level enters as a third polynomial. The dotted black line presents
the best ﬁt of a quadratic relationship between reading test scores and grade level. The
AIC criteria was used to decide on the functional form of the relationships. Table 3.A.1 in
the appendix shows the full list of studies considered in the ﬁgures.
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the results, the test scores are normalized to having a mean of zero and a variance of
one (z-scores).
Figure 3.A.1 in the appendix illustrates the distribution of the three test scores. Even
though the tests are designed to capture basic competencies, there is ample variation at
the upper and lower end of the competency distributions. The histogram of the receptive
vocabulary test score shows that its distribution is highly left-skewed. Therefore, the
results section also includes ﬁndings for receptive vocabulary that analyze whether this
skewness presents a problem. Speciﬁcally, we transform the receptive vocabulary test
scores using a Box-Cox-transformation. The transformed and standardized test scores
have a distribution that is much more similar to a normal distribution (see Figure 3.A.2
in the appendix). Because the interpretation of the transformed test scores is less
straightforward than that for the untransformed test scores, the main speciﬁcation for
receptive vocabulary is based on the untransformed test scores. However, the robustness
section documents that the main results remain unchanged when using the transformed
test scores.
The analysis focuses on individuals who entered primary school in West Germany.
East Germany (including Berlin) is dropped from the analysis because the East German
schooling system diﬀered considerably from the schooling system in the West for this
time period. Also, the East German cut-oﬀ dates for school entry did not diﬀer between
regions and over time, inhibiting separate identiﬁcation of the eﬀects of age at school
entry from month-of-birth eﬀects. The analysis considers information on around 3,700
individuals for mathematical literacy, around 5,900 individuals for text comprehension,
and around 6,000 individuals for receptive vocabulary.4 Descriptive statistics of the
three samples are provided in Table 3.1. Diﬀerences between the samples are small,
except for age at test, which is due to the fact that the diﬀerent competencies were
assessed in diﬀerent waves. The average age at test is between 46 and 50 years. Half
of the respondents are women. On average, they entered school at 61/2 years old and
received an average of 131/2 years of education.
4The initial West German sample size of individuals participating in the competency tests is 3,766,
5,976, and 6,190, respectively. We had to drop between 1.4% and 1.7% of the observations to ensure
that all variables required to construct the instrument are observable and due to data cleaning.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics
Sample: Mathematical Sample: Text Sample: Receptive
literacy comprehension vocabulary
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Female 0.499 0.500 0.498 0.500 0.503 0.500
Age at school entry 6.48 0.49 6.48 0.49 6.48 0.49
Age at test 45.80 11.19 46.68 11.38 49.61 11.09
Years of education 13.58 2.70 13.39 2.79 13.54 2.76
Observations 3,678 5,855 6,053
Notes: The reason for the diﬀerences in the number of observations by competency test
is that the tests were taken in diﬀerent waves.
3.3.2 School enrollment regulations
The analysis exploits variation in school entry cut-oﬀ dates that legally deﬁne at which
age children are supposed to enter school. In Germany, children turning age 6 before the
cut-oﬀ date enter school at the beginning of the school year, while those turning 6 after
the cut-oﬀ enter school one year later. The cut-oﬀ date is determined by the states. The
age at school entry does not depend only on the cut-oﬀ date and one's birthday; it also
depends on the date when the school year starts, which is also legally determined at
the state level. The cut-oﬀ date and the beginning of the school year have experienced
several changes over time in German states. In recent decades, the school year has
generally started in August, while it started in April during the 1950s and 1960s (see
Table 3.A.2 in the appendix). The cut-oﬀ date experienced more changes, varying from
the 31st of March to the 31st of December (see Table 3.A.3 in the appendix).
The cut-oﬀ is not strictly enforced, as there are options to enroll earlier or to delay
school entry, but a sizeable share of parents sticks to the oﬃcial cut-oﬀ. Figure 3.2
documents how the legally determined expected school starting age is related to the
average of the actual SSA. The diagonal line illustrates the case of full compliance, i.e.,
when all children follow the cut-oﬀ rules without exception. The dots show the actual
association between expected and average actual school starting age. Even though
Figure 3.2 documents a clear, positive association between the expected and the actual
relationship, it also shows that the actual relationship is ﬂatter. This ﬂatness indicates
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that children with relatively low expected entry ages, i.e., turning 6 years old just
before the school cut-oﬀ, are, on average, older than 6 when entering school since some
children delay entry. Further, children with relatively high expected entry ages, i.e.,
those turning 7 shortly after the cut-oﬀ, are, on average, somewhat younger than 7
when entering school because some children enroll early. This pattern is evidence that
parents actually make use of the legal possibilities of delayed and early school entry.
Since non-compliance with the cut-oﬀ rules occurs and might be selective, exploiting
variation from legal cut-oﬀ dates to identify the causal eﬀect of age at school entry seems
important. Also, note that the range of expected age at school entry in Figure 3.2
exceeds one year. This is because the minimum expected age at school entry diﬀers
between the states in Germany. While some states have oﬃcial rules that students
should be enrolled between the ages of 5.8 and 6.7 (when complying with the rules),
others allow the age range to vary from 6.4 to 7.3 years. This variation is exploited in
a further analysis to ﬁnd out whether the estimated diﬀerences in competencies by the
age at school entry derives from diﬀerences in absolute or relative age.
Figure 3.2: The relationship between the expected and the average of the actual age at
school entry
Note: The dots indicate the association between the expected school starting age and the
average actual age at school entry. The diagonal line indicates how the association would
look if everyone complied with the cut-oﬀ rules.
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3.4 Estimation strategy
The causal eﬀect of school starting age is estimated by the following equation:





k + εki , (3.1)
where Y ki is the standardized test score of individual i on test k (k = mathemati-
cal literacy, text comprehension, or receptive vocabulary). SSAi is school starting age,
and Xi is a set of covariates, including gender, dummies for the states of enrollment
in primary school, a full set of year-of-birth dummies, and a full set of month-of-birth
dummies. Estimating the parameter of interest βk1 from Equation 3.1 by OLS would
induce biased estimates because the early or late enrollment of children varies with
children's abilities and parents' resources in a systematic manner. For instance, Dobkin
and Ferreira (2010) show that children of highly educated parents have a lower prob-
ability of complying with the enrollment regulations. These identiﬁcation issues are
taken into account by using an instrumental variable (IV) estimator. The instrument
is based on the school entry cut-oﬀ dates that vary by states and over time. Following
the previous literature, the instrument is deﬁned as the expected age at school entry
ESSAi. This is the age at which an individual would have entered school if school entry
were determined solely by the oﬃcial regulations. The IV estimator is implemented in
the following ﬁrst-stage equation:
SSAi = γ˜0 + p˜i
′ESSAi +Xiθ˜ + µ˜i. (3.2)
Xi includes the aforementioned set of covariates. The inclusion of month-of-birth dum-
mies is only possible because the cut-oﬀ dates vary over time and between states (see
Section 3.3.2). Few papers can account for month-of-birth eﬀects, although Buckles
and Hungerman (2013) ﬁnd that parents' backgrounds correlate with children's month
of birth, even in two consecutive months within the same season. This correlation
might lead to systematic diﬀerences between those born before and those born after
the cut-oﬀ. Using only cut-oﬀ dates without controlling for the month of birth absorbs
these diﬀerences, biasing the estimation of the eﬀect of school starting age. Including
the year-of-birth dummies serves the purpose of controlling for changes over time that
likely correlate with the outcome and the instrument, such as the educational expansion
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during the 1960s and 1970s. The year-of-birth dummies also capture the inﬂuence of
age at test in a non-parametric way.5
All estimates account for clustering at the level of states. Since only ten clusters
can be accounted for, as there are only ten states, the standard errors may suﬀer from
downward bias. We follow suggestions in Cameron et al. (2008) for estimation with few
clusters and present small-sample-adjusted p-values of a test against zero instead of the
downward biased standard errors. As a test of robustness, we also present p-values of
a wild cluster bootstrap, which was found to work well when the number of clusters is
small (Cameron et al., 2008).
First-stage estimates and validity of the identiﬁcation strategy
Table 3.2 presents the ﬁrst-stage estimates. Increasing the expected age at school
entry by one year is associated with an average increase of actual age at school entry by
0.38 years. Since the F-test for the signiﬁcance of the instrument is always considerably
above 10, there is no problem of a weak instrument. These results reinforce the conclu-
sions from Figure 3.2, meaning that the expected school starting age is well suited to
serve as an instrument for actual school starting age.
Due to the alternative speciﬁcations of the dependent variable being exactly iden-
tiﬁed, the validity of the instrument cannot be tested. However, in the following we
perform several of measures to provide some plausibility arguments for the validity of
the identiﬁcation strategy. It has been suggested to analyze whether births are sys-
tematically displaced around the cut-oﬀ (McCrary, 2008). Figure 3.A.3 in the appendix
shows the number of observations by distance to the cut-oﬀ for each of the three samples.
No systematic pattern of bringing forward or postponement of births becomes visible.6
In addition to this we also show that predetermined variables, such as parental charac-
teristics, are not correlated with the instrument. If the instrument were correlated with
parental background, this could have a direct eﬀect on competencies. Table 3.3 shows,
separately for the three samples, that the family status at the age of 15 (i.e., whether
the individual was raised by a single parent) and mother's and father's education, age
at birth, and migration status are all unrelated to the instrument. This suggests that
5We apply further robustness tests that include, directly, age at test measured on a monthly basis
in the regression. The results remain the same.
6For an example of systematic timing of the date of delivery with respect to a policy reform in
Germany, see Tamm (2013).
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Expected school starting age (ESSA) 0.3755 0.3697 0.3761
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
F-statistic (excluded instrument) 81.25 133.29 148.19
Observations 3,678 5,855 6,053
Note: The dependent variable is the school starting age. The ﬁrst row indicates the sample
used to analyze each of the three competencies. As mentioned in Section 3.3.1, using diﬀerent
samples is necessary because each competency was tested in a diﬀerent survey wave. The control
variables include the year of birth, the month of birth, the state of primary school enrollment,
and gender. Estimation accounts for clustering at the state level. Small-sample-adjusted p-
values are shown in parentheses.
parents do not strategically plan to deliver children before or after the school cut-oﬀ
date in Germany, which is also conﬁrmed by Bahrs and Schumann (2016). In order to
test the robustness of our main results, Section 3.5 also presents IV estimates controlling
for the above-mentioned parental characteristics.
3.5 Results
Table 3.4 presents the main IV estimates in Panel A. The ﬁrst column of Table 3.4
presents the results for mathematical literacy. The estimate is statistically insigniﬁcant
and small in size, suggesting that SSA has no long-lasting eﬀects on mathematical
competencies that persist until adulthood. The point estimate for an increase of age at
school entry by one year relates to 6% of a standard deviation, which is far below what
was measured in Grade 10 (see Panel A of Figure 3.1). The second column of Table 3.4
documents the results using text comprehension as an outcome. Similar to the results
for mathematical literacy, the estimate for text comprehension presented in Panel A is
statistically insigniﬁcant, and it is much smaller than the eﬀects that were found in the
literature for tests taken at younger ages. Speciﬁcally, the point estimate relates to 8%
of a standard deviation. The third column of Table 3.4 shows results using receptive
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Table 3.3: The eﬀect of school starting age on predetermined characteristics (IV results)
Single- Mother Father Mother's Father's Mother Father
parent with with age at age at foreign foreign
family at college college birth birth born born
age 15 degree degree
Sample: mathematical literacy
IV estimate: SSA -0.0284 0.0056 0.0383 1.8301 2.0310 -0.0156 -0.0194
(0.436) (0.854) (0.526) (0.260) (0.253) (0.733) (0.562)
Observations 3,674 3,586 3,553 3,573 3,535 3,657 3,606
Sample: text comprehension
IV estimate: SSA 0.0692 0.0095 0.0605 0.3586 0.9372 -0.0129 -0.0404
(0.150) (0.561) (0.223) (0.433) (0.444) (0.729) (0.291)
Observations 5,848 5,674 5,627 5,687 5,627 5,823 5,736
Sample: receptive vocabulary
IV estimate: SSA 0.0482 0.0220 0.0976 0.2359 1.4198 -0.0435 0.0075
(0.129) (0.341) (0.161) (0.740) (0.287) (0.093) (0.734)
Observations 6,045 5,870 5,819 5,884 5,813 6,018 5,933
Note: The table provides IV estimates of the eﬀect of school starting age on the outcomes listed in the
ﬁrst row. ESSA is used as the instrument. Estimation accounts for clustering at the state level. Small-
sample-adjusted p-values are shown in parentheses.
vocabulary as an outcome. In contrast to the other two measures of competency, the
impact of the estimate of school starting age on receptive vocabulary is signiﬁcantly
positive. An increase of age at school entry by one year is associated with an increase
in test scores by a third of a standard deviation. This is an economically sizable eﬀect.
Before discussing reasons for why the eﬀect of SSA on the Peabody Picture test
persists, while it vanishes for math skills and text comprehension, we present several
robustness checks. Panel B of Table 3.4 shows that the results remain robust when
controlling for parental background characteristics. This is not surprising given that
Table 3.3 has already shown that parental background is uncorrelated with the instru-
ment. We also ﬁnd that controlling for parental background increases the precision of
the estimates. This leads to lower p-values for the estimate of school starting age on
receptive vocabulary but leaves our conclusion of insigniﬁcant results for math skills
and text comprehension unchanged. As has already been discussed in Section 3.2, some
recent studies have shown that controlling for age at test matters considerably when
estimating the eﬀects of SSA on competency tests (see, e.g., Black et al., 2011). In our
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main speciﬁcation, age at test is partially controlled for by the year-of-birth dummies.
Panels C and D directly control for age at test measured on a monthly basis to capture
even small diﬀerences in age at test. Small age diﬀerences within a given cohort occur
because the interviews were conducted in diﬀerent months over the year and because
some individuals participated in the text comprehension test in wave 2010/2011, while
others participated in wave 2012/2013. Panels C and D present the results of a linear
speciﬁcation for age at test and of a squared speciﬁcation, respectively. Both speciﬁ-
cations still control for the year-of-birth dummies. Results in Panels C and D are very
similar to those of the main speciﬁcation.
States that implement reforms to the schooling system, such as changes in the cut-oﬀ
date, might experience diﬀerent trends in the outcome variable even without reforms.
To rule out that such state-speciﬁc changes over time aﬀect our estimates, Panel E
controls for state-speciﬁc time trends using a linear speciﬁcation, and Panel F controls
for state-speciﬁc time trends using a squared speciﬁcation. Controlling for time trends
has only a minor impact on the estimates of SSA. Panel G of Table 3.4 shows results
excluding the most recent cohorts. We do so because most of the changes in cut-oﬀ
dates and the school start month took place during the 1950s and 1960s. In order to
not rely on cohorts that are relatively far away from these reforms, the speciﬁcation
in Panel G is restricted to cohorts born between 1944 and 1973, dropping those born
between 1974 and 1986.7 The results for this reduced sample are very similar to those
for the entire sample.
Panels H and I present results for alternative deﬁnitions of the instrument. While
Panel A includes a linear speciﬁcation for ESSA as an instrument for SSA, Panel H ad-
ditionally includes ESSA-squared as an instrument. Furthermore, Panel I uses separate
dummies for each value of ESSA as an instrument for SSA. These alternative deﬁnitions
of the instrument generally conﬁrm our main ﬁndings of statistically signiﬁcantly eﬀects
of SSA on receptive vocabulary, although the point estimate is reduced by around one
third (from 0.35 to 0.21) in Panel I.
Panel J shows that the results are robust to calculating the standard errors by
alternative methods. As is pointed out in Section 3.4, all estimates account for clustering
at the level of the states. Because the number of clusters is small, we follow Cameron
7The last cohort aﬀected by reforms is the birth cohort of 1963. 1973 is chosen to include, at most,
ten birth cohorts afterwards.
86
3.5 Results
Table 3.4: The eﬀect of school starting age on competencies in adulthood
Mathematical literacy Text comprehension Receptive vocabulary
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A Main speciﬁcation
IV estimate: SSA 0.0648 0.0818 0.3461
(0.795) (0.644) (0.021)
F-statistic (excluded instrument) 81.25 133.29 148.19
Observations 3,678 5,855 6,053
Panel B Controlling for parental background characteristics
IV estimate: SSA 0.0492 0.0994 0.3797
(0.839) (0.573) (0.009)
F-statistic (excluded instrument) 78.99 121.89 126.57
Observations 3,678 5,855 6,053
Panel C Controlling for age at test in addition to the year-of-birth dummies
IV estimate: SSA 0.0628 0.0849 0.3462
(0.800) (0.649) (0.021)
F-statistic (excluded instrument) 81.30 132.70 148.14
Observations 3,678 5,855 6,053
Panel D Controlling for age at test and its square in addition to the year-of-birth dummies
IV estimate: SSA 0.0422 0.0864 0.3668
(0.873) (0.653) (0.028)
F-statistic (excluded instrument) 94.73 205.61 171.34
Observations 3,678 5,855 6,053
Panel E Controlling for state-speciﬁc time trends
IV estimate: SSA 0.0712 0.0765 0.3141
(0.767) (0.643) (0.043)
F-statistic (excluded instrument) 80.18 132.95 155.91
Observations 3,678 5,855 6,053
Panel F Controlling for state-speciﬁc time trends using a quadratic speciﬁcation
IV estimate: SSA 0.0742 0.0809 0.2710
(0.771) (0.612) (0.075)
F-statistic (excluded instrument) 77.14 131.06 153.7
Observations 3,678 5,855 6,053
Panel G Sample 1944-1973
IV estimate: SSA 0.1000 0.1015 0.2907
(0.707) (0.584) (0.015)
F-statistic (excluded instrument) 71.61 106.66 127.47
Observations 3,028 4,799 4,984
Panel H Alternative deﬁnition of the instrument: ESSA + ESSA-squared (as additional instrument)
IV estimate: SSA 0.061 0.0497 0.3091
(0.809) (0.772) (0.047)
F-statistic (excluded instruments) 40.74 69.20 77.21
Observations 3,678 5,855 6,053
Panel I Alternative deﬁnition of the instrument: Separate dummies for each value of ESSA
IV estimate: SSA -0.0498 -0.0122 0.2110
(0.803) (0.934) (0.054)
F-statistic (excluded instruments) 7.70 80.35 131.60
Observations 3,678 5,855 6,053
Panel J Wild cluster bootstrap
IV estimate: SSA 0.0648 0.0818 0.3461
[0.904] [0.667] [0.096]
F-statistic (excluded instrument) 81.25 133.29 148.19
Observations 3,678 5,855 6,053
Note: The table presents results of IV regressions that use ESSA as an instrument for SSA (see equations 1 and 2). The outcome
variables are documented in the ﬁrst row. Panel B controls for the parental background characteristics that are shown in Table 3.
Standard errors account for clustering at the state level. Small-sample-adjusted p-values are shown in parentheses. Panel J presents
p-values using wild cluster bootstrap that are shown in brackets.
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et al. (2008) by presenting small-sample-adjusted p-values in our main speciﬁcation. An
alternative procedure for obtaining inference is using wild cluster bootstrapping, which
is implemented in Panel J. The conclusion remains unchanged, i.e. the IV estimate for
receptive vocabulary is statistically signiﬁcant, while the estimates for mathematical
literacy and for text comprehension remain statistically insigniﬁcant.
Table 3.5: Robustness check using the transformed receptive vocabulary test score
Language: transformed receptive vocabulary
IV estimate: SSA 0.3496
(0.034)
F-statistic (excluded instruments) 148.19
Observations 6,053
Note: The table presents results of IV regressions that use ESSA as an instrument for SSA
(see equation 1 and 2). The outcome variable is generated using a Box-Cox-transformation
ytransformedi = (y
λ
i − 1)/λ with Lambda equal to 4.22 and then standardized to having a mean
of zero and a variance of one. Estimation accounts for clustering at the state level. Small-sample-
adjusted p-values are shown in parentheses.
Finally, as has been discussed in Section 3.3.1 and shown in Figure 3.A.1 in the
appendix, the distribution of the receptive vocabulary test score is highly left-skewed.
Therefore, Table 3.5 presents results that use transformed test scores as the outcome
variable. The transformed receptive vocabulary test scores have a distribution that is
much more similar to a normal distribution. The IV estimates remain the same when
using this alternative outcome. Similar to the case for the untransformed receptive
vocabulary test scores, the eﬀect of SSA is statistically signiﬁcant, and the eﬀect size is
close to a third of a standard deviation (of the transformed test score). As an alternative
to using transformed test scores, we also tested whether the results are robust to drop-
ping individuals at the extreme lower end of the untransformed test score distribution.
Results are generally not aﬀected by this. For example, if we drop individuals with
an untransformed z-score of below -4, the IV estimate is 0.315. If we drop individuals
with an untransformed z-score of below -2, the IV estimate is 0.252. Both estimates are
statistically signiﬁcant.
Discussion of the results
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Our results show that the eﬀects of school starting age fade away in adulthood
for math competencies and for text comprehension but remain signiﬁcant for receptive
vocabulary. This subsection discusses why the long-term impact of SSA diﬀers between
competencies. First, we look at the pathways of students in the schooling and vocational
systems. This is highly important in the German case since the educational system is
characterized by early tracking in school and a strong apprenticeship system. Second,
we tie those results together with ﬁndings from the literature concerning how individuals
acquire competencies. In particular, we discuss how acquiring competencies diﬀers by
the particularities of the German educational system.
Table 3.6: IV estimates of school starting age on schooling
Years of Highest school Highest school Highest school
schooling degree: low degree: middle degree: high
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IV estimate: SSA 0.5102 -0.1488 0.0283 0.1205
(0.020) (0.044) (0.539) (0.021)
F-statistic (excluded instruments) 151.0719 151.07 151.07 151.07
Observations 5,920 5,920 5,920 5,920
Note: The table provides IV estimates of the eﬀect of school starting age on the outcomes listed in
the ﬁrst row. The instrument used is ESSA. The estimation sample comprises individuals for whom
a valid test score for receptive vocabulary is available. Estimation accounts for clustering at the
state level. Small-sample-adjusted p-values are shown in parentheses.
In Germany, students are assigned to diﬀerent school tracks at the age of 10 de-
pending on their abilities and educational performance in primary school. The tracks
diﬀer in curriculum, degree of diﬃculty and abstraction of the material that is covered,
in the highest degree attained when leaving school, and in the length of schooling. For
the cohorts in our data set, attaining a school degree from the lowest track required
8 or 9 years of schooling (Hauptschule); from the middle track, 10 years (Realschule);
and from the highest track, 13 years (Gymnasium). Using data from one out of ten
West German states, Puhani and Weber (2007) show that the school starting age has a
substantial impact on the assignment of tracks in Germany, meaning that a higher SSA
leads to choosing a higher track. Based on the representative NEPS data, we answer
this question using all West German states by estimating our main IV model with dif-
ferent educational outcomes as dependent variables, such as the highest school degree
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and the highest vocational degree attained. In order to save space, we will not provide
results for each of the three samples used in the analysis. Instead, the analysis focuses
on the sample for which the receptive vocabulary scores are available, which is not only
the sample for which we have found signiﬁcant results, but it is also the sample with
the largest number of observations.
Table 3.7: IV estimates of school starting age on vocational education
Highest vocational Highest vocational Highest vocational
degree: none degree: apprenticeship degree: college
(1) (2) (3)
IV estimate: SSA -0.0340 0.0138 0.0202
0.071 0.787 0.690
F-statistic (excluded instruments) 135.01 135.01 135.01
Observations 5,681 5,681 5,681
Note: The table provides IV estimates of the eﬀect of school starting age on the outcomes listed in the
ﬁrst row. The instrument used is ESSA. The estimation sample comprises individuals for whom a valid
test score for receptive vocabulary is available. Estimation accounts for clustering at the state level.
Small-sample-adjusted p-values are shown in parentheses.
Table 3.6 provides the results of the inﬂuence of age at school entry on years of
schooling and on the highest school degree attained. Overall, they indicate that being
one year older at school entry increases years spent in school by approximately half a year
(Column 1). Columns 2 to 4 show that a one-year-higher SSA decreases the probability
of attaining the lowest school degree by 15% and increases the probability of attaining
the highest school degree by 12%. These ﬁndings are very similar to those in Dustmann
et al. (2017) on school track at the age of 14.8 Table 3.7 shows the results for vocational
education: distinguishing no vocational degree, having completed an apprenticeship,
and obtaining a college degree. SSA only aﬀects the probability of having obtained no
8At ﬁrst glance, our IV estimates appear to be considerably larger than the eﬀects presented in
Dustmann et al. (2017), but note that Dustmann et al. (2017) present reduced-form estimates, while
we present IV estimates. Our reduced-form estimates are -5.8 ppt for attaining the lowest schooling
degree and +4.7 ppt for attaining the highest schooling degree. Table 2 in Dustmann et al. (2017)
compares individuals born in diﬀerent months that diﬀer, on average, in expected school entry age by
0.5 and 0.91 years, respectively. If we rescale the respective estimates to represent one-year diﬀerences,
the eﬀect sizes from Dustmann et al. (2017) range between -7.8 ppt and -3.8 ppt for attending the
lowest school track and between +4.0 ppt and +6.6 ppt for attending the highest school track. Our
reduced form estimates fall exactly into these intervals.
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vocational degree by 3%, which is much smaller in magnitude than the eﬀect of SSA
on the schooling degree. In contrast, SSA has no statistically signiﬁcant impact on
completing an apprenticeship or college.9 We suggest that the reason for observing SSA
eﬀects mostly on school track choice, but not on the highest educational degree, is that
SSA eﬀects mirror maturity diﬀerences that are biggest, when children are young. When
becoming older, maturity becomes less important for explaining educational success and
students' real potential becomes visible. The German schooling system is ﬂexible by
allowing high ability students from middle school to upgrade their skills after leaving
school (Dustmann et al., 2017). These students can even study, if they fulﬁll some
requirements. In addition, high school graduates who have learned of their potential to
be lower than expected can abstain from enrolling at university.
Given that we mainly ﬁnd SSA eﬀects on track choice, we hypothesize that the
division into the diﬀerent school tracks is the potential mechanism for the eﬀects of
SSA to persist into adulthood, while selection into diﬀerent vocational tracks is less
important. To shed further light on this hypothesis, we once again estimate the impact
of SSA on the receptive vocabulary score but now control additionally for the potential
educational mechanisms. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.8 control for the highest schooling
degree attained and the highest vocational degree, respectively. These ﬁndings illustrate
that once we control for the schooling degree, the eﬀect of SSA on receptive vocabulary
vanishes almost completely. The point estimate drops from 35% of a standard deviation
in our main speciﬁcation to 7% and is no longer statistically signiﬁcant. In contrast,
results in Column 2 show that controlling for the highest vocational degree has a con-
siderably smaller impact. The eﬀect size decreases only modestly; it is still sizeable at
28% of a standard deviation, and it is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. These
results are indicative evidence that SSA aﬀects the track assignment by which it has a
long-term impact on receptive vocabulary. However, why does this conclusion not also
hold for the other competencies?
Pischke and von Wachter (2008) state that basic math and reading/writing skills are
taught in secondary school in Germany, regardless of the track choice. This means that
basic skills are taught to all students. The diﬀerence between the lower and higher tracks
in this regard is mainly that higher-track students learn more advanced and academic
9Dustmann et al. (2017) also ﬁnd that the eﬀects of SSA are much smaller when considering com-
pleted education.
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Table 3.8: IV estimates of SSA on receptive vocabulary while controlling for mechanisms
Language: receptive Language: receptive
vocabulary vocabulary
(1) (2)
IV estimate: SSA 0.0773 0.2739
(0.485) (0.019)
Additional controls for the highest school degree Yes No
Additional controls for the highest vocational degree No Yes
F-statistic (excluded instruments) 152.10 134.91
Observations 5,920 5,681
Note: The table provides IV estimates of the eﬀect of school starting age on receptive vocabulary. The
instrument used is ESSA. Estimation accounts for clustering at the state level. Small-sample-adjusted
p-values are shown in parentheses.
knowledge. Given the focus of the competency tests on basic skills and their appli-
cation to everyday problems, advanced knowledge is not captured in the competency
tests available in the NEPS data. The basic skills are also necessary for participating
successfully and productively in the German labor market (Pischke and von Wachter,
2008). Thus, we consider it plausible that these skills are used and, thereby, practiced
regularly after leaving school.
In contrast, receptive vocabulary is learned by exposure to oral or written lan-
guage.10 School tracks might diﬀer in terms of vocabulary growth due to students
being exposed diﬀerently to language activities. Students in the highest track have
more opportunities to engage in these activities because they stay in school longer, but
also because reading texts or books (including classical literature) is much more frequent
in the highest track. The literature has also shown that the number of diﬀerent and rare
words in texts and books matters in terms of increasing individuals' vocabulary growth.
The largest variety can be observed in scientiﬁc texts (Hayes and Ahrens, 1988). Due
to its more academic curriculum, graduates from the highest track are likely to have
been exposed to more academic words than lower- or medium-track students.
In a nutshell, school starting age aﬀects the track assignments. The academic track
10The scientiﬁc literature has not yet reached consensus on whether vocabulary growth occurs mainly
incidentally through conversations and reading (Sternberg, 1987) or whether it is transmitted through
explanations by teachers or parents or within texts (Biemiller, 2001).
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puts much more weight on developing language skills than the middle and the lower
school tracks, which might result in a more-reﬁned and larger set of vocabulary used
by academic track students. In contrast, there is evidence that academic-track schools
are not superior to middle- and lower-track schools when it comes to generating the
basic skills gauged in the mathematical literacy and text comprehension tests. The
next section is devoted to answering what policy can do to counteract the long-lasting
SSA eﬀects on receptive vocabulary.
Absolute vs. relative age eﬀects
As discussed in Cascio and Schanzenbach (2016), the eﬀects documented in most
of the literature and in our main results are a mixture of absolute age at school entry
and of relative age. Separate identiﬁcation is important from a policy perspective. For
example, take a policy that changes the cut-oﬀ date by one month. If only absolute
age is important, this policy does not have any impact on those further away from the
cut-oﬀ, but only on those whose birthday falls between the old and the new cut-oﬀ.
If those between the old and the new cut-oﬀ beneﬁt from the reform, there will also
be an improvement when looking at the aggregate of children because no child will be
disadvantaged by the reform. In contrast, if relative age is important, this policy also
has an impact on children further away from the cut-oﬀ because the policy aﬀects the
average age of classmates and, thus, the relative age of each student. Furthermore, if
only relative age is important and not absolute age, this policy will only inﬂuence which
child is the oldest and which child is the youngest in the class and, thus, who is hit by
the negative eﬀect of being (relatively) young, but it has no eﬀect on the aggregate of
children.
Focusing on receptive vocabulary, Table 3.9 provides separate estimates for absolute
and relative age eﬀects. Separate estimates are possible because we have variation in cut-
oﬀ dates between states and over time. This allows us to deﬁne separately instruments
for age at school entry and for age relative to the child that should be the youngest
within a cohort, given all children follow the regulations. However, both instruments are
highly correlated, with a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.91. This correlation makes separate
identiﬁcation somewhat problematic, and we emphasize that the separate eﬀects should
not be over-interpreted. According to our ﬁndings, only absolute age eﬀects are relevant
for receptive vocabulary. In contrast, the point estimate of relative age has a negative
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sign, is much smaller and is far from being statistically signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding is similar
to that of Cascio and Schanzenbach (2016), who also report that absolute age is more
important than relative age.
Table 3.9: IV estimates of absolute and relative school starting age
Language: receptive vocabulary
IV estimate: absolute SSA 0.4148
(0.039)
IV estimate: relative SSA -0.0933
(0.372)
F-statistic (excluded instruments) 72.13
Observations 6,053
Note: The table provides IV estimates of the eﬀects of absolute and of relative school starting
age on receptive vocabulary. Estimation accounts for clustering at the state level. Small-sample-
adjusted p-values are shown in parentheses.
3.6 Conclusion
The previous literature has shown that scores of competency tests administered to
school children are inﬂuenced by the age of children at school entry. While there is
evidence that these eﬀects become smaller as the children grow older, little is known
about whether the eﬀects fade away completely or remain important long after leaving
school. We ﬁnd no evidence that the eﬀects of school starting age on math competencies
and text comprehension are still relevant in adulthood, although they are considerable
when children are in school. These results are also in line with the previous literature,
which has shown no or only small long-term eﬀects of SSA on wages and employment
(e.g., Fredriksson and Öckert, 2014; Larsen and Solli, 2017; Dustmann et al., 2017).
Assuming that basic competencies in math and text comprehension matter for labor
market success, the absence of long-run SSA eﬀects on these competencies could explain
the absence of long-run eﬀects of SSA on labor market success. Hence, we conclude that
our results do not provide reasons for policy actions.
In contrast, for receptive vocabulary, the eﬀect of school starting age remains large
and statistically signiﬁcant in the longer run. Our ﬁndings suggest that the long-run
eﬀect on receptive vocabulary is due to Germany's tracking system, which sorts children
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into diﬀerent school tracks at an early age. Given that, this eﬀect is due to absolute
rather than to relative age, recent policies that shift the cut-oﬀ to an earlier date, making
some children older by one year at school entry, should lead to an improvement in the
average receptive vocabulary competencies even in adulthood. Of course, the beneﬁts
of such reforms need to be contrasted with their social costs (e.g., the cost of one more
year in childcare) and private costs (e.g., of entering the labor market one year later).
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3.A Appendix
Table 3.A.1: Studies considered in Figure 3.1
Grade level
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Math test scores
Attar and Cohen-Zada (2018) x x
Bedard and Dhuey (2006) x 11x 18x
Black et al. (2011) x
Cook and Kang (2018) x
Datar (2006) x
Elder and Lubotsky (2009) 2x x x x x
Koppensteiner (2018) x
Lubotsky and Kaestner (2016) 2x
McEwan and Shapiro (2008) x x
Nam (2014) x x 4x
Peña (2017) x x x x x x x
Ponzo and Scoppa (2014) x x
Smith (2009) x x x
Reading/writing test scores
Attar and Cohen-Zada (2018) x x
Cook and Kang (2018) x
Datar (2006) x
Elder and Lubotsky (2009) 2x x x x x
Lubotsky and Kaestner (2016) 3x
McEwan and Shapiro (2008) x
Nam (2014) x x x
Peña (2017) x x x x x x x
Ponzo and Scoppa (2014) x
Puhani and Weber (2007) x
Smith (2009) 2x 2x 2x
Notes: Those studies that include several estimates per grade level report either separate
estimates for diﬀerent countries, such as in Bedard and Dhuey (2006), or diﬀerent test scores,
such as separate tests for reading and writing.
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Table 3.A.2: Month of school start by state
State Month of school start
BW 1950-1951: September, 1952-1966: April, 1966-1994: August
BY 1950-1994: August
HB 1950-1966: April, 1967-1994: August
HH 1950-1966: April, 1967-1994: August
HE 1950-1966: April, 1966-1994: August
NI 1950-1966: April, 1967-1994: August
NW 1950-1966: April, 1966-1994: August
RP 1950-1966: April, 1966-1994: August
SL 1950-1958: August, 1959-1966: April, 1966-1994: August
SH 1950-1966: April, 1967-1994: August
BE 1950-1951: August, 1952-1966: April, 1967-1994: August
Source: State-speciﬁc laws and legislation determining the month of school start.
Note: In some states, the school year started two times during 1966 (short school year).
Table 3.A.3: Cut-oﬀ date by state
State Cut-oﬀ date
BW 1950: 31.12., 1951: 31.5., 1952: 31.3., 1953-1963: 15.4., 1964-1966: 31.12., 1966-1994: 30.6.
BY 1950-1968: 30.9., 1969-1994: 30.6.
HB 1950-1965: 31.3., 1966: 31.5. & 30.11., 1967: 1.7., 1968-1994: 30.6.
HH 1950-1961: 31.3., 1962-1966: 31.12., 1967-1994: 30.6.
HE 1950-1956: 30.6., 1957-1961: 31.3., 1962-1965: 31.12., 1966: 31.3. & 30.11., 1967-1994: 30.6.
NI 1950-1955: 30.6., 1956-1966: 31.3., 1967-1994: 30.6.
NW 1950-1960: 30.6., 1961-1965: 31.3., 1966: 31.3. & 30.11., 1967-1994: 30.6.
RP 1950-1952: 30.6., 1953-1965: 31.3., 1966: 31.3. & 30.11., 1967-1994: 30.6.
SL 1950-1954: 31.12., 1955-1957: 30.9., 1958: 31.12., 1959-1956: 31.3., 1966: 31.3. & 31.12.,
1967: 30.9., 1968-1994: 30.6.
SH 1950-1955: 30.6., 1956-1963: 31.3., 1964-1965: 31.12., 1966: 31.12. & 30.11., 1967-1994:
30.6.
BE 1950-1951: 31.12., 1952-1955: 30.6., 1956-1966: 31.3., 1967-1994: 30.6.
Source: State-speciﬁc laws and legislation determining the cut-oﬀ date of school entry for children.
Note: In some states, the school year started two times during 1966, resulting in two cut-oﬀ dates.
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Figure 3.A.1: Distribution of the standardized test scores
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Figure 3.A.2: Distribution of the transformed receptive vocabulary test scores
Note: The transformed test scores are generated using a Box-Cox-transformation
ytransformedi = (y
λ
i − 1)/λ with Lambda equal to 4.22. The transformed test scores are
then normalized to having a mean of zero and a variance of one.
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Figure 3.A.3: Number of observations by distance to cut-oﬀ
Note: Figures are for samples with information on mathematical literacy (top), text com-
prehension (center), and receptive vocabulary (bottom).
100
Chapter 4
Now You See Me! Ethnic
Discrimination in the Market for
Apprenticeships*
4.1 Introduction
It is well known that ethnic discrimination exists in all areas of life, extending from
social markets (Tjaden et al., 2018) and the housing market (Ewens et al., 2014) to the
labor market (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004). The understanding of discrimination
is important to promote economic and social integration and equal opportunities for
every individual in a society. Its importance becomes even more clear when realizing
that discrimination directly aﬀects the prospects of an individual in the labor market,
not only directly via wages and employment opportunities but also through educational
performance, e.g. in the form of self-fulﬁlling prophecies (Glover et al., 2017).
Observed discrimination in the labor market hiring process is often seen as the
result of limited information about applicants. This leads to hiring decisions based on
perceived diﬀerences in the average productivity of diﬀerent groups. When this is the
case, additional information such as references, training program certiﬁcations and work
experience are able to decrease discrimination. However, in case of young individuals
in the transition from school to the ﬁrst job, there exist only limited possibilities to
*This chapter is based on joint work with Patrick Nüß (Macroeconomic Policy Institute (IMK),
Christian Albrechts-University Kiel).
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provide the required information. It is therefore unclear whether youths face similar
levels of discrimination when applying for apprenticeships as workers do who apply for
regular jobs.
Survey data reveal that despite the fact that young people with migration back-
ground send more applications, they are less likely to be invited to a job interview
(49%) than their German counterparts (62%) (Beicht, 2016). Furthermore, applicants
without German citizenship have only half the apprenticeship entry rate compared to
those with German citizenship (BMBF, 2018). The BMBF (2018) explains this with
diﬀerences in occupational preferences, regional labor markets, limited proﬁciency in the
German language and fewer internships. But what is the role of discrimination? Given
the importance of the school-to-work transition for future labor market prospects, it is
important to understand the relevance of discrimination and to search for solutions in
the school-to-work transition.
To solve the issue of discrimination in the ﬁrst stage of the hiring process, anonymous
application procedures are a common and successful solution (Goldin and Rouse, 2000;
Krause et al., 2012). However, this could simply delay discrimination to a later stage.
Furthermore, ethnic discrimination is more likely to be observed in small ﬁrms (Kaas
and Manger, 2012) where anonymous application procedures are diﬃcult to implement.
Giving this prevailing circumstance in the market for apprenticeships, there is a need
for alternative solutions to anonymous procedures which are easily accessible enough
to solve discrimination in the school-to-work transition. One such solution which is
gaining popularity involves video applications. These allow a deeper insight into the
personality and motivation of the applicant.
In this paper a correspondence experiment is used to study ethnic discrimination in
the hiring market for apprenticeships in Germany. We send ﬁctitious applications with
German and Arabic-sounding names to real vacancies, augmenting applications with
a short motivational video. These video introductions of applicants serve as a simple
way of extending employer's insight into the personality and motivation of an applicant.
This is done with the intention of decreasing potential statistical discrimination and to
test the limitations due to attention discrimination (Barto² et al., 2016).
We ﬁnd that applications with German-sounding names are on average twice as
likely to receive an invitation for a job interview. Videos of applications with German-
sounding names are about 50% more likely to be viewed than those from applicants
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with Arabic-sounding names. However, callbacks for applications with a video increase
by 33% for Arabic-sounding names compared to applications with Arabic-sounding
names without video. A similar eﬀect for videos can not be found for German-sounding
names. Furthermore, despite the fact that videos only have observable eﬀects on Arabic-
sounding names, the videos of German-sounding names are viewed 37% more often com-
pared to the Arabic-sounding names, which is in support of attention discrimination.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 gives an overview of
relevant literature. Section 4.3 describes the experimental design and callback measures.
Section 4.4 presents the results and provides robustness and heterogeneity analysis,
Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Literature Review
For the labor market there exists comprehensive research on the existence of discrimi-
nation for a range of countries.1 Due to limitations of administrative and survey data,
a common approach to isolate discrimination from alternative explanations is the use
of correspondence experiments. One prominent experiment was conducted by Bertrand
and Mullainathan (2004) who send ﬁctitious applications with African-American- com-
pared to white-sounding names to job vacancies. They provide evidence for lower call-
backs of African-American-sounding names compared to their white-sounding counter-
parts and therefore for ethnic discrimination in the United States.
The results that native-sounding names receive signiﬁcantly more callbacks has in
the following years also been found for European countries when comparing Turkish-,
Arab- or Middle Eastern-sounding to native-sounding names (Weichselbaumer, 2016b;
Baert et al., 2015; Kaas and Manger, 2012; Carlsson and Rooth, 2012; Rooth, 2010),
including evidence for ethnic discrimination in Austria (Weichselbaumer, 2016b) and
Germany (Kaas and Manger, 2012; Goldberg et al., 1996).
According to the literature, ethnic discrimination can be explained by the exis-
tence of taste-based discrimination (Becker, 1957) and statistical discrimination (Arrow,
1973). Taste-based discrimination argues for discrimination based on the employer's
1Excellent overviews of correspondence experiments on hiring discrimination can be found in Baert
(2018), Bertrand and Duﬂo (2017), Zschirnt and Ruedin (2016), Rich (2014) and Riach and Rich (2002).
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prejudice or distaste for the cultural background of a group membership. As an alter-
native explanation, statistical discrimination is the result of asymmetric information.
Because of limited information about the applicants, employers might use group mem-
berships as a signal for perceived diﬀerences of the average productivity related to the
group.
If statistical discrimination instead of taste-based discrimination is the driving force,
extending the access to information about applicants should decrease or even solve dis-
crimination. Previous ﬁndings for several markets indicate the dominance of statistical
discrimination as a driver for ethnic discrimination. Altonji and Pierret (2001) show
that if more information is available to the employer, the applicants' wage is more de-
pendent on their productivity. By analysing the rental market Ewens et al. (2014) ﬁnd
discrimination related to the neighbourhood's racial composition consistent with statis-
tical discrimination. Further evidence for statistical discrimination can also be found
for the sports card market (List, 2004) or online market places (Doleac and Stein, 2013;
Nunley et al., 2011), as well as for carpooling marketplaces (Tjaden et al., 2018). In
addition, in the case of a virtual labor market for football players, Bryson and Chevalier
(2015) provide evidence against taste-based discrimination.
While most of the literature seems to conﬁrm the existence of statistical discrimina-
tion, recent results show that statistical discrimination can not explain ethnic discrimi-
nation alone. For example, Oreopoulos (2011) ﬁnds that native-sounding names receive
signiﬁcantly more callbacks than foreign-sounding names. He also discovers that dis-
crimination does not decrease when adding additional information to the applications
which would be evidence of statistical discrimination. Employers view language bar-
riers as the main reason for discrimination, yet when providing information about a
high level of language proﬁciency, discrimination remains. Further investigation pro-
vides evidence for hiring discrimination in case of religious applicants (Valfort, 2017) or
indirectly through appearance, for instance should the applicant be wearing a headscarf
(Weichselbaumer, 2016a).
Beside the debate of statistical and taste-based discrimination, Barto² et al. (2016)
ﬁnd evidence for attention discrimination as an alternative explanation for discrimina-
tion. They show that employers choose diﬀerent levels of attention for applicants of an
ethnic minority compared to those of an ethnic majority in diﬀerent markets, including
the labor market. This is supported by a lab-in-the-ﬁeld experiment using eye-tracking
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technology by Lahey and Oxley (2018) who ﬁnd that screeners spend less time viewing
a resume if it is of a young and black applicant, which implies that even the existence
of additional information does not guarantee its usage.
Focusing on experiments in German speaking labor markets, there is evidence for
statistical discrimination (Kaas and Manger, 2012), taste-basted discrimination (We-
ichselbaumer, 2016a) as well as attention discrimination (Barto² et al., 2016). While
Weichselbaumer (2016a) and Barto² et al. (2016) focus on adults with existing work
experience, the experiment of Kaas and Manger (2012) focuses on young university
students, applying for an internship. In another experiment in the market for appren-
ticeships in Germany, Kübler et al. (2019) provide evidence of increasing callbacks for
young people who have gained additional vocational training experience before begin-
ning an apprenticeship. Our study focuses on ethnic discrimination in school to work
transition in the market for apprenticeships, with lower educational achievements than
Kaas and Manger (2012) and without the signal of university attendance.
Previous labor market research on ethnic discrimination focuses on statistical dis-
crimination related to qualiﬁcations based on grades (Veit and Yemane, 2018), language
proﬁciency (Oreopoulos, 2011) and recommendation letters (Kaas and Manger, 2012).
Our research beneﬁts from research on school to work transitions in Germany that
considers the relevance of non-cognitive skills as a potential solution for ethnic discrimi-
nation. Solga and Kohlrausch (2013) study low-achieving German youths transitioning
into apprenticeships. They observe increasing job prospects if employers can observe
the motivation and behavior of these applicants. This suggests non-cognitive skills are
more important than grades for the low-skilled youths who apply for apprenticeships.
Protsch and Solga (2015) conduct a ﬁeld experiment and provide evidence for the rele-
vance of both cognitive and non-cognitive skills, with a higher relevance of non-cognitive
skills.
Concluding, we suspect to observe an overall high level of ethnic discrimination in the
market for apprenticeships due to the fact that individuals have limited work experience
and qualiﬁcations. Due to the higher relevance of non-cognitive skills in this market,
augmenting applications by a short motivational video might be a simple and suitable
way of solving ethnic discrimination by extending the employers' potential insights into
the personality and the motivation of an applicant. The success is a priori unclear
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since such videos might also be subject to the potential risk of attention discrimination
(Barto² et al., 2016).
4.3 The Experiment
To analyze ethnic discrimination in the market for apprenticeships in Germany we con-
duct a correspondence experiment to analyze employer attitudes in a real world context.
Field experiments have been applied to a wide range of settings ranging from ethnic
discrimination (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004) to gender discrimination (Riach and
Judith, 2006) and in recent years also to employers' attitudes toward tattoos (Jibuti,
2018) and unemployment (Nüß, 2018).
The basic idea is to send one or more ﬁctitious job applications, similar in all aspects
except one characteristic, to real vacancies and then monitor ﬁrms' callbacks. This
concept is best suited to analyze employers' attitudes towards applicants based on these
characteristics. This is possible since the relevant characteristic can be isolated from
the applicant's motivation and skill. The latter are not commonly observable by the
researcher but observable to the employer during the hiring process. A correspondence
therefore allows full access to all information available during the hiring process. With
all productivity relevant characteristics equal and the unobservables isolated, monitoring
ﬁrms' callbacks allows the causal eﬀect of a randomly assigned characteristic in the
hiring process to be identiﬁed. This, in the end, rules out alternative explanations for
diﬀerent labor market prospects mentioned in BMBF (2018).
4.3.1 Experimental Design
The experiment was carried out between February and May 2018 in 26 regions in Ger-
many. The timing results from the fact that application activity increases in the mid
February, directly after schools hand over the midterm certiﬁcates and the beginning
of the apprenticeship in August/September each year. Three apprenticeship programs
are chosen, these are automotive technician, sales and oﬃce clerk. The occupational
choices result from the top 5 most popular male and female apprenticeships and by
their overall availability within Germany (BIBB, 2018). There are four identities, two
each with German- and Arabic-sounding names.
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Vacancies are collected from three large websites providing vacancies in Germany,
two of which specialize in vacancies for apprenticeships. This increases the external
validity of the experiment and opens the door for an analysis of regional speciﬁc aspects.
Three applications are sent via email to each ﬁrm. These applications consist of
a cover letter, a resume and the school certiﬁcates with above average grades (1.9)
and comparable grades by subjects.2 The name and ﬁgure is randomly assigned. All
applicants are 16 years old and are currently completing the 10th grade (secondary
school). Their resumes include work experience in the relevant occupation resulting
from a completed internship. Additionally, one of the three applications is augmented
by a short 16-19 second video introducing the applicant. The video is then accessible
by a link to a private YouTube channel (see Figure 4.A.1 for a screenshot of a video).
When a video is assigned to an application, the link is included in both the email and
the cover letter. First, the link is included in the initial email introducing the candidate
and describing the attachments. This is in order to allow for immediate attention for
the application. Second, the link is also included in the cover letter. By doing so we
ensure that the video may be considered in a later stage of the hiring process when the
applications are screened in more detail and the initial email might already be out of
mind. In both cases the applicant mentions that he added a video in order to allow for
a ﬁrst personal impression.
4.3.2 Measurement of Callbacks
To measure the callbacks, each of the resulting four identities is linked to an individual's
phone number and an email address. This allows for the receipt of callbacks by email
and by telephone via a linked voice mail. To minimize any inconvenience caused to ﬁrms,
emails and voice mails are checked on a daily basis and every callback is immediately
declined. A positive callback in the literature follows typically two categorizations, both
considered in the following analysis. A positive callback following the strict deﬁnition
(Callback Category 1) includes all callbacks explicitly inviting the applicant to a job
interview for the apprenticeship. A positive callback based on callbacks in a broader
sense (Callback Category 2) includes every kind of request for additional information,
alternative apprenticeship oﬀers, invitations for an internship and requests to contact
the employer.
2Grades in Germany vary from 1 (excellent) to 6 (insuﬃcient).
107




Table 4.1 gives an overview of the ﬁnal dataset. The sample consists of 3828 applications
sent to 1276 ﬁrms. The most frequent observation are ﬁrms with 6 to 50 employees
(55%) in West Germany (71%), with a request for 10 years of educational attainment
(64%) for applicants. The data set consists of 48% apprenticeships for oﬃce clerks and
an equal share of 26% for sales and automotive technicians. A majority of 60% of the
apprenticeships are advertised in February and March. Furthermore, we observe an
approximately equal share of male and female human resources managers responsible
for the hiring process.
Figure 4.1: Callback rate
(a) Overall (b) Videos
Note: Callback category 1.
Overall 9% of all applicants are invited to a job interview (Callback Category 1) and
16% get at least a positive callback in a broader sense (Callback Category 2). This covers
17% of ﬁrms inviting at least one applicant to a job interview (28% for Callback Category
2). In the following detailed analysis the focus is on an interpretation based on Callback
Category 1. However, the results are overall consistent in size and signiﬁcance with
callback category 2 and available in the appendix (Table 4.A.1 and Table 4.A.2). When
comparing the 9% overall invitations to job interviews of Table 4.1 with Table 4.A.1
and Figure 4.1a we see that invitations are unequally distributed between German-




Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Callback of category 1 (C1) 0.093 0.291 0 1 3828
Callback of category 2 (C2) 0.163 0.370 0 1 3828
Firms with at least one callback (C1) 0.165 0.371 0 1 1276
Firms with at least one callback (C2) 0.278 0.448 0 1 1276
Video 0.333 0.471 0 1 3828
Foreign 0.501 0.500 0 1 3828
East Germany 0.287 0.452 0 1 3828
Job begin in August 0.715 0.452 0 1 3828
Job begin in September 0.285 0.452 0 1 3828
No. of open positions 1.196 0.584 1 5 3828
HR female 0.495 0.500 0 1 3828
HR gender unknown 0.045 0.207 0 1 3828
Occupation:
Automotive Technician 0.263 0.440 0 1 3828
Oﬃce Clerk 0.473 0.499 0 1 3828
Sales 0.264 0.441 0 1 3828
Firm size (employees):
Less than 6 0.144 0.351 0 1 3828
6 to 50 0.543 0.498 0 1 3828
51 to 500 0.269 0.443 0 1 3828
501 or more 0.044 0.205 0 1 3828
Educational Demand (years of schooling (German degree)):
None (Keine Anforderung) 0.057 0.232 0 1 3828
9 years (Hauptschulabschluss) 0.176 0.381 0 1 3828
9 years+ (Erw. Hauptschulabschluss) 0.100 0.299 0 1 3828
10 years (Mittlere Reife) 0.636 0.481 0 1 3828
12/13 years (Hochschulreife) 0.031 0.172 0 1 3828
Month of job posting:
February 0.369 0.483 0 1 3828
March 0.227 0.419 0 1 3828
April 0.216 0.411 0 1 3828
May 0.188 0.391 0 1 3828
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Figure 4.2: Callback rate
(a) Occupation (b) East/West Germany
(c) Firm size (d) Educational Demand
Note: Callback category 1.
invited to a job interview in 12.4%, compared to 6.3% for Arabic-sounding names. This
implies that applicants with German-sounding names are twice as likely to be invited to
a job interview compared to their equally qualiﬁed Arabic counterparts, signiﬁcant on
the 0.1% signiﬁcance level. This observation is in line with the BMBF (2018) observation
of twice as high apprenticeship entry rates of Germans compared to non-Germans.
Looking at applications with and without videos reveals that invitations to job
interviews do not change for the German group (Figure 4.1b). In the foreign group,
however, the invitations to job interviews increase by 2 percentage points compared to
applications without video. This corresponds to a 36 percent increase in callbacks, yet
insigniﬁcant.
Figure 4.2 provides further insight into diﬀerences in invitations to job interviews
and discrimination, in consideration of (a) occupational variation, (b) regional diﬀer-
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ences, (c) ﬁrm size and (d) ﬁrms' educational requirements. As before, statistical test
regarding this variation is available in the appendix (Table 4.A.1 and Table 4.A.2).
From Figure 4.2a we observe that of the three occupations, automotive technician ap-
plicants with Arabic-sounding names are the most disadvantaged since applicants with
German-sounding names receive more than 3 times more invitations to job interviews.
For sales positions, Germans are twice as likely to be invited to a job interview. For
oﬃce clerks, we observe the lowest discrimination with German-sounding names being
1.5 times as likely to be invited to a job interview compared to their Arabic-sounding
counterparts.
In general, regional variation plays an important role for discrimination. According
to Carlsson and Rooth (2012) regions where employers have a more negative attitude
towards minorities have lower callbacks for minority groups. This has implications for
our study since diﬀerences in attitudes towards ethnic minorities may also vary be-
tween former East and West German states. Figure 4.2b therefore considers diﬀerences
in discrimination related to West and East Germany. Interestingly we observe on av-
erage 5 percentage points higher callbacks in East Germany for German- as well as
Arabic-sounding names. As a result, in West Germany, German-sounding names are
2.2 times more likely to be invited to a job interview than Arabic-sounding names,
compared to 1.7 times in East Germany. Contrary to what could have been expected,
this implies lower discrimination in East Germany compared to West Germany. The
most likely explanation for this is that the skills shortage in East Germany is more
pronounced than in West Germany and ﬁrms are therefore keen to avoid the risk of a
vacant apprenticeship.3
It is known from Kaas and Manger (2012) that ethnic discrimination is likely to be
higher for small ﬁrms. This is consistent with Figure 4.2c that provides evidence for
decreasing discrimination with increasing ﬁrm size. Most strikingly, there are almost
no invitations to job interviews for Arabic-sounding names observable in ﬁrms with less
than 6 employees.
The observed pattern for educational requirements of ﬁrms in Figure 4.2d is also
very interesting. Intuitively one would expect ethnic discrimination to be lowest when
employers have no educational requirements for applicants. However, employers with
3In 2018 the applicants to positions ratio (averaged over the three occupations and regions) is 1.5
in West but only 1.3 in East Germany.
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no requirements about an applicant's education discriminate most and are 3 times more
likely to invite German-sounding names to a job interview. With increasing require-
ments, discrimination also decreases. While the applicants have 10 years of schooling
and are not able to fulﬁll the requirements of some ﬁrms, ﬁrms still invite 7% German-
as well as Arabic-sounding names to job interviews with no detectable discrimination.
Regarding Figure 4.2d another interesting pattern is observed. Callbacks for German-
sounding names decrease with increasing requirements of ﬁrms, leading to the observed
decrease in discrimination. On the other hand, invitations for Arabic-sounding names
seem to be independent of ﬁrms requirements and are indistinguishable from ﬁrms where
the applicants do not fulﬁll the demanded educational requirements.
4.4.2 Multivariate analysis
To ensure the robustness of our ﬁndings and to control for all potential variables, the
analysis is extended by a linear probability model, again focusing on invitations to job
interviews (callback category 1). As before, robustness checks for callback category 2
are available (Table 4.A.3) supporting the ﬁndings of the following analysis.
In Table 4.2 for callback category 1 the baseline estimation in column (1) includes
a dummy variable for foreign ethnicity and another dummy variable for the eﬀect of
the attached video. Very similar to the previous results, here applicants with a Arabic-
sounding name have a 6.1 percentage point lower probability of an invitation to a job
interview compared to applicants with German-sounding names, signiﬁcant on the 0.1%
level. With an eﬀect size below 1 percentage point, however, we ﬁnd no evidence for a
relevant or signiﬁcant eﬀect of the attached video. In a step-by-step extension in column
(2)-(7), we further control for (2) application characteristics, (3) picture and name, (4)
ﬁrm size, (5) city, (6) occupation as well as (7) additional ﬁrm information. We further
check robustness by (8 and 10) ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and speciﬁcations (9 and 10) allowing
for eﬀect heterogeneity for the video based on ethnicity.
By extending the set of control variables, we observe a robust and an increased level
of discrimination against Arabic-sounding names of 7.5 to 8.5 percentage points, with
all speciﬁcations signiﬁcant at the 0.1% signiﬁcance level. A glance at the eﬀect of the
motivational video provides no change in the eﬀect or signiﬁcance for column (2)-(8).
However, when allowing for eﬀect heterogeneity for the video based on ethnicity, even







Table 4.2: Probability of a callback of category C1 (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Foreign -0.0605∗∗∗ -0.0608∗∗∗ -0.0754∗∗∗ -0.0759∗∗∗ -0.0757∗∗∗ -0.0754∗∗∗ -0.0755∗∗∗ -0.0735∗∗∗ -0.0841∗∗∗ -0.0788∗∗∗
(0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0170) (0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0159) (0.0176) (0.0162)
Video 0.0084 0.0084 0.0095 0.0095 0.0095 0.0095 0.0095 0.0092 -0.0033 -0.0014
(0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0100) (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.0086) (0.0157) (0.0148)
Video × Foreign 0.0255 0.0211
(0.0199) (0.0195)
Layout, Order X X X X X X X X X
Picture, Name X X X X X X X X
Firm size X X X X X
City X X X X
Occupation X X X
Educational Demand X X
HR Gender: female, unknown X X
Firm FE X X
N 3828 3828 3828 3828 3828 3828 3828 3828 3828 3828
adj. R2 0.010 0.011 0.013 0.020 0.041 0.048 0.051 0.491 0.052 0.491
Notes: OLS. Callback category 1. Signiﬁcance levels + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001, robust standard errors (in parentheses) for (1)-(7)
and (9), cluster robust standard errors adjusted for clusters at the ﬁrm level for (8) and (10).
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names. As expected based on Figure 4.1a, a sizable coeﬃcient for the interaction term
of video and foreign ethnicity is found. We observe an increase in the video eﬀect for
Arabic-sounding names to between 2 and 2.5 percentage points, however, remaining
insigniﬁcant.4 The three depicted coeﬃcients in (10) are jointly signiﬁcant.5 This
means that a video increases the probability of a callback for ethnic minorities by 38
percent. We interpret the results as weak evidence for the hypothesis of videos reducing
statistical discrimination by providing additional information about candidates.
Results for callback category 2 in Table 4.A.3 reveal a much smaller interaction
coeﬃcient for video and ethnicity which is 1.3 percentage points (column (10)). This
suggests that the video is more relevant for actual invitations of ethnic minorities to job
interviews rather than aﬀecting employers asking for additional information or calling
back with other oﬀers such as internships.
As was stated in the literature review, discrimination can also be the result of at-
tention discrimination based on ethnicity. Statistical discrimination would predict that
additional information accessible to the employer is used to solve asymmetric informa-
tion and to avoid decision making based on prejudices about a group. Contrary to this
attention discrimination implies that employers spend less time screening resumes of
minority groups, thereby ignoring easily accessible information. In order to investigate
the potential relevance of attention discrimination for our videos, Table 4.3 provides
insight into employers screening behavior with regard to the attached video links.6
In total 1276 applications with a link included are sent. The link is included in the
initial email as well as the cover letter. Employers therefore are confronted with the
video in the initial stage and during a later, more detailed screening of the applications.
The videos have an average duration of 17 seconds, however the average watch time of
the video is 20% longer than the video which holds for German- and Arabic-sounding
names.7 This suggests that employers seriously consider the video while watching it
and in some cases even watch parts of it again.
4This reduces the remaining ethnic discrimination to −7.88 + 2.11 = 5.77 percentage points.
5The F-statistic, which reports the results from a joint signiﬁcance test with the null hypothesis
H0 : Foreign = 0, V ideo = 0 and V ideo × Foreign = 0, is 8.5 and reports a p-value of 0.0000 thus
rejecting H0.
6However, due to data protection legislation video links are not personalized and can therefore not
be linked to viewing behavior of individual employers.
7With a 1.2 second diﬀerence between German and Arabic individuals.
114
4.4 Results
Table 4.3: Video Statistics
German Foreign Diﬀerence
Sum Mean SD Sum Mean SD b t
Views 702 478
Video links sent 634 642
Views / Video links sent 1.11 0.74
Watch time (seconds) 19.94 4.59 21.13 5.19 -1.19∗∗∗ (-4.04)
Video duration (seconds) 16.25 17.50
Watch time / Video duration 1.23 0.28 1.21 0.30 0.02 (1.15)
Observations 702 478 1180
Notes: Mean individual watchtime calculated from daily watchtime and views reported by
youtube.com; Total watchtime (in minutes): 233.32 (German) and 168.33 (Foreign); Period:
2018/3/25-2018/7/1; Diﬀerences of means and t-statistics reported; + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Out of 634 applications including a video for German-sounding names, the video
was viewed 702 times implying the video of German-sounding names was on average
viewed 1.1 times. Contrary to this, out of 642 applications that included a video for
Arabic-sounding names, the video was viewed 478 times implying on average that the
video was viewed 3/4 of the time. Therefore, despite the fact that videos only had ob-
servable eﬀects on Arabic-sounding names, the videos of German-sounding names were
viewed 37% more often compared to the Arabic-sounding names, which is in support of
attention discrimination (Lahey and Oxley, 2018; Barto² et al., 2016). This results in
a dilemma that additional information as well as eﬀort is not equally valued for all ap-
plicants as already observed in the unequal treatment related to the ﬁrms' educational
requirements (Figure 4.2d).
4.4.3 Heterogeneity and Robustness
Complementary to the analysis of ethnic discrimination and the video solution to di-
minish discrimination, we complement the analysis with additional robustness checks
and a heterogeneity analysis that has attracted attention in Figure 4.2. In the following
the regional relevance and market tightness is addressed ﬁrst, secondly, characteristics
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and requirements of ﬁrms and for further robustness, the time until the begin of the
apprenticeship and school background.
Labor market tightness
The most surprising observation in Figure 4.2 is the observation of a higher number of
invitations to job interviews and lower discrimination in East compared to West Ger-
many. This is surprising for two reasons. First, Carlsson and Rooth (2012) provide
evidence for an association of a regionally more negative attitude to minorities and
observed hiring discrimination, which is in support of taste-based discrimination. The
rising popularity of the right-wing political party AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) in
the 2017 election8 especially in former Eastern German states is expected to reﬂect such
a negative regional attitude towards minorities which allows us to test for taste-based
discrimination.
The same is expected regarding statistical discrimination. As shown in the liter-
ature on ethnic discrimination, discrimination decreases in strong labor markets with
low unemployment where ﬁlling a vacancy becomes more diﬃcult (Baert et al., 2015;
Carlsson et al., 2018). As a consequence, one would expect higher discrimination in
East Germany, which is characterized by higher unemployment than West Germany.
However, this does not seem to be the case for the apprenticeship market.
In the following we therefore consider the regional labor market tightness for appren-
ticeships for all tested occupations and regions. The regional applicants to positions
ratio, diﬀers substantially for the 26 city regions (which correspond to 17 labor market
regions) and range from 0.58 to 2.27 for the three occupations.9 Therefore, eﬀects for
East/West Germany should disappear when controlling for labor market tightness.
Table 4.4 considers the regional access for applicants to the tested occupations.
Again, when comparing East and West Germany, we observe 5 percentage points more
invitations to job interviews in East Germany. Contrary to what the success of the
right-wing populist party AfD might suggest, we do not observe higher discrimination
in East Germany. As expected, when considering the labor market tightness for appren-
ticeships, we observe decreasing invitations to job interviews when a higher number of
8https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/bundestagswahlen/2017/ergebnisse.html




Table 4.4: Probability of a callback of category C1: East Germany, labor market tightness
and AfD votes (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Foreign -0.0821∗∗∗ -0.1083∗∗ -0.0858∗∗ -0.1182∗
(0.0183) (0.0393) (0.0268) (0.0489)
Video -0.0007 -0.0018 -0.0006 -0.0015
(0.0159) (0.0158) (0.0159) (0.0158)
Video × Foreign 0.0202 0.0222 0.0200 0.0217
(0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0199)
East 0.0539∗∗ 0.1247∗∗∗
(0.0180) (0.0370)
East × Foreign -0.0059 -0.0253
(0.0225) (0.0479)
Labor market tightness -0.0723∗∗∗ -0.0534∗∗
(0.0199) (0.0204)
Labor market tightness × Foreign 0.0174 0.0131
(0.0240) (0.0246)
AfD votes 0.0016 -0.0077∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0030)
AfD votes × Foreign 0.0002 0.0020
(0.0018) (0.0038)
N 3828 3828 3828 3828
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001, robust standard
errors (in parentheses). Covariates included are layout, order, picture, name, ﬁrm size and
educational demand. Labor market tightness is the relation of Applications to Positions in the
labor market regions. Votes AfD are the ﬁrst votes in percent in the electoral districts for the
Alternative for Germany (AfD) in the Bundestag Election 2017.
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applicants are available, with no evidence for ethnic discrimination depending on the
regional and apprenticeship speciﬁc labor market tightness. The results for both, East
Germany and the labor market tightness are robust as well as signiﬁcant when consid-
ered simultaneously in column (6).
Educational demand and ﬁrm size
Two other interesting observations in Figure 4.2 result from ﬁrm size and educational
requirements, both related to a ﬁrm's hiring procedures. We observe, consistent with
Kaas and Manger (2012), that discrimination decreases with ﬁrm size. This is intuitive
since increasing ﬁrm size leads to more professionalized screening procedures allowing
us to solve asymmetric information to a higher degree. Secondly, we observe unequal
treatment to be related to a ﬁrm's educational requirements with the highest discrim-
ination by ﬁrms which have no educational requirements. To test the robustness of
these patterns in a multivariate setting, Table 4.5 tests for heterogeneous treatment
eﬀects based on ﬁrm size and a ﬁrm's educational requirements. As before, we observe
clear evidence for ethnic discrimination with the same eﬀects of the video treatment
for German- and Arabic-sounding names as in Table 4.2 for all speciﬁcations. When
testing for the relevance of a ﬁrm's requirements, we observe a pattern consistent with
Figure 4.2. With increasing requirements, the eﬀect of ethnic discrimination decreases,
but none of the interaction terms are statistically signiﬁcant. When considering het-
erogeneity based on ﬁrm size, we are not able to observe the previous pattern or any
signiﬁcant diﬀerence. Neither of the results change in a joined analysis.
Time until the begin of the apprenticeship
To investigate the sensitivity of our results related to the timing of the applications,
Table 4.A.5 tests for heterogeneity based on the time until the beginning of the ap-
prenticeship and ethnicity and their interaction. There are two potential explanations
for eﬀect heterogeneity resulting from the timing of the application. On the one hand,
employers searching for an apprentice shortly before the beginning of the apprenticeship
have a smaller applicant pool that leads to the risk of not ﬁnding an apprentice. As a
result, employers might discriminate less against minority groups given the lack of alter-
natives. On the other hand, with less remaining time until the start of an apprenticeship
an application could signal a low level of eﬀort in a previous job search and therefore a
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Table 4.5: Probability of a callback of category C1: educational demand and ﬁrm size
(OLS)
(1) (2) (3)
Foreign -0.1269∗∗ -0.0999∗∗∗ -0.1450∗∗
(0.0453) (0.0269) (0.0508)
Video -0.0010 -0.0014 -0.0011
(0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0148)
Video × Foreign 0.0211 0.0211 0.0211
(0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0195)
Educational demand interaction (Reference category: None × Foreign):
9 years × Foreign 0.0337 0.0346
(0.0488) (0.0487)
9 years+ × Foreign 0.0379 0.0364
(0.0532) (0.0528)
10 years × Foreign 0.0563 0.0550
(0.0442) (0.0439)
12/13 years × Foreign 0.0592 0.0586
(0.0563) (0.0562)
Firm size interaction (Reference category: Less than 6 × Foreign):
6 to 50 × Foreign 0.0232 0.0211
(0.0258) (0.0258)
51 to 500 × Foreign 0.0297 0.0265
(0.0286) (0.0287)
501 or more × Foreign 0.0086 0.0060
(0.0554) (0.0548)
Educational demand X X X
Firm size X X X
N 3828 3828 3828
Notes: OLS. Callback category 1. Signiﬁcance levels + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001, the
cluster robust standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clusters at the ﬁrm level. Dependent variable
is callback category 1. Other covariates included: ﬁrm eﬀects, educational demand, ﬁrm size, occupation, city,
pictures, names, layout and order.
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Table 4.6: Mean callbacks: schools
Callback category 1 Callback category 2
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. N
School 1 0.090 0.286 0.153 0.360 1926
German 1 0.116 0.320 0.195 0.397 948
Foreign 1 0.064 0.246 0.112 0.316 978
School 2, German 2 0.131 0.338 0.222 0.416 962
School 3, Foreign 2 0.062 0.241 0.123 0.329 940
low level of motivation, as well as being a signal for low overall productivity given their
previous failure to succeed in ﬁnding an apprenticeship. Results of Table 4.A.5 show
that there is little evidence that these interaction terms drive the results in a certain
direction. For callback category 1 the job start in 5 months and in 3 months interacted
with ethnicity are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent to the reference category (6 months). At
the same time, the coeﬃcients of the foreign and the video-foreign interaction terms
stay almost unchanged, indicating that there are no heterogeneous treatment eﬀects
based on these variables.10
Schools
The four identities in the experiment are from three diﬀerent schools. This is done in
order to be able to test for diﬀerences between as well as within schools. However, it
is possible that employers look up town areas where schools are located. As a conse-
quence their decision as to whether or not to send an invitation might relate to implicit
associations with these districts. To make sure the results are not inﬂuenced by this,
we present callbacks for schools separately in Table 4.6. In callback category 1 the call-
back rate for Germans is very similar and is 11.6 and 13.1% respectively. The callback
rates in the ethnic minority group are almost identical and are 6.4 and 6.2%. The same
holds for the standard deviations. For callback category 2 relative diﬀerences between
10How long after the deadline candidates received callbacks did not diﬀer for ethnicity due to a
general drop in callbacks at the end of July. There were however some ﬁrms that invited candidates
for internships again in the following year after their oﬀers had been declined in 2018.
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candidates are of a similar size. The school indicators are included in a regression with
school number 1 being the base category. Results are depicted in Table 4.A.4. Results
in (1) of Table 4.A.4 are similar to results already seen in the main estimation.11 The
coeﬃcients of the second and third school show only a small and insigniﬁcant eﬀect.
While they are only slightly more popular among recruiters it is reassuring to see that
the eﬀect sizes in (1) of school 2 and school 3 are very similar. Again, for callback
category 2 results show larger but still insigniﬁcant school eﬀects.
4.5 Conclusion
Individuals without German citizenship have only half the apprenticeship entry rate
compared to those with German citizenship (BMBF, 2018). This is explained with dif-
ferences in occupational preferences, regional labor markets, limited proﬁciency in the
German language and participation rate in internships. But what role does discrim-
ination play? Given the importance of the school-to-work transition for future labor
market prospects, it is important to understand the relevance of discrimination and to
search for solutions in the school-to-work transition.
In this paper a correspondence experiment is used to study ethnic discrimination in
the hiring market for apprenticeships in Germany. We send ﬁctitious applications with
German and Arabic-sounding names to real vacancies, augmenting applications with
a short motivational video. These video introductions by applicants serve as a simple
way of extending employer insight into the personality and motivation of applicants and
therefore solving the problem of discrimination in the hiring market for apprenticeships.
Previous experiments in German-speaking labor markets provide evidence for sta-
tistical discrimination (Kaas and Manger, 2012), taste-basted discrimination (Weichsel-
baumer, 2016a) as well as attention discrimination (Barto² et al., 2016). When statisti-
cal discrimination is an important driver for ethnic discrimination in the labor market,
one can expect higher levels of discrimination in the hiring market for apprenticeships
compared to student internships (Kaas and Manger, 2012) and other labor markets
where more work experience is preconditioned (e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004).
11The variables for the candidates names are not included as a control in this model due to them
being highly correlated with the school variables and causing collinearity.
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Results show that applications with German-sounding names receive twice as many
callbacks as those with Arabic-sounding names. This is in line with above mentioned
literature which ﬁnds that individuals without German citizenship have only half the
apprenticeship entry rate compared to those with German citizenship. Results suggest
that most of the diﬀerences in apprenticeship entry rates can be attributed to ethnic
discrimination. Providing a video in the application that gives employers more insight
into the personality and motivation of applicants increases invitations to job interviews
for Arabic-sounding names. However, since these conditional eﬀects are insigniﬁcant
we interpret the results as weak evidence of videos increasing invitations for Arabic-
sounding names. Furthermore, despite the fact that videos only had observable eﬀects
on Arabic-sounding names, the videos of German-sounding names were viewed 37%
more often compared to the Arabic-sounding names, which is in support of attention
discrimination. This results in a dilemma that additional information as well as eﬀort is
not equally valued for all applicants. An observed unequal treatment related to a ﬁrm's
educational requirements further supports this. Finally the analysis considers a ﬁrm's
regional access to applicants for an apprenticeship as well as whether possible diﬀerences
between East and West Germany are due to the recent success of a right-wing political
party in East Germany. Our results show no evidence of discrimination depending on
a ﬁrm's regional access to applicants. There is also no evidence of a higher degree of




Figure 4.A.1: Video screenshot
Note: Recruiters see video without censor bar.
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Table 4.A.1: Summary: callback category 1
German Foreign Diﬀerence
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. b t-stat Obs.
Callback category 1:
Overall 0.124 0.329 0.063 0.243 0.060∗∗∗ (6.46) 3828
Without video 0.125 0.330 0.056 0.231 0.068∗∗∗ (6.04) 2552
With video 0.121 0.327 0.076 0.266 0.045∗∗ (2.70) 1276
East Germany 0.162 0.369 0.097 0.296 0.066∗∗ (3.25) 1098
West Germany 0.108 0.311 0.050 0.217 0.058∗∗∗ (5.68) 2730
East Germany, without video 0.169 0.376 0.082 0.275 0.087∗∗∗ (3.59) 732
East Germany, with video 0.148 0.356 0.126 0.332 0.022 (0.61) 366
Occupation:
Automotive Technician 0.127 0.333 0.041 0.197 0.086∗∗∗ (4.95) 1008
Sales 0.177 0.382 0.085 0.280 0.092∗∗∗ (4.38) 1011
Oﬃce Clerk 0.091 0.288 0.064 0.245 0.027∗ (2.16) 1809
Firm size:
Less than 6 0.101 0.301 0.011 0.104 0.090∗∗∗ (4.69) 552
6 to 50 0.127 0.333 0.058 0.235 0.068∗∗∗ (5.41) 2079
51 to 500 0.114 0.319 0.082 0.274 0.032+ (1.75) 1029
501 or more 0.220 0.416 0.174 0.382 0.045 (0.73) 168
Educational Demand:
None (Keine Anforderung) 0.186 0.391 0.051 0.222 0.135∗∗ (3.08) 219
9 years (Hauptschulabschluss) 0.147 0.355 0.080 0.272 0.067∗∗ (2.76) 675
9 years+ (Erw. Hauptschulabschluss) 0.111 0.314 0.047 0.212 0.063∗ (2.31) 381
10 years (Mittlere Reife) 0.117 0.321 0.062 0.240 0.055∗∗∗ (4.80) 2436
12/13 years (Hochschulreife) 0.065 0.248 0.073 0.262 -0.008 (-0.17) 117
Month of job posting
February 0.095 0.294 0.041 0.197 0.055∗∗∗ (4.13) 1413
March 0.144 0.351 0.065 0.246 0.079∗∗∗ (3.84) 870
April 0.141 0.349 0.079 0.271 0.062∗∗ (2.82) 825
May 0.136 0.344 0.084 0.278 0.052∗ (2.23) 720
Notes: All variables refer to callback category 1. Two-sample t-test for unpaired data and heteroscedasticity
with null hypothesis of equal means performed. + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 4.A.2: Summary: callback category 2
German Foreign Diﬀerence
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. b t-stat Obs.
Callback category 2:
Overall 0.209 0.407 0.118 0.322 0.091∗∗∗ (7.68) 3828
Without video 0.204 0.403 0.116 0.320 0.088∗∗∗ (6.09) 2552
With video 0.219 0.414 0.121 0.327 0.098∗∗∗ (4.68) 1276
East Germany 0.246 0.431 0.158 0.366 0.087∗∗∗ (3.62) 1098
West Germany 0.194 0.396 0.102 0.302 0.092∗∗∗ (6.86) 2730
East Germany, without video 0.243 0.430 0.153 0.360 0.090∗∗ (3.08) 732
East Germany, with video 0.251 0.435 0.169 0.376 0.082+ (1.93) 366
Occupation:
Automotive Technician 0.198 0.399 0.095 0.293 0.103∗∗∗ (4.67) 1008
Sales 0.295 0.456 0.177 0.382 0.118∗∗∗ (4.47) 1011
Oﬃce Clerk 0.165 0.372 0.099 0.299 0.066∗∗∗ (4.18) 1809
Firm size:
Less than 6 0.144 0.352 0.047 0.213 0.096∗∗∗ (3.90) 552
6 to 50 0.219 0.413 0.106 0.308 0.112∗∗∗ (7.02) 2079
51 to 500 0.205 0.404 0.144 0.352 0.061∗∗ (2.59) 1029
501 or more 0.329 0.473 0.326 0.471 0.004 (0.05) 168
Educational Demand:
None (Keine Anforderung) 0.265 0.443 0.128 0.336 0.137∗ (2.54) 219
9 years (Hauptschulabschluss) 0.242 0.429 0.152 0.359 0.090∗∗ (2.96) 675
9 years+ (Erw. Hauptschulabschluss) 0.232 0.423 0.115 0.320 0.116∗∗ (3.03) 381
10 years (Mittlere Reife) 0.197 0.398 0.108 0.311 0.089∗∗∗ (6.14) 2436
12/13 years (Hochschulreife) 0.097 0.298 0.109 0.315 -0.012 (-0.22) 117
Month of job posting
February 0.160 0.367 0.087 0.282 0.073∗∗∗ (4.23) 1413
March 0.237 0.426 0.116 0.320 0.122∗∗∗ (4.77) 870
April 0.247 0.432 0.131 0.338 0.116∗∗∗ (4.28) 825
May 0.230 0.422 0.163 0.370 0.067∗ (2.27) 720
Notes: All variables refer to callback category 1. Two-sample t-test for unpaired data and heteroscedasticity

























































Table 4.A.3: Probability of a callback of category C2 (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Foreign -0.0911∗∗∗ -0.0916∗∗∗ -0.0983∗∗∗ -0.0991∗∗∗ -0.0996∗∗∗ -0.0990∗∗∗ -0.0993∗∗∗ -0.0882∗∗∗ -0.0964∗∗∗ -0.0914∗∗∗
(0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0221) (0.0219) (0.0218) (0.0216) (0.0216) (0.0201) (0.0226) (0.0208)
Video 0.0105 0.0106 0.0118 0.0118 0.0119 0.0119 0.0119 0.0119 0.0161 0.0054
(0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0125) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0112) (0.0196) (0.0179)
Video × Foreign -0.0084 0.0130
(0.0250) (0.0247)
Layout, Order X X X X X X X X X
Picture, Name X X X X X X X X
Firm size X X X X X
City X X X X
Occupation X X X
Educational Demand X X
HR Gender: female, unknown X X
Firm FE X X
N 3828 3828 3828 3828 3828 3828 3828 3828 3828 3828
adj. R2 0.015 0.017 0.019 0.033 0.046 0.063 0.065 0.502 0.065 0.502
Notes: OLS. Callback category 2. Signiﬁcance levels + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001, robust standard errors (in parentheses) for (1)-(7)
and (9), cluster robust standard errors adjusted for clusters at the ﬁrm level for (8) and (10).
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Table 4.A.4: Probability of a callback: schools (OLS)
(1) (2)





Video × Foreign 0.0211 0.0130
(0.0195) (0.0247)
School 2 0.0085 0.0226
(0.0132) (0.0162)
School 3 0.0065 0.0151
(0.0107) (0.0147)
N 3828 3828
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001, the cluster robust standard
errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for clusters at the ﬁrm level. Other variables included are: ﬁrm
eﬀects, pictures, layout and order.
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Table 4.A.5: Probability of a callback: job start in months (OLS)
(1) (2)





Video × Foreign 0.0215 0.0141
(0.0195) (0.0248)
Job Start interaction (Ref. category: Job Start in 6 months × Foreign):
Job Start in 5 months × Foreign -0.0012 0.0069
(0.0260) (0.0305)
Job Start in 4 months × Foreign -0.0169 -0.0099
(0.0302) (0.0356)
Job Start in 3 months × Foreign -0.0010 0.0081
(0.0329) (0.0394)
N 3828 3828
Notes: Signiﬁcance levels + p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001, the cluster robust standard errors (in
parentheses) are adjusted for clusters at the ﬁrm level. Other variables included are: ﬁrm eﬀects, job start in months
(levels), pictures, layout and order.
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